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Summary
This thesis is about performance measurement in higher education. It brings in
different stakeholders' perspectives on performance measurement, in UK universities
using data envelopment analysis. The introduction gives the background of the higher
education sector in the UK at present and its history. It introduces the drive for
performance measurement in higher education, and the motivation for the dissertation.
The method data envelopment analysis is then described.
The traditional use of performance indicators and peer assessment is reviewed and
the use of DEA, instead of parametric techniques, is justified. The opportunity to use
DEA in a somewhat different way than previously is identified.
The novel proposed framework integrates in the same analysis the perspectives of
three different levels of stakeholders. Firstly, the perspective of the applicant in the
process of choosing a university to apply to; secondly, the perspective of the State that
funds and evaluates university performance; and finally the institutional perspective. In
the applicant's perspective, the use of DEA in university selection is compared to
existing methods. The new approach devised recognises the different values of students
and is empirically tested in a case study at a comprehensive school. This chapter clearly
deals with a choice problem, and the link with MCDM is first approached. Finally, a
comprehensive decision support system that includes DEA for university selection is
arrived at.
Then the relationship between the State and higher education over time is described,
the current operational model explained and the future trends outlined. In order to
measure performance, according to the mission and objectives of the state/ funding
councils, a review of their three main remits is undertaken. The contribution of DEA to
inform the State/ funding councils in their remit is then discussed. The problem of
taking account of subject mix factor in the measurement of performance is dealt with,
by linking the input/ output divide by means of virtual weights restrictions.
It is shown how institutions can turn performance measurement to their own benefit,
by using it as a formative exercise to understand the different expectations of them, by
the two previous external evaluations. A methodology for institutional performance
management is proposed that takes into account the external/ internal interfaces: the
applicant/ institution, and state/ institution interfaces. The methodology is illustrated
with an application to the University of Warwick.
Virtual weights restrictions are widely used in this thesis, a reflection on its uses is
offered. The reasons for mainly using virtual weights restrictions instead of absolute
weights restrictions are explained. The use of proportional weights restrictions is
reviewed, and the reasons for using simple virtual weights and virtual assurance regions
in this thesis is ascertained. Alternatives to using virtual weights restrictions are
considered, namely using absolute weights restrictions with a virtual meaning. The
relationship between DEA and MCDM in this domain is elaborated upon.
Several conclusions are arrived at and novel contributions are made to the
knowledge of the subject treated: the importance of bringing in the perspectives of
different stakeholders in an integrated approach; the contribution of DEA in choice
problems; handling subject mix by means of virtual assurance regions; data availability
policy is found to be inadequate; a more appropriate way of comparing departments
within a university; and the superiority of virtual assurance regions to represent
preference structures and link the input-output divide.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
Higher education consists of degree and equivalent courses. It is financed by the
governmental budget allocated to the funding councils, following the recommendation
of the Secretary of State of the Department for Education and Employment (DfEE).
Finance from the Higher Education Funding Councils for England, Scotland and Wales
(HEFCE, SHEFC, HEFCW), and the Department for Education in Northern Ireland
(DENT) helps meet the costs of teaching, research and related activities in all publicly
funded universities and higher education colleges. In addition, institutions undertake
paid training, research or consultancy for commercial firms. The research councils
provide support for postgraduate studies and research. The funding councils carry out
assessments of the education provided by institutions, publish regular reports on their
findings and aim to ensure that any serious problems are put right by the university or
college concerned. The quality of education in the two Northern Ireland universities is
assessed by the HEFCE on behalf of the DENI. The Higher Education Quality Council
(HEQC), financed by subscription by institutions, ensured up to March 1997 that
satisfactory quality control arrangements were in place. In March 1997 a new agency -
The Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education (QAA) brought together the
quality audit and assessment functions together in a single agency.
There are some 90 universities, including the Open University. They are governed
by royal charters or by Act of Parliament and enjoy academic freedom. They appoint
their own staff, decide which students to admit, provide their own courses, and award
their own degrees.
Applications from potential students are usually made through the Universities
Colleges Admission Service (UCAS). Overseas students are provided with the services
of the British Council and UK Council for Overseas Student Affairs (UKOSA) for this
effect.
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In this thesis only the universities within the HE sector will be considered, leaving
aside a less homogeneous group of institutions that are normally smaller and more
specialised.
1.2 UK Universities at Present and their History
The universities of Oxford and Cambridge date from the 12th and 13th centuries, and
the Scottish universities of St Andrews, Glasgow, Aberdeen and Edinburgh from the
14th and 15th centuries. All the other universities in Britain were founded in the 19th
and 20th centuries (see Table 1-1) 1 . The 1960s saw considerable expansion in the
number of new universities, following the publication of the Robbins Report in 1963.
The report advocated a substantial increase in the numbers of university places and
universities. As a consequence, new universities were established and the Colleges of
Advanced Technology upgraded to university status. The development of the public
sector polytechnics was initiated in the mid-1960s and there was exceptional growth in
student numbers up to 1991. The number of universities also jumped considerably in
1992, when polytechnics and some other higher education establishments were given
the freedom to become universities and chose to exercise it.
Table 1-1: Universities in the UK
The Traditional 	 The Old Foundations
Universities
Victorian Expansion: the Federal and
Civic Universities
The 20th Century : London-based
Colleges (the second year is the date
of attaining independent status from
the University of London)
Oxford(1264) Cambridge (1284) St. Andrews (1411) Glasgow (1451)
Aberdeen (1495) Edinburgh (1583)
Durham and Newcastle (1832) Belfast (1845) London (1836) Wales
(1893) Bristol (1876) Manchester (1880) Dundee (1881) Liverpool
(1881) Leeds (1884) Sheffield (1897) Birmingham (1898)
Nottingham (1881, 1948) Reading (1902, 1926) Southampton (1902,
1952) Hull (1927, 1954) Exeter (1922, 1955) Leicester (1918, 1957)
Keele (1949, 1962)
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The Post Robbins
	 The New Universities : 'Green-Field'
	 Sussex (1961) York (1963) East Anglia (1964) Essex (1961) Kent
Expansion	 (1964) Lancaster (1964) Warwick (1965) Stirling (1967)
The New Universities : upgraded	 Aston (1966) Bath (1966) Bradford (1966) Brunel (1966) City (1966)
Colleges of Advanced Technology	 Heriot-Watt (1966) Loughborough (1966) Salford (1967) Strathclyde
(1964) Surrey (1966)
Unitary System of	 The Newer' Universities: upgraded 	 Abertay Dundee (1994) Anglia (1992) Central England, B'ham
Higher Education	 Polytechnics and Colleges 	 (1992) Bournemouth (1992) Brighton (1992) West of England, Bristol
(1992) Coventry (1992) De Monfort (1992) Derby (1992) East
London (1992) Glamorgan (1992) Glasgow Caledonian (1992)
Greenwich (1992) Hertfordshire (1992) Huddersfield (1992) Kingston
(1992) Central Lancashire (1992) Leeds Metropolitan (1992)
Lincolnshire & Humberside (1992) Liverpool John Moores (1992)
London Guildhall (1992) Luton (1993) Manchester Metropolitan
(1992) Middlesex (1992) Napier (1992) Northumbria (1992) North
London (1992) Nottingham Trent (1992) Oxford Brookes (1992)
Paisley (1992) Plymouth (1992) Portsmouth (1992) Robert Gordon
(1992) Sheffield Hallam (1992) South Bank (1992) Staffordshire
(1992) Sunderland (1992) Teeside (1992) Thames Valley (1992)
Westminster (1992) Wolverhampton (1992)
When the traditional ancient, civic and federal universities in the UK were founded
they were funded from private resources. However, following the formation of the
University Grants Committee (UGC) in 1919 as the body responsible for advising the
Secretary of State on the funding of universities there was a progressive dominance of
public funding and this remained the position for the 'old' universities until 1988.
Initially the polytechnics and colleges established in the mid-1960s received public
• funding, which was administered by Local Education Authorities in the regions in
which they were located.
The position changed radically in 1988 when the Universities Funding Council
(UFC) and the Polytechnics and Colleges Funding Council (PCFC) were established
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under the Education Reform Act 1988. In 1989, between them assumed their formal
funding responsibilities for the British universities and the polytechnics and higher
education colleges in England. Both councils were Non-Departmental Public Bodies
(NDPB) with a high degree of autonomy from the then Department of Education and
Science (DES).
In May 1991 a Government White Paper, Higher Education - a New Framework
proposed a number of substantial changes, the most significant of which was to be the
abolition of the so-called 'binary line', between the universities, and the polytechnics and
colleges; and the establishment of a unitary system of higher education. In March 1992
the Further and Higher Education Act 1992 was passed by Parliament. The principal
organisational change that resulted was the establishment of separate Higher Education
Funding Councils for England (HEFCE), Scotland (SHEFC) and Wales (HEFCW).
Funding of higher education in Northern Ireland continued to be the responsibility of
the Department of Education of the Northern Ireland Office (DENT). The HEFCE,
responsible for the funding of most UK institutions, was established formally on 2 June
1992 and it took responsibility for the funding of all higher education institutions in
England from 1 April 1993.
The establishment of the new funding agencies brought together the 'old' universities
from the UFC sector including the federal universities of London and Wales with its
major institutions, the 'new' universities (the former polytechnics) and the higher
education colleges in the PCFC sector. The Act also brought into the sector three
institutions which were previously funded directly by the Department for Education -
the Open University, the Royal College of Art and the Cranfield Institute of
Technology. Subsequently, two HE colleges were granted university status and the
major institutions of the University of London were given direct access to the HEFCE
and treated effectively as if they were independent institutions. Further, two colleges
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joined the sector from the further education sector. The new sector comprises 115
university institutions in the UK, counting separately the constituent colleges of the
federal universities of Wales and London. If Wales and London are counted as single
institutions, the total is 902.
It should be noted that the Department of Education and Science became the
Department for Education (DFE) in May 1992, when the Science Branch of the DES
(that part of the department that had been responsible for science policy and the
research councils) was transferred to the new Office of Public Service and Science as
the Office of Science and Technology (OST). In October 1995, it was created the
Department for Education and Employment (DfEE) 3 with the aim of bringing greater
coherence in the development of education and employment policies, resulting from the
consideration that the nation's future economic competitiveness depends crucially on a
workforce well equipped with basic literacy and numeracy skills.
The above developments produced a marked increase in the Age Participation Index
(API): particularly in the last few years, as seen in Table 1-2.
Table 1-2: Participation Rates
Percentage
1985/86	 1990/91	 1995/96
GB API	 14	 19	 30-32
GB API = Under 21 home initial entrants/ average number of 18
and 19 year olds in the population
The funds allocated to higher education, however, did not increase with increased
participation, which resulted in a constant erosion of unit funding, as seen by DfEE data
in Figure 1-1 (from THESIS data bank).
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Figure 1-1: Unit Costs per FTE Student
1.3 Motivation for this Thesis
The last years have seen increased pressures for efficiency and effectiveness in the
public sector in general, and in the higher education sector in particular. Since the
beginning of the eighties funding cuts have been imposed, more accountability
demanded and selectivity in the allocation of funds, increasingly dependent on the
results of performance assessment exercises, has become common policy.
The review of the literature on performance measurement in universities in chapter 2
shows the potential for the use of data envelopment analysis (DEA), a methodology that
seeks to assess.the performance of homogeneous organisational units.
This thesis is concerned with establishing a theoretical framework for the
measurement of performance in universities using DEA, considering not only the
evaluative side of the exercise, but also as a tool for the enhancement of performance
and organisational change. For this purpose, our approach explicitly takes into
consideration the existence of different universities' stakeholders and their purposes for
measuring performance, against a background of what can currently be said about their
mission and objectives. We also discuss some issues that emerge from the interaction
of the different stakeholders perspectives.
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The adequacy of current performance measures and the possible inappropriate
behavioural responses they may generate is discussed, and so is the data availability
policy currently in use.
Finally, a discussion of the use of weights restrictions in DEA, that emerge from its
use in the applications of the framework is presented.
1.4 The Method: Data Envelopment Analysis
In 1957 a paper was published in the journal of the Royal Statistical Society by M. J.
Farrell on The Measurement of Productive Efficiency 5. This paper provided the
background for data envelopment analysis.
DEA emerged during a study by E. Rhodes, under the supervision of A. Charnes and
W. W. Cooper, to evaluate the performance of an educational programme (PFT -
Program Follow Through) for disadvantaged pupils in the USA. The analysis involved
comparing the performance of a set of school districts that were participating in PFT
and a set that was not. It was the challenge of estimating the relative efficiency of the
schools involving multiple outputs and inputs, without information on prices, that
resulted in the formulation of the ratio form of DEA, known by the initials of its
developers - CCR (Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes). It was first published in 1978 in the
European Journal of Operational Research 6. Thus DEA began as a tool to measure
efficiency of public sector organisations.
1.4.1 The Concept
DEA is a method used to estimate the efficiency of homogeneous organisational
units, called decision making units (DMUs), that use the same inputs to produce the
same outputs. DEA takes the observed input and output values to form a production
possibility space, against which the individual units are compared to determine their
efficiencies. The output efficiency of a unit measures the amount by which the output
8
5_1, j =1,...,n
E, Vr and i
S. t.
where
of that unit can be increased without the need to increase the inputs. The input
efficiency is defined likewise.
The CCR model measures the efficiency of target unit Jo relative to a set of peer
units:
CCR Model
1, 140) rlo
r=i e0 = max 
u,v
V X ijo
i=1
• amount of output r from unit j,
• amount of input i from unit j,
• the weight given to output r,
• the weight given to input
• the number of units,
• the number of outputs,
• the number of inputs,
• a positive non-Archimedean infinitesimal.
It is assumed that there are n DMUs to be evaluated. Each DMU consumes varying
amounts of m different inputs to produce s different outputs. The CCR model translates
into the following: unit j0 is said to be efficient (e0=1) if no other unit or combination of
units can produce more than unit j„ on at least one output without producing less in
some other output or requiring more of at least one input.
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Figure 1-2: DEA - a graphical representation
A graphical illustration of the concept is presented in Figure 1-2. Assuming a simple
model of a university production process, there are two outputs, teaching and research,
normalised by unit of funding. The solid line in Figure 1-2 represents the frontier
derived by DEA from data on a population of universities, each producing different
amounts of teaching and research outputs per unit of input. U3, U4 and U2 are efficient
units, which are the comparators for the inefficient units they envelop. DEA optimises
on each individual observation with an objective of calculating a discrete piecewise
frontier determined by the set of efficient units (U3, U4, and U2). It contrasts with
parametric analysis, such as regression, in which the single optimised regression
equation is assumed to apply to each DMU. DEA, unlike parametric methods, does not
require any assumption about a functional form that relates independent to dependent
variables. It calculates a maximal performance measure for each DMU relative to all
other DMUs in the observed population, with the only requirement that each DMU will
lie on or below the frontier (i.e. e  1). Each inefficient DMU, not on the frontier is
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scaled against a linear combination of the DMUs on the frontier, e.g. U8', and its
measure of efficiency is given by the ratio e = 0U8/ 0U8' .
DEA produces only relative efficiency measures, since the calculations are generated
from actually observed data for each DMU. The relative efficiency of each DMU is
calculated in relation to all the other DMUs, using the observed values for the outputs
and inputs of each DMU. DEA maximises the relative efficiency score of each DMU,
subject to the condition that the set of weights obtained in this manner for each DMU
must also be feasible for all the other DMUs included in the calculation. The produced
piecewise empirical production frontier represents the best-practice production frontier -
the maximum output empirically obtainable from any DMU in the observed population,
given its level of inputs.
For each inefficient DMU, one that is enveloped by the efficient set, DEA identifies
the sources and level of inefficiency for each of the inputs and outputs. The level of
inefficiency is determined by comparison to a single or linear combination of other
efficient units that use the same level of inputs and produce the same or a higher level of
outputs. This is achieved by increasing some outputs (or decrease some inputs) without
worsening the other inputs or outputs. The potential improvement for each DMU does
not necessarily correspond to observed performance, but is indicative of potential
improvements based on the best-practice performance of 'comparable' DMUs located in
the efficient frontier.
The CCR model assumes constant returns to scale (CRS). In 1984 Banker, Charnes
and Cooper' proposed the BCC model, which relaxed the original CRS requirement of
. the CCR ratio model. The BCC model makes it possible to investigate local returns to
scale, under variable returns to scale (VRS) assumption. Under VRS assumption, DEA
can complement information about average returns to scale with DMU-specific scale
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efficiency for each DMU on the frontier. A detailed formulation of these models is
provided in the next section.
1.4.2 Basic DEA Models
The CCR model is a linear fractional model and it needs to be transformed to an
ordinary linear programme to be solved. This can be done by scaling either the
denominator or the numerator of the objective function equal to a constant such as I.
The equivalent linear programming models (multipliers formulation), and their duals
(envelopment formulation), are as follows:
Table 1-3: Input Oriented CRS
Primal	 Dual
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Table 1-4: Output Oriented CRS
Primal	 Dual
1	 1
— = min vi xtio	 --= max 00+	 s7 +EY. s r+
e0
	 0	 i=1
	
r=1
s.t.	 s.t.
From the envelopment formulation, we can see that in the input oriented models, one
focuses on maximal movement towards the frontier through proportional reduction of
inputs (by a factor h0), whereas in the output oriented models, one focuses on maximal
movement via proportional augmentation of outputs (by a factor 00). The choice of
model will depend on which factors under consideration are more easily controlled by
the DMU.
The CRS models yield an evaluation of overall efficiency, and identify the sources
and estimate the amount of inefficiency. The VRS models, on the other hand,
distinguish between technical and scale inefficiencies by estimating pure technical
efficiency at the given scale of operation, and identifying whether increasing,
decreasing, or constant returns to scale possibilities are present. Under VRS, the linear
models are as below:
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Table 1-5: Input Oriented VRS
Primal	 Dual
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Table 1-6: Output Oriented VRS
Primal	 Dual
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To illustrate what happens when the different models are used, seven example
DMUs (PI,..., P7) are shown in Figure 1-3. An inefficient DMU can be made fully
• efficient by projection onto a point (k‘ o ,fc, ) on the envelopment surface. The
particular point of projection selected will be dependent not only on the returns to scale
assumption, but also on the orientation of the model, as shown for P.5.
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Figure 1-3: Example DMUs
The difference between the CRS and VRS models is the convexity constraint
I n
A = 1 in the envelopment formulation, and the variable coo in the multiplier
formulation. The presence of the convexity constraint in the VRS models diminishes
the feasible region for the DMUs. The result is an increase in the number of efficient
DMUs: under CRS only DMU 2 is efficient, whereas under VRS DMUs 1 to 4 are. As
for the variable 03, it will define the y-intercept corresponding to the segments of the
piecewise frontier, and thus define the local returns to scale applying to each target unit,
assuming VRS. See Table 1-7 for unique optimal solutions. Multiple optimal solutions
are addressed in Banker and Thrall (1992) 8 . Under CRS, co, 0, and thus the frontier
• passes through the origin.
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Table 1-7: Local returns to scale under VRS
Increasing Constant Decreasing
co o > 0	 co; < 0
In an input oriented model, the variable ho represents the reduction applied to all
inputs of DMU jo to improve efficiency. The presence of the non-Archimedean E in the
multipliers formulation objective function allows for the minimisation of ho to pre-empt
the optimisation of the slacks. The correct algorithmic implementation requires a two-
stage approach, which is the case of the software 9 used in this thesis. Thus, the
optimisation is computed in a two-stage process, with maximal reduction of inputs
being achieved first; and then, in the second stage, movement onto the frontier is
achieved via the slack variables ( sland sr+ ), as for P6. That is: a DMU is efficient if
and only if the two conditions are satisfied h 0=1, and all slacks are zero. The non-zero
slacks and the value of h 0 1 identify the sources of inefficiencies. Under VRS, DMUs 1
to 4 are efficient and define the piecewise linear envelopment surface, the input
shrinkage and all slacks being zero projects DMU 5 onto P5' lying on the segment
P1P2.
In an output oriented model the objective is to achieve via the variable 00 as much
expansion of the outputs as possible. Additionally, as before, that might not be enough
to achieve efficiency. Thus for DMU 7, the efficient projection onto the VRS frontier
requires both an output augmentation by 0; and the slack value s7, as seen in Figure
1-3.
Under CRS the previous discussion for the role of the non-Archimedean constant
still applies, i.e. the proportional input reduction (output expansion) may not be enough
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to achieve efficiency. This is not obvious for a two-dimensional example as in Figure 1-
3, but in a multiple-input multiple-output example, slacks may be present and necessary
to reach the efficient frontier. It may even be the case that simultaneous augmentation
of outputs and reduction in inputs occurs, as seen by the expressions for the obtained
targets below.
For input oriented models:
!Jo	 0 U0 
—s7*,Vi
j=1
Yrjo = I 2L 	 = Yr +sr , Vr
j=1
For output oriented models:
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In summary, either under CRS or VRS a unit is considered efficient in an input
oriented model if and only if it is efficient in the corresponding output oriented model.
However, although the two orientations provide the same envelopment surfaces, an
inefficient DMU is projected to different points on the frontier under the input and
output orientations, and will possibly have different efficient units as peers. On the
other hand, the relationship between the CRS and VRS models is different. If a DMU is
characterised as efficient in the CRS model, it will also be characterised as efficient in
the VRS model, the converse is not necessarily true.
In conclusion, the choice of a DEA formulation requires a choice of orientation -
minimisation of inputs or maximisation of outputs, and a scale assumption - constant
returns to scale or variable returns to scale. Other models, namely additive and
multiplicative, can be found in the DEA reference text by Chames et al, (1994)1°.
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1.4.3 Incorporating Judgement or A Priori Knowledge
One of the recognised advantages of the DEA methodology is that a priori
specification of the weights (multipliers formulation) is not required, and each DMU is
evaluated in the best possible light. However, the absolute freedom given to the units to
choose their own sets of weights can have undesirable consequences. This freedom can
lead to some units appearing efficient through a judicious choice of weights, rather than
good performance. One approach to this problem is to impose weights restrictions to
curb the complete freedom under classical DEA, incorporating expert opinion, the
decision-maker's preferences, or other judgement into the analysis. Restrictions can be
directly applied to the multipliers, normally named absolute weights restrictions, or
applied to the virtuals, named virtual weights restrictions. The virtual inputs and
outputs of a DMU reveal the relative contribution of each input and output to its
efficiency rating. Virtual input/ output is the product of the input/ output level and
optimal weight for that input/ output. The higher the level of virtual input/ output, the
more important that input/ output is in the efficiency rating of the DMU concerned.
Therefore use of virtual inputs and outputs can help to identify strong and weak areas of
performance.
Proposed techniques include to impose bounds on ratios of multipliers (Thompson et
al, 198611.,) imposing upper and lower bounds on individual multipliers (Dyson and
Thanassoulis 12 , 1988), appending proportional virtual weights restrictions (Wong and
Beasley", 1990); and transforming input-output data to simulate weights restrictions
(Charnes et al.,1990 14). For more on weights restrictions see Allen et al. 199715.
In this thesis, virtual weights constraints applied to the target unit have been used to
translate a priori judgements, although the most appropriate way to implement virtual
weights restrictions is not fully resolved. In chapter 6 a discussion of the application of
virtual weights restrictions is undertaken.
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1.5 Outline of this Thesis
In this chapter, we have provided an overview of the thesis: the background of the
UK university sector and the context they operate in, the motivation for writing the
thesis, and a description of the methodology adopted.
In Chapter 2, Performance Measurement in Universities, we first undertake a review
of the use of performance measurement in UK universities and the methods used thus
far. Secondly, we justify the use of the DEA methodology instead of other methods,
and critically review the published research on the use of DEA for performance
measurement in universities. Finally we propose a new framework for the use of DEA
in performance measurement in UK universities that takes into account who is doing the
assessment, for what purpose, and which criteria are used. Briagias 'caw die assesscckeat
three different levels of stakeholders interested in the performance of universities: the
State, the institution, and the applicant, gives a global picture of UK universities
performance measurement, and how the different perspectives interact.
Chapter 3, The Applicant's Perspective, is concerned with the process of university
selection by applicants to UK universities. The appropriateness of popular league
tables, such as the Times' , in guiding applicant's choices is considered, and a case study
of applicants at a comprehensive school reported on. The contribution of DEA as a
decision support technique, which can produce customised individual league tables to
inform the potential student in his/ her choice, is illustrated. Finally it explores the
design of a decision support system for university selection using DEA with informed
judgement.
Chapter 4, The State Perspective, reviews the relationship between the State and the
higher education sector, and how the funding councils implement state policy. The
contribution of DEA to inform the funding councils on their remit of assessing quality
and allocating resources is ascertained. Some DEA models for measuring the
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performance of the university sector are proposed, and an application to the academic
year 1995/96 is described.
In Chapter 5, The Institutional Perspective, presents the institutions 'sandwiched'
between the external assessment by the two former classes and their own objectives.
The contribution of DEA to inform management is explored. First, a theoretical
framework for institutional performance management is described, that takes into
account the interfaces between its internal and external environments. Then an
application of the methodology to the University of Warwick is described.
Chapter 6, The Use of Virtual Weights Restrictions in DEA, discusses the use of
virtual weights restrictions in DEA. We have as the point of departure the work of
Wong and Beasley'', which first proposed restricting the virtuals, instead of the absolute
multipliers. The implications of their proposed three approaches for imposing
proportional virtual weights restrictions are considered. Then it discusses the use of
virtual weights restrictions in this thesis, which is somewhat different from the previous
approaches. The chapter concludes with some general principles for the implementation
of virtual weights restrictions.
The final chapter summarises the findings of this thesis, the contribution it makes for
the analysis of performance measurement in HE, the limitations of the material, and also
points to further areas of research.
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2. PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT
IN UNIVERSITIES
2.1 Introduction
The last years have seen increased pressures for efficiency and effectiveness in the
public sector in general, and in the higher education sector in particular. Since the
beginning of the eighties funding cuts have been imposed, more accountability
demanded and selectivity in the allocation of funds, increasingly dependent on the
results of performance assessment exercises, has become common policy.
Cave et al (1988) 1 report pressures for accountability of the UK higher education
system in the same way as other public services that receive money from the
Government. In 1985 the Jarratt Report 2, issued by the Committee of Vice-Chancellors
and Principals (CVCP) in conjunction with the Government and the Universities Grant
Committee (UGC), suggested that the universities should work to clear objectives;
achieve value for money; and have strong management and planning structures. The
Government would thus be concerned to ensure that universities, as much as other
public sector institutions, met objectives determined outside themselves, and
demonstrated they achieved these goals. In 1985, the Green Paper The Development of
Higher Education into the 1990s3 advocated the development of performance indicators
(PIs). By 1987 the White Paper, Higher Education: Meeting the Challenge4 proposed
the replacement of the UGC by the Universities Funding Council (UFC), that became
responsible for the distribution of funds among universities under new contract
arrangements, and a new Polytechnics and Colleges Funding Council (PCFC) was
established, which would also submit public sector institutions to a system of contract
funding. Performance would be monitored in accordance with those contracts. The
White Paper also made recommendations for quality and efficiency, including more
selectively funded research, 'targeted with attention to prospects for commercial
exploitation', and it favoured the development and use of PIs. In 1987/88 the provision
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of Government funds already depended crucially on evidence of real progress in
implementing and building upon the proposed changes.
The 1991 White Paper, Higher Education: A New Framework5, not only proposed
the end of the binary line, the establishment of the new funding councils, research
funding to be allocated entirely on a selective basis; but also introduced a new emphasis
on quality. It suggested that quality audit should be the responsibility of the institutions
and quality assessment that of the funding councils. The latter would inform funding
and be based on two approaches: first, the use of PIs and calculations of value added;
and, second, the external judgements on the basis of direct observations.
Currently there is selectivity in the distribution of resources and rationalisation, and,
when appropriate, even the closure of small departments as an incentive to better
financial management and improved standards of teaching.
2.1.1 The Introduction of Performance Indicators
The Jarratt Committee suggested a major shift in evaluation methods from subjective
peer review to performance indicators as a means of performance measurement. It
recommended explicit quantitative as well as qualitative judgements.
In 1986 the Government, CVCP and UGC agreed on a Concordat 6 that required
changes to be met for further finance to be released to universities, and outlined a set of
possible Pis. Then in 1987 their Joint Working Party listed 39 PIs for publication7
relating to both inputs and outputs in teaching and research. They were published by
the CVCP under the name University Management Statistics and P1s 8, for British
universities. The ninth and final annual volume, still for the old universities only, was
published with data (by now it listed 54 measures) for the 1992/93 academic year 9. In
1992 the Joint Performance Indicators Working Group (JPIWG) of the Committee of
Vice-Chancellors and Principals of the Universities of the UK (CVCP); the Standing
Conference of Principals (SCOP); and the Committee of Scottish Higher Education
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Principals (COSHEP); was established, to build on earlier work and develop
performance measures and indicators of both teaching and research, for the new merged
university sector. By 1993 it circulated the national totals for the number of
publications for each cost centre in 20 categories and averages for three indicatorsw.
However, institutional figures were not published and the exercise was never repeated.
In 1995 another group - Higher Education Management Statistics (HEMS)" - was
created by representative bodies of the institutions (CVCP, SCOP and COSHEP), which
was invited by the funding councils to take forward the work of the JPIWG. Later, in a
consultative document I2, it alerted institutions to the macro and institutional statistics -
note that they are no longer called PIs - that were planned to be published by the Higher
Education Statistics Agency (HESA) in 1996. It invited suggestions on health warnings
and caveats. By then it was no longer intended there should be a successor to the
Universities Management Statistics and Performance Indicators published for the old
university sector by the University Statistical Record (USR). Perhaps not surprisingly,
only the macro statistics", since the academic year 1994/95, have been published to this
date. Publication of the institutional statistics for the academic year 1995/96 has been
announced by HESA, but has not been completed yet.
This delay on agreed statistics to be published by HESA was noted in a letter by the
DfEE to HEFCE:
'would like to see progress with the setting of performance
indicators for the higher education sector as a whole' (DfEE, 1996)"
The remit of the state to inform the 'clients' of higher education and the
consequences for data availability policy will be discussed in Chapter 4.
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This difficulty of finding appropriate measures to portray institutional performance
stems from the rise of the quality movement (for a review see Cave et al, 1997) 15, and
the realisation that some qualitative issues were not being dealt with by the, often crude,
quantitative measures that had been used in the past. This argument was especially true
in the more heterogeneous unitary system of higher education, with institutions with
very different characteristics and missions. More holistic approaches were favoured,
such as the peer review of teaching and research, in the form of the teaching quality and
research assessment exercises, described in the next section.
2.1.2 Peer Assessment: Teaching and Research Assessment Exercises
In 1985 in a letter 16 to universities explaining the new resource allocation procedure,
the UGC referred to research PIs but lamented that the availability of few indicators of
teaching performance would not permit a systematic external assessment of teaching
quality to be made. It suggested that a suitable methodology for taking account of
teaching quality could be used in due course.
In May 1986 the UGC research ratings by 'cost centres' were sent to universities17
following a four-point scale: star, for outstanding, the highest rating; A+, above
average; A, average, and A-, below average. In 1989 the research selectivity exercise
(as it was then called) classified departments into one of five (instead of four)
categories. By then the published ratings 18 were already being used to inform
calculations of grant to universities. In 1992 a third research assessment exercise -
RAE 19 (now with yet another different name) took place to allocate research funds for
the new merged university sector. Subsequent funding 2° translated the one to five rating
into a funding scale of zero to four, bringing increased selectivity into the funding
system. For the 1996 RAE 21 , the new emphasis on quality rather than quantity is
translated in a key change: the details of up to four publications per researcher would be
requested for scrutiny, but not the total number of publications. Selectivity is further
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increased by translating the seven point scale (1, 2, 3b, 3a, 4, 5 and 5*) into a funding
scale of zero for the lower two ratings; each subsequent rating point attracting a weight
50% greater than the previous point, with an 20% premium for the top rating 22, instead
of the previously used linear scale.
The assessment of the quality of teaching, now known as the teaching quality
assessment exercise, took more time to develop. The Scottish council's approach to
quality assessment in 1992 included a framework that covered 11 dimensions, and all
institutions would be visited23 . In 1993 the English council outlined the purposes and
methods of its quality assessment 24. The purposes included: to ensure that higher
education was of satisfactory quality or better; to encourage improvements in quality;
and to inform funding and reward excellence. Subject areas would be assessed within
three categories: excellent, satisfactory and unsatisfactory. Assessment would comprise
scrutiny of an institution's self-assessment supported by statistical indicators; together
with an assessment visit, in the case of institutions claiming excellence, all whose self-
assessment suggested they might be unsatisfactory, and a sample of others. In 1994, the
Barnett Report 25
 proposed some changes to the HEFCE method of assessment (used
also by HEFCW, and by HEFCE on behalf of DENI), including universal visiting,
summative judgement at the threshold level, and the framing of recommendations for
improvement within a limited number of dimensions, so as to produce a profile. Thus
HEFCE announced in 1994 a new method of assessment 26, which is currently in use. It
includes the proposed universal visiting, a framework based on six core aspects of
provision, profiles structured within four grades, and an overall summative judgement at
the threshold level.
On 27 March 1997 a new agency - The Quality Assurance Agency for Higher
Education (QAA) - that brought together the quality audit and assessment functions was
established. It took over the work of the participating funding councils' quality
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assessment divisions and all the functions of the Higher Education Quality Council
(HEQC). The institutions are also represented by their representative bodies:
Committee of Scottish Higher Education Principals (COSHEP); the Committee of Vice-
Chancellors and Principals of the Universities of the UK (CVCP); the Heads of Higher
Education Institutions in Wales (HHEW); the Standing Conference of Principals
(SCOP); and the participating funding councils: the Department for Education Northern
Ireland (DENI); the Higher Education Funding Councils for England and Wales
(HEFCE and HEFCW).
The QAA has recognised that opinions are still divided over the value of audit and
assessment. However, it warned that, like it or not, institutions would be judged and
funded by their measured performance:
'As a sector, we must take steps to have the largest say in what is to
be measured and how.' (HEFCE,1997)27
In conclusion, the measurement of performance is here to stay, but institutions and
their representatives want to have a say in how it is undertaken, instead of having an
external methodology imposed on them.
In the next section the reasons for using DEA as a methodology of performance
assessment in universities are discussed.
2.1.3 Why Use Data Envelopment Analysis
As far back as 1987, Smith and Mayston 28 argued that the pursuit of efficiency in the
public sector, by publishing performance indicators for individual agencies, was fraught
with the problem of interpreting them in isolation. They then suggest the use of DEA to
show how the data underlying performance indicators can be used to generate a single
measure of efficiency for an agency, which additionally adjusts for differences in the
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environment that different agencies face. Cave eta! (1988) 1 in their review of the use of
performance indicators lament early on in the book the little use of DEA, a promising
tool, which had not been fully explored in higher education, despite its theoretical
attractions. They suggest that as more data becomes available, studies showing
consistent results when the inputs and outputs identified and other assumptions made
are changed, that DEA could have a greater impact upon assessment in higher
education. On similar lines, Smith (1990) 29 assesses developments of the use of
performance indicators in the public sector in relation to work in the private sector. It
points to regression analysis and DEA as analytic techniques available to interpret
performance indicators.
The use of regression analysis to evaluate performance in UK higher education has
been used particularly by a group of researchers at Lancaster University - G. Johnes, J.
Johnes and J. Taylor. Work has been done on the research output of universities
(Johnes, 1988 3°; Johnes, 1990 31 ; Johnes et al, 1993 32 ; Taylor, 199433 ; Taylor, 199534),
progression and completion rates (Johnes and Taylor, 1989 35 ; Johnes, 199036), student
attainment (Johnes and Taylor, 1987 37), employment and further study (Johnes et al,
1987 38 ; Johnes and Taylor, 1989 39), and unit costs (Johnes, 19904°). Most of their
findings are collected in Johnes and Taylor (1990)41 , where they also conclude that it
would be interesting and potentially valuable to compare the results of the regression
approach with those obtained using DEA. Additionally, Johnes's review (1992)42 of the
use of performance indicators in higher education, recognises the advantage of DEA as
a tool that does not involve imposing arbitrary weights. 'The method holds much
promise.' DEA has recently been used to explore the research performance of
economic departments of UK universities (Johnes and Johnes, 1993 43 ; Johnes and
Johnes, 1995 44; Johnes, 1995 45) taking advantage of the data available following the
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research assessment exercises. However, unlike what Cave et al (1988) 1 had predicted,
data on teaching performance did not become as readily available.
DEA has been compared to ratio analysis (Thanassoulis et al, 1996 46), regression
analysis (Thanassoulis, 1993 47), and subjective peer review (Doyle et al, 1996 48). DEA,
unlike performance indicators, which are difficult to interpret in isolation, generates an
aggregate performance measurement (APM) for the unit under analysis. DEA can also
set targets so that units become efficient. Unlike regression analysis, DEA allows for
multiple inputs and outputs. It is a non-parametric method, not requiring the user to
hypothesise a mathematical form for the production function. DEA measures
performance against a frontier of best observed practice, rather than average
performance. DEA can also be used as an idealised model, where units judge
themselves, consistent with policy constraints set outside themselves, as in the case of
peer review. In fact, peer review, is normally quite an expensive method of
performance assessment, which might profit from the support of quantitative methods
like DEA, specially in models that incorporate measures of quality.
In the next section the use of DEA in the context of university performance is
reviewed.
2.2 Using DEA to Measure Performance in Universities
DEA has been used to compare the relative efficiency of public and private
universities in the USA (Ahn, 1987 49; Ahn et al, 19885°; Ahn et al, 198951 ; Ahn and
Seiford, 1993 52); efficiency and perceived quality of the top national universities in the
USA (Breu and Raab, 1994 53), and the cost and value-added efficiencies of universities
in the UK (Athanassopoulos and Shale, 1997 54). DEA has also been used to compare
the overall efficiency of university departments of accounting (Tomkins and Green,
-
1988 55), chemistry and physics (Beasley, 1990 56; Beasley, 199557); the research
performance of departments of economics (Johnes and Johnes, 199343 ; Johnes and
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Johnes, 199544; Johnes, 199545), and business schools (Doyle et al, 1996 48) in UK
universities; and business and economics departments of Danish universities (Olesen
and Petersen, 1995 58); and university departments of the same university (Sinuany-Stern
et al, 199459) in Israel. Wilkinson (1991) 6° uses a modified version of DEA to deal with
incomplete data sets, either because the data is not available, or because of
'specialisation' of a decision making unit (DMU). Doyle and Green (1994) 61
 even
suggest its use in student and staff appraisal in higher education. Table 2-1 summarises
the DEA models used in these studies.
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2.2.1 Comparing universities
Ahn (1987) 	 his thesis, under the supervision of Charnes and Cooper, used and
tested DEA, for the first time, as a potential tool for use in managerial accounting in
comparison with other approaches for measuring the efficiency of higher education
institutions. DEA was applied to doctoral-granting universities in the USA, where they
used labour and capital inputs to produce three outputs: teaching as transmission of
knowledge, research as creation of knowledge, and public services to the community.
By comparing DEA results with those secured from ratio analysis supplemented by
trend analysis, DEA was found to be superior not only in raising questions but also
supplying decision aids with accompanying supporting information. The DEA results
were also compared to econometric regression studies of educational activities.
Departing from these previous studies, institutions were divided into those with and
without medical schools. For both groups, contrary to the 'statistical averaging'
approach used in the econometric studies, public universities proved more efficient than
private universities 'on average', when using DEA. The findings are summarised in
Ahn et al (1988) 5°. Ahn et at (1989)51
 then go back to Ahn's (l987)
	 for
future research to extend the study to multiple year data. Both static and one-time
portrayals are supplemented by time dependent 'window analysis', for five years of
data, as intervals between the receipt of funds and the production of results might be
needed. Another suggestion for further study in Ahn (1987)49, is pursued in Ahn and
Seiford (1993)52, which empirically examined the sensitivity of DEA to changes in
models and variable sets, while analysing the relative efficiencies of public and private
doetoral-granting institutions of higher education in the USA, for the academic year
1985-86. Four different models (CCR ratio, BCC ratio, additive, and multiplicative),
and four different variable sets, with different degrees of disaggregation of inputs and
outputs, are used. It is concluded that the DEA results strongly support the hypothesis
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that state schools are more efficient than private schools, when visible and closely
monitored output variables are used for evaluation (e.g. FTE enrolments). The reverse
is true, however, when quality-related, but loosely monitored, output variables, such as
degrees awarded or external grants (over and above state appropriations), are used as
output variables. These findings are particularly important for data availability policy,
and what exactly is being measured, which will be further discussed in Chapter 4. As to
the choice of models, without exception, the hypothesis test results were consistent
across all models and variable aggregation, thus establishing the robustness of DEA.
Breu and Raab (1994) DEA to measure the relative efficiency of the 'best' 25
US News and World Report-ranked universities. Their results indicated how DEA
might be used to measure the relative efficiency of these higher education institutions
from commonly available 'performance indicators'. The quality ranking of US News
bears an inverse relationship to a ranking implied by the narrow production efficiency
criterion DEA. In fact, we argue that the results might have been expected, because
different purposes for measuring performance were present. Just as perceived quality
indicators are useful in the context of choosing a university, efficiency indicators are
more useful in the context of administering these institutions.
In the UK, Athanassopoulos and Shale (1997) the cost and value-added
efficiencies of 'old' universities, thus recognising that different objectives exist in the
context of university performance measurement, which might or might not be in
conflict. Unlike the previous US-based studies, absolute freedom of weights is rejected.
They use virtual weights restrictions in their models for three purposes. First, so that no
factors in the model are ignored. Second, to translate value judgements, such as state
imposed policies on funding. Third, to reflect the association between certain inputs
and outputs, such as the contribution of one input to more than one output, for instance.
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2.2.2 Comparing university departments
Tomkins and Green (1988) DEA, for the first time, to evaluate the efficiency
of university departments. At the time, there was much concern in the UK over the
efficiency of universities, and the UGC was, for the first time, in the process of
evaluating academic departments. The study was done for departments of accounting,
to test the suitability of DEA for such an evaluation, as some government agencies were
considering its use. They present results for six models, defined using varied input/
output measures, with good stability of results. They realised that their DEA analysis
does not evaluate quality, and conclude that if DEA cannot completely replace
judgement, at least would be able to inform it. Another advantage they found is that
because 'universities cannot easily find a niche to opt out of the competition' they are
particularly suitable DMUs for a DEA assessment, which allows for total freedom of
weights.
Taking a different view, Beasley (1990) 56
 presented a DEA model for comparing
university departments of chemistry and physics for the academic year 1986-87. He
highlighted the fact, that contrary to previous mostly data-driven exercises, it is
important to consider the conceptually correct data to be used in a DEA model, to
deduce what data should be available. This theme will be further discussed in Chapter
4. In a departure from the Tomkins and Green (1988) some measures of quality
are introduced, and the relative importance of different measures translated with
weights restrictions on the virtuals. The problem on how to consider research income is
debated, and the opposite view to Tomkins and Green (1988) 55 is taken. Whilst
evaluating the success of a department in attracting research income may be important
(as considered by Tomkins and Green, 1988 55), Beasley regarded it as equally, or more
important, to evaluate how effective a department is at converting this money input into
outputs. He did consider research income also as an output (which has the perverse
effect of double counting), but only as a proxy of quantity of publication, in the absence
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of this information for the disciplines concerned. We argue that this debate has to do
with the reason why the assessment is being done in the first place, which will be
discussed later in this chapter. In his defence for comparing departments of the same
discipline, Beasley argued against the legitimacy of comparing university departments
concerned with different disciplines with each other (as for instance in Sinuany-Stern et
al, 199459). He also found the comparison of entire universities misleading, as the
results obtained may have nothing to do with efficiency, but may be due to the different
balance and mix of disciplines present in different universities. It is for this reason that
Ahn (1987)49, Ahn et al (1988) 5°, and Ahn and Seiford (1993) 52 considered universities
with and without medical schools separately, and Athanassopoulos and Shale (1997)54
investigated the science/ non-science divide. Unlike Tomkins and Green (1988)55,
Beasley thought that the use of weights restrictions improves the model, by translating
the relative importance of input/ output measures, although he is not quite clear to
whom.
Using data for UK universities Wilkinson (1991) 60 used a modified version of DEA
to compare the performance of one cost centre, and one academic subject group, taking
into consideration their 'specialisation'. This entails the elimination of one or more
variables in the analysis for a particular DMU or set of DMUs and the re-calculation of
the performance profile pertaining to those DMUs. The issue of effectiveness is dealt
with by weights restrictions, although, as with Beasley, it is not clear who defines these.
Following the 1989 UFC Research Selectivity Exercise, Johnes and Johnes (1993)43
measured the research performance of UK economics departments using DEA. They
used a data set which included, not only the data available to the UFC panel, but also
full bibliographic details for the years 1984-88. Unlike the UFC peer group, which
might have imposed upon all departments its own subjective judgement, DEA uses the
available quantitative information in a purely objective manner. 192 DEA runs were
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performed for different input/ output sets, and, as in previous studies, they concluded
that the sensitivity of DEA to changes in the input/ output specification was remarkably
small. From the 192 runs, two clusters of efficiencies, using cluster analysis, emerged;
the distinguishing feature being the inclusion of per capita research grants as an input.
They strongly favoured the view that grants are an input and not an output, but do
include grants as an output in some models to acknowledge different perceptions of
relative research performance by different people. In fact, efficiency scores generated
by models with grants as an input are generally weakly correlated with the UFC's
research rating, which contrasts with a strong correlation exhibited by efficiencies
derived from models in which per capita research grants are an output. One might then
be tempted to infer from these results that the UFC peer review group might have
implicitly considered grants as an output rather than an input. Other conclusions are:
firstly, the lack of relationship between the efficiency scores and size of department,
which is in line with the CRS model used; and secondly, there is only limited evidence
(statistically significant only for some models) that efficiency scores are lower for
departments located outside England.
Johnes and Johnes (1995)44 continued to use DEA to further investigate the technical
efficiency of UK university departments of economics as producers of research. They
departed from the 192 DEA runs in their previous paper 43, choosing three different
models to analyse. These models included, unlike in the previous paper, one weight
restriction, which accounts for the fact that papers in core journals are considered to be
of better quality. As before, they found no relationship between measured performance
and size for all models. In the first model, the comparison between the efficiency scores
reported and the UFC ratings, obtained by informed peer review, indicate that the
correspondence is tolerably close. This suggested that a department's performance, as
viewed by the peers, is determined largely by the per capita rates of publication in
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academic journals, especially the core journals. The second model introduces the value
of external research grants per faculty member as a second input into the research
production function. As a result, the correlation coefficient obtained between the
efficiencies scores and the UFC rating becomes significantly lower than in the first
model. Again they argued that if peers consider both grants and publications to be
indicative of high research productivity, then they are guilty of double counting, for
some of the publications would not have been possible without the favourable research
environment created by the grants. Finally, in the third model, the per capita annual
number of hours spent on each of three activities: UG teaching, PG teaching, and PG
research supervision, is subtracted from an arbitrary constant in order to arrive at a
measure of time available for research by each faculty member. The results obtained,
however, are very similar to those of the first model.
Ultimately, they raised the problem that if all possible inputs into the production
process were included in the analysis, then all DMUs would likely appear to be
technically efficient. They did not explicitly recognise that what the UFC was
measuring is not necessarily the same as their concept of technical efficiency. It will be
later argued in this chapter that precisely because of that, one needs to know who is
doing the assessment and for what specific purpose. However, as Johnes and Johnes
pointed out the successful execution of a DEA requires that appropriate and consistent
data is available, which is not always the case.
Following his work of determining overall efficiency scores for departments of the
same discipline56, Beasley (l995) 57 considered the problem of how to split joint inputs
and outputs between the teaching and research activities in some optimal way. In doing
so, he estimated the efficiency with which a given department carries out each activity.
Considering this problem highlights the issue of how to determine efficiencies when
resources are shared between different activities, and a non-linear approach to this issue
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based upon DEA was presented. This approach, while having wider applicability, is
useful in the context of university performance measurement, as previous studies have
shown there is a need for obtaining separate measures for the two university functions
of teaching and research.
Johnes (1995) 45 provided an update for the analysis of Johnes and Johnes (1993)43
with the RAE data collected by the funding councils in 1992, to study the relative
performance of 60 UK university departments of economics. The paper is innovative in
two ways: first, the analysis is the first to include the new universities; second, scale
efficiency along with technical efficiency is dealt with. Johnes' paper discussed three
sets of DEA runs (see Table 2-1). The overall efficiency scores obtained for the first
simple model exhibit a weak correlation with the outcome of the funding councils' peer
review process. The introduction of income from research council grants as an output
in the second model had a dramatic effect on the overall efficiency scores, and markedly
improved the correlation between the efficiency scores and the results of the peer
review. This analysis confirmed their similar findings for the 1989 UFC review. In the
third model, an example was given with disaggregation of inputs and outputs. The
correlation between the efficiency scores thus produced and the outcome of the peer
review process was somewhat weaker than that achieved in the case of more
parsimonious models. For the author, this indicated that some departments deemed to
be relatively weak performers by the peer review group performed relatively well as
producers of the output types which have been added to the third model. This would
provide evidence in support of the popular perception that books and chapters in books
count for little in the peer group's assessment of economics departments' research
performance. However, they failed to analyse the confounding effect of the
disaggregation of the input set. As to the issue of scale, they found some evidence that
some of the larger departments in the sample suffered from scale diseconomies even
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though they appeared to be technically efficient, whereas some departments which were
of sub-optimal size were also technically efficient. The latter currently may not be
receiving comparable rewards by the funding councils. We shall argue that by using
BCC, while advocating that it is a more 'advanced' model than CCR, is misleading. In
fact, it represents different assumptions regarding returns to scale, and thus the results
of the 1993 study cannot be compared with the 1995 one. It would be interesting to
know the results of the 1995 study had the CCR model also been used.
Olesen and Petersen's (1995) 58 application serves to illustrate a model they devised
that can provide estimates of the sensitivity of efficiency scores regarding an unknown
amount of noise in data. Their conclusions related to the model itself, and not to the
evaluation of the departments and policy implications that might have been derived.
On the other hand, Doyle et al (1996) 48 built on the work of Johnes and Johnes
(l993) 	 Johnes (l995) 	 examine the judgements made by a panel of experts,
during the RAE92, about the research rating of UK business schools during 1988-1992.
Doyle et al., though, departed from the Johnes' orientation in using DEA in the
traditional economic way of estimating production functions for the departments, to use
DEA in an operational research approach, as a decision analysis tool. They used policy
capture to determine, and critically evaluate, how business schools were judged. They
then suggested methods to improve the process of judgement, principally using
modified CCR62 (the unit under evaluation is not included in the reference set, which
allows for the ranking of efficient units) as an idealised model whereby the judged
institutions judge themselves, consistent with 17 policy constraints. The paper was
particularly innovative, in relation to the others above, in that it explicitly addresses the
issue of who is doing the assessment, and for what purpose. They compared the panel's
apparent decision criteria against the guidelines laid down by the UFC for the conduct
of the RAE92. By using DEA to model the judgement of the panel, they suggested that
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future panels might like to consider it as a decision support tool, which may improve the
quality and defensibility of their judgements. To make explicit what would otherwise
remain implicit, allows the decision makers to look for unwarranted policies, which may
have crept into their judgemental processes. An example of an unwarranted policy to
which the panel has fallen prey, according to the paper, is insular mentality: English
universities, old-established universities, the panel's own university, and British
journals are favoured; as are large institutions. The DEA model, however, simulates a
panel consisting of one member from each of the to-be-judged institutions, who is
authorised to behave in a totally partisan manner in suggesting which of the
performance indicators is important to their institution, and at the same time having to
comply with externally imposed, or logically necessary set of policies. In the DEA
results, old universities still performed better, and so did the panel institutions to a
lesser extent. However, neither English, nor larger departments performed better. They
concluded for the superiority of the model of the judge over the judge: 'The modelling
process works because, given sufficient examples of judgements to estimate the judge's
policies, the 'noise' of inconsistency of the judge may be removed.'
2.2.3 Appraisals of academic staff and students
Doyle and Green (1994)61 made an experiment of applying DEA to the problem of
student and staff appraisal in higher education. The subject is not strictly in the remit of
this thesis, however, they do attempt to address some of the questions considered
important in this thesis. They not only discussed the technique itself but also discussed
the wider implications of having and using such a technique to assist appraisal.
Namely, whether to appraise and for what purpose, what to take into account, how to
measure it, and finally how to combine it. They conceded, for instance, in the debate
whether research income is an input or an output, that different people, at different
times ('perhaps with different hats on') will take different views. They did focus,
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though, mainly on the question of how to use DEA to sensibly combine different
appraisal criteria.
,
2.3 The Approach of this Thesis: Bringing in The Stakeholders
Perspective
As seen from the review above, previous DEA studies typically do not explicitly
address the existence of different levels of stakeholders interested in the performance of
universities. Here, a theoretical framework for the measurement of performance in
universities using DEA, considering not only the evaluative side of the exercise but as a
tool for the enhancement of performance and organisational change is developed. For
this purpose the approach takes into consideration the existence of different
universities' stakeholders and their purposes for measuring performance, against a
background of what can currently be said about their mission and objectives.
Universities, as with any other organisations, serve a variety of stakeholders, defined
as individuals or groups of individuals who have a stake or interest in the continued
survival and high performance of the organisation (see Mittroff, 1983 63). The final
report" by the Joint Performance Indicators Working Group (JPIWG) identifies the
customers for the statistics to be published by HESA and their principal needs. The
customers they identify include: higher education institutions, Government, funding
councils, students, employers and the public at large.
For the HEMS, the repository of the latter JPIWG, the prime purpose is to identify
statistics for use by institutions in their internal management and, in addition, to
produce sector-level information for use in reporting on the sector as a whole. Hence,
.we can already identify an attempt to address the issue of performance measurement for
different customers. Whether the measures provided are adequate is a matter of debate
that will later be addressed (see Chapter 4).
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Previous research has traditionally ignored the existence of many of these
'customers' - stakeholders of the higher education sector - when assessing universities'
performance. Some studies adopt an economic perspective of labour and capital inputs
producing research, teaching and public service outputs. Others take a partial view,
such as The Times Good University Guide", which claims a student perspective.
Finally there is a panoply of partial studies that concentrate only on research or teaching
across a particular subject, and that are often driven by data availability rather than by a
reflection of what should be measured, for which purpose, and for whose interest.
In our approach we shall differentiate between three different levels of stakeholders
for the purpose of universities' performance measurement in the UK (Table 2-2). One
can argue that Government represents the wider society and that the funding councils
implement governmental policy, and hence can be aggregated at the same level: the
State perspective. At another level, we have the institutions (constituted by departments
with its staff and students), which hold a good degree of autonomy, but are also
accountable for state funds: the institutional perspective. Finally, we consider the
potential student who is in the process of choosing a university: the applicant
perspective.
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Table 2-2: Three perspectives in universities performance measurement
Perspectives Stakeholders
State	 Employers and society in general
Government
Funding councils
Institutional	 Institutions
Departments
Students
Applicant	 Potential students
According to Mitroff (1985) 63, stakeholders are all those interest groups, parties,
actors, claimants, and institutions - both internal and external to the corporation - that
exert a hold on it. Corporations face complex, messy problems, for which there are
often many equally promising solutions and not just one 'best' solution accepted as such
by all stakeholders. We can build an analogy, by considering the higher education
system as the corporation with the diffuse 'problem' of performance measurement to be
solved. The point is that different stakeholders do not generally share the same
definition of an organisation's 'problems' and hence, they do not in general share the
same 'solutions'. A method is needed that acknowledges different perspectives since it
informs us of different options, and ideally works toward a final point of shared
commitment to a set of possible solution alternatives. For that reason, having
determined three different standpoints, the following questions need investigation:
• What are the mission/objectives of the different stakeholders?
• What is their purpose for measuring performance?
• What measures are necessary to that end?
• What issues emerge from the interaction of the different perspectives?
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The different perspectives of the stakeholders result from the existence of different
missions and objectives within the sector, and lead to different purposes of performance
measurement. Performance measurement is often used in a formative way. Institutions,
for instance, measure their performance to establish targets and to benchmark
themselves against other performers in order to enhance their performance. It can also
have a summative purpose of evaluation, when used for the allocation of funds by the
State depending on merit, or in the choice of a university by an applicant.
To serve the different purposes for measuring performance, different criteria will be
required. As an example of this diversity and considering student accommodation,
students will be interested in good quality convenient accommodation at a reasonable
price. Institutions will additionally be concerned about the level of income from
university accommodation, whilst the funding councils will primarily be concerned with
the overall cost effectiveness and efficiency of the institutions.
We address these questions in the following sections, starting with the external
perspectives on university performance: the applicant and the State perspectives, and
finally with the internal vs. external evaluations: the institutional perspective.
2.3.1 The Applicant's Perspective
It is generally assumed that the potential student wants to gain a qualification that
will provide him/ her with good job and life skills, apart from having an enjoyable
extended period of personal and social development.
The potential student will want to select an adequate university, 'a place to live,
work, sleep and play for three or four years', to achieve his/her objectives. However,
different prospective students will put different emphases in different parameters when
choosing a university.
One of the most popular sources of information that attempts to assess universities'
performance from the perspective of the potential student is The Times Good University
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Guide. It claims to give a balanced picture of UK's universities in order to provide
reference material for students choosing an undergraduate degree. The volume for
199665 rated universities according to ten criteria: entry points, student/ staff ratios,
,
library spending, student accommodation, teaching assessment, firsts awarded, research
ratings, and value added. Then it produced an aggregate performance measure for each
university, based on equal weights given to the different factors, allowing for the
construction of a league table. For the 1997 edition value added was dropped because it
was considered to be an unreliable measure at that point. A different weighting scheme
was also introduced to supposedly reflect different concerns of the prospective
undergraduate: teaching and research assessments were given weighting of 2.5 and 1.5
respectively, compared to 1 for the rest of the indicators.
The Times guide defends that students have a right to 'more objective' information
than is provided by university publications. This is probably true to some extent. We
shall argue, however, that different students will use different criteria when assessing
universities and will have different preference structures relating to the criteria used.
From this assumption the effectiveness of 'one-suits-all' league tables as an aid to
university selection in questioned. For instance, Alomenu (1994) 66, a mature student at
Nottingham University, does not think that the information provided is the most
appropriate:
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'Out of the Times headings, the only factors that were important to
me were student accommodation and future employment prospects. The
other factors didn't affect my choice. My choice of Nottingham was
'
based on the type of course and its quality as perceived from entrance
literature and the university's prospectus. Further impressions were
gained from my interview, from an alternative prospectus and from
talking to a student at the campus.'
In the face of this account two questions arise:
• If the guides, like the Times', are not giving the information required to potential
students, what information should be provided?
• Is there an archetypal student, or should we be catering here for different potential
students, with different profiles and consequently needing a different set of measures
to cover all tastes?
These questions shall now be addressed based upon what is known about student
behaviour and consumer behaviour in general. The choice of a university by a
prospective student can be considered a form of complex decision-making behaviour,
which is classified by consumer behaviourists (Dibb et al, 199467) as an 'extensive
decision-making process'. This procedure comes into play when a purchase, here the
choice of a university, involves an unfamiliar, expensive and infrequent acquisition.
The buyer, in this case the prospective student, uses many criteria to evaluate alternative
choices and spends much time seeking information and comparing universities before
deciding on the 'purchase'. Students will have already some information in their
memory about universities they may choose. If that is not enough to make a decision
they will search for additional information. An individual's personal contacts - friends,
relatives, associates - are often viewed as credible sources of information, because the
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student trusts and respects them. Utilising the university dominated sources of
information, which include prospectuses and open-days, is another possibility. Students
can also obtain information from public sources; for instance, Government reports,
'
news stories, or guides such as the one published by the Times. To evaluate the
universities, the student establishes certain criteria, by which to compare, rate and rank
the different alternatives. However, the greater the quantity of information available,
the higher the probability becomes that the student may be overloaded with information,
become confused and make a poorer choice. It is for this reason that it is important to
improve the quality of the information, to stress the features important to different
students, such that they are able to make an informed decision, helping them make a
better 'acquisition'. According to consumer behaviourists, three major categories of
influences are believed to affect the consumer buying decision process: personal,
psychological and social factors. Personal factors such as demographic factors,
situational factors and level of involvement are unique to a particular person. Individual
characteristics such as age, gender, ethnic origin, income, family life-cycle may
influence the choice of a university. Therefore, it is essential to answer the second
question above. What measures do different students need to choose a university?
Some studies (Keen and Higgins, 199068 and 199269; Roberts and Higgins, 19927();
Allen and Higgins, 1994 71 ) have concluded that different kinds of students have
different criteria, or at least weight the criteria differently, when choosing a university.
For instance, comparing mature with traditional applicants, shows that mature students
are more concerned about distance from home, whereas traditional students give greater
consideration to the nature of the town/ city in which the institution is based. When it
comes to entry qualifications, these play a less important role for mature students, since
they are usually faced with a situation where they will be accepted without formal
qualifications. Even among traditional applicants it would be expected that the weight
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of the entry grades will vary. A high flyer, who is expecting top A-level grades, will
find it easier to be accepted in almost any university; whereas for a less able student the
A-level grades will be a stronger constraint to finding a place at a university.
Differences will also be encountered when comparing homel overseas and
undergraduatel postgraduate students.
2.3.2 The State Perspective
The objectives of the Government/ funding councils normally refer to the pursuit of
wide participation4 in higher education at value-for-money for a better educated and
trained workforcen, and to serve the economy more efficiently 5, by achieving greater
commercial and industrial relevance73' 74 in higher education activity. Lately, the
introduction of market forces5 into the higher education system has been vigorously
pursued: universities are expected to compete for students, state funds, and other
external income.
There is clearly a main evaluative purpose in measuring the efficiency and
effectiveness of the use of public funds distributed by the funding councils for teaching
and research. These measures provide the funding councils with information to support
their operational requirements in the allocation of resources. On the other hand, there is
a secondary purpose of informing the institutions delivering higher education, the
Government, the funding councils, students, employers and the public at large, of the
performance of institutions and higher education in general. This allows the institutions
to benchmark themselves against other institutions (a formative purpose of performance
measurement); the Government to monitor the pursuit of its policy for the sector; and
the potential students to make more informed choices.
The funding councils, in conjunction with HESA, currently collect data for the
construction of performance measures at sector (published") and institutional level (not
fully published yet) relating to teaching, research, and finance. For each type there is an
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impressive array of measures that would be cumbersome to list and analyse individually
here. Instead some general observation on classes of measures are made.
Macro indicators refer to the nature of applicants and admissions, participation in
higher education, description of student population, progression, costs, length of higher
education experience, qualifications obtained, first destinations of graduates, impact on
general population; and finance statistics for the whole sector. These and institutional
financial profiles have already started to be published. Institutional statistics for the
teaching activity will comprise: student progression rates, exit qualifications, and
employment destinations. Research indicators will comprise: different sorts of research
output, research students, and external research income.
The deficiencies of quantitative measures are somewhat addressed by the measuring
of quality through the teaching quality assessment and research assessment exercises.
The method of peer review used in those exercises ensures that the volume of activity
has passed a test of quality. Nevertheless, comparisons are made only within subject
areas and relative performance is not valid across different disciplines, leaving inter-
institutional comparisons difficult to make. The measures are mostly output measures,
and little account is taken of the input side. Value for money, the much cherished
governmental objective, is in fact very difficult to assess, since it is hard to assign a
value to the different forms of output, and no account is taken to inputs in the sort of
measures available. As to value added, there are problems with the comparability of
outputs, such as exit qualifications. Some argue that the system of external examiners
in place, does not enforce completely the supposed comparability of qualifications
across universities. To standardise and ensure comparability between exit qualifications
is, in fact, one of the remits of the new Quality Assurance Agency.
Finally, it is doubtful whether the stated purpose of informing other stakeholders of
the sector are being met. Students that are in the process of choosing a university will
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not have information from this source on special needs provision, health care,
counselling services, cost of living and accommodation, or availability of places in halls
of residence, for instance. When it comes to institutions, care is needed before official
management statistics can be converted to relevant measures of performance, since
close attention must be paid to their individuality in relation to their missions.
2.3.3 The Institutional Perspective
The universities are usually intuitively categorised on the basis of their age and
subject orientation into different groupings: ancient (English and Scottish), civic or
redbrick (old and newer, with the two federal universities, London and Wales,
sometimes treated separately), technological, and modern or plate glass. Some authors
(King, 197075 ; Dolton and Makepeace, 198276 ; Tight, 198877) have used multivariate
techniques - such as cluster analysis, factor analysis and discriminant analysis - to arrive
to typologies of universities. These typologies, although different in detail, have
confirmed the existence of five major groups of universities: London, Oxbridge, civic,
technological and campus, to which we have added the new universities group (see
Table 2-3).
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Table 2-3: Universities typology (based in Tight, 1988)
Grouping	 Description
London	 Other than its size , its major distinguishing characteristic is the high
'
percentage of students taking medical courses.
Oxbridge Though sharing a number of characteristics with the civic group, it is
distinctive in its emphasis on languages and other arts subjects, its
extensive residential provision, its large proportion of postgraduate
students, and in the numbers of them who are pursuing research as
opposed to taught courses.
Civic These universities have an above average number of undergraduates, a
significant involvement in medical education, and a below average
proportion of income from research grants and contracts.
Technological These are of average size, with an heavy emphasis on engineering and
professional/ vocational subjects, correspondingly low provision of
languages and other arts subjects, and a high proportion of male
students.
Campus These institutions are characterised by their concentration on the study
of education, social studies, languages and other arts subjects. They
have an above average proportion of students in residence, average or
below average enrolments, and a low proportion of income derived
from research grants and contracts.
New	 The former polytechnics that chose to become universities following
universities The Further and Higher Education Act 1992. They tend to have fewer
postgraduate students and in terms of subject split, they have fewer
students studying medicine, science and languages, and more in
education, engineering and social studies.
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Regardless of the fact that each university might have its own mission and
objectives, they generally address similar issues. First of all, they will want to attract
students; then to develop competencies in them, while placing different emphases on
research/ teaching, regional/ national scope, vocational/ academic courses; and finally,
to survive as an organisation.
Emergent issues result from the interaction of the different perspectives on
universities' performance. Higher education seeks to meet multiple objectives, for
instance, good quality teaching and research; and as it pushes to extremes of excellence
on one of these objectives, it increases the probability of not meeting the constraints on
others. Similarly, the conflict between stakeholders might occur:
The clash between the Government conception of the university,
and the universities' own conception of the university, is actually quite
central to contemporary British life.' (Cowen, 1991)78
'educational institutions will have to learn to understand the
motives of students just as businesses have to understand their
markets.' (Preston et al., 1992)79
On one hand, universities have to meet goals and objectives set outside themselves
by their sources of financial support, the funding councils. Regardless of each
university's methodology for defining what is good performance and how to monitor it,
they will always be accountable to the public through the funding councils. On the
other hand, they will have to satisfy the demands of their market - the students, that will
demand the use of increased resources. At institutional level, the evaluation that a
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university makes of its constituent departments, will have to take into account the
external evaluation by applicants and the state (see Figure 2-1).
State	 Institutional	 Applicant
perspective	 perspective	 perspective
external	 internal	 external
evaluation	 evaluation	 evaluation
Figure 2-1: Two internal/ external interfaces of institutional evaluation
The two external perspectives will affect the internal performance measurement and
control system that allows an institution to correct its behaviour and keep in line with its
stated missions. Dyson et al (1994) 80 explain this mechanism of performance
measurement and control (see Figure 2-2). Each university defines a mission statement
according to the direction it wants to follow. This mission statement then needs to be
operationalised into more detailed objectives to be achieved. A set of performance
measures are defined to monitor the pursuit of the objectives. According to the results
obtained targets may be set to reflect priorities emergent from the mission statement. At
this point, behavioural responses in the organisation may be required to accomplish the
targets, resulting in an organisational change and ultimately leading to an improved
direction.
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Figure 2-2: Performance Measurement and Control (Dyson et al, 1994)
Through browsing the different institutions' mission statements 81 , a large number
appear surprisingly similar. This leads one to question whether these are to a large
extent for external use as a 'selling' slogan, to please their funding sources and their
perceived market.
2.4 Concluding Remarks
The drive for efficiency in the public sector, which started in the eighties, has been
extended also to the higher education sector. Universities, as never before, have been
subjected to external performance assessment. The drive for assessment came first from
the government, who demanded accountability for the resources supplied, and increased
efficiency in a time of reducing budgets, and expansion of student numbers. Second,
applicants, faced with decreasing generosity from the government in distributing grants,
have also increasingly judged their choice of a university more carefully. Universities
are jammed in the middle of the external evaluation placed on them, and their own
internal assessment for the pursuit of their own objectives.
After surveying the literature on performance measurement in universities, the
advantage of using DEA instead, or in conjunction, with PIs, peer assessment, and
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regression methods is assessed. However, previous DEA analyses of the university
sector performance fail, in general, to acknowledge the existence of different levels of
stakeholders interested in the measurement of performance. It is ascertained that the
,
interaction of these different levels should be explored. Thus the thesis proposes a
framework for the use of DEA to measure performance bringing in the different
perspectives on university performance measurement. 	 The application of the
framework to the different perspectives is described in the next three chapters.
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3. THE APPLICANT'S PERSPECTIVE
3.1 Introduction
Every year applications from potential students are made through the Universities'
and Colleges' Admission Service. Overseas students are also provided with the services
of the British Council and UK Council for Overseas Student Affairs. This chapter is
concerned with the process of university selection by these applicants.
The appropriateness of the Times' league table in guiding applicant's choices is
considered, and a case study of applicants at a comprehensive school reported on. The
contribution of data envelopment analysis as a decision support technique which can
produce customised individual league tables to inform the potential student in his/ her
choice is illustrated. The last section explores the design of a decision support system
for university selection using DEA with informed judgement.
3.2 The Applicant's Perspective
The starting assumption is that generally the potential student wants to gain a
qualification that will provide him/ her with good job and life skills, and also experience
an enjoyable extended period of personal and social development.
The potential student will want to select an appropriate university, 'a place to live,
work, sleep and play for three or four years', to achieve his/ her objectives. It must be
borne in mind, however, that different prospective students will put different emphases
on different parameters when choosing a university.
One of the most popular sources of information that attempts to assess universities'
performance from the perspective of the potential student is The Times Good University
Guide'. It claims to give a balanced picture of UK universities in order to provide
reference material for students choosing an undergraduate course.
It has been argued that different students will use different criteria when assessing
universities and will have different preference structures relating to the criteria used.
From this assumption the effectiveness of The Times Good University Guide (1996) as
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an aid to university selection is considered, and the contribution of DEA as a more
appropriate tool for performance measurement in this instance demonstrated.
3.3 DEA and university selection 	 ,
The previous section has identified the applicant's interest in the performance of
universities as being concerned with criteria related to the choice of university, and the
current selection system (1996/7) allows applicants to apply to up to six universities, or
more strictly apply for six programmes. The Times Good University Guide aims to give
a balanced view of British universities and provides information to help applicants make
an informed choice. The main feature of the guide is a table ranking the universities in
order of merit based on data presented in the book. The data relate to ten performance
indicators (Table 3-1) and each university is given a score in the range 1 to 100 on each
indicator. The scores are then added together to form an aggregate score, which is then
used to form the rankings (Table 3-2). The method of aggregation, in which the scores
are given equal weights, assumes equal importance of the criteria, apart from the
existence of any major differences in the spread of scores within an indicator, which
would implicitly give greater weight to criteria for which the spread of scores is greater.
The ten performance indicators are as in Table 3-1:
71
Table 3- 1: The Times 1996 performance indicators
Performance Indicator	 Description
Entry points This is a figure for the number of A-level or equivalent points required for entry averaged over
the different subject mixes. Where a university takes many students with non-standard
qualifications such as access courses, the score will be lowered'.
Student/ staff ratios This measure is the ratio of full-time equivalent students to full-time equivalent teaching staff.
Research contract staff and academic related staff are excluded from the calculation. The
score for an institution may be biased by subject mix, as some subjects are resourced at a
higher level than others.
Library spending This includes spending on materials and staffing but not on capital costs. The copyright
libraries of Oxford and Cambridge receive consequentially high scores although
undergraduate students in particular may well not perceive benefits commensurate with the
scores. The wide spread of scores for this measure implicitly gives it a greater than equal
weight.
Accommodation	 This indicates the proportion of full-time students who can be accommodated in facilities
owned or controlled by the university.
Teaching assessment	 This measure uses information obtained from the teaching assessments although not all
subjects have yet been assessed.
Firsts This is based on the proportion of first class degrees awarded and should be treated with
caution as it is mainly controlled by the home institution of the student, although the external
examiner system aims to ensure consistency of standards.
Research ratings	 This uses information from the Research Assessment Exercise to provide a measure of the
quality of research. This measure may be more relevant to postgraduate students.
Value added This measure is a ratio of an aggregation of completion rates, firsts and employment figures
to average entry qualifications. This measure implicitly treats entry qualifications as an input
and yields higher scores for those institutions that take in students with lower qualifications
and enhance their performance in terms of qualifications and employment.
Overseas students The score here is the proportion of students from overseas, and will be of particular interest
to overseas students and may also be a measure of the international standing of an
institution.
Employment This measure is based on the status of students six months after graduation, and is
composed from the percentages in permanent employment, unemployed and going on to
research or further study. The proportion in permanent work is weighted most heavily in the
overall measure, whilst those in temporary work are excluded, and there is no discrimination
between different types of jobs.
It is worth noting that the guide is primarily about first degrees, and that wholly or
largely postgraduate institutions such as the London Business School, the Royal College
of Art, and Cranfield Institute of Technology are excluded.
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Table 3-2: The Times ranking of universities 1996 - top of the table
entgrad staffstud libspend accomm teachass overstud firsts gradempl research valadd Total Rank
Cambridge 100 93 69 91 100 55 100 86 100 51 845 1
Oxford 98 75 100 86 97 60 66 99 98 60 840 2
Imperial 76 100 44 34 96 65 74 77 - 97 56 719 3
Edinburgh 72 74 35 40 93 56 45 77 94 76 666 4
StAndrews 73 52 37 100 96 60 40 75 82 51 666 4
LSE 83 42 69 37 98 75 30 70 100 60 666 4
York 74 68 32 79 99 55 44 71 87 52 661 7
Warwick 73 58 28 59 93 55 38 78 94 63 640 8
Bristol 73 73 38 40 88 56 46 81 80 64 640 8
Nottham 75 61 34 43 94 57 37 79 87 69 640 8
UCL 69 89 29 29 93 59 50 67 98 57 640 8
Bath 76 51 34 34 88 57 40 86 90 65 620 12
Manchter 72 65 35 43 93 55 32 74 92 59 620 12
Soton 71 69 33 36 92 55 33 72 79 76 620 12
UMIST 70 62 23 46 77 61 53 74 93 61 620 12
Durham 74 44 26 52 94 59 31 83 84 68 620 12
Newcastle 69 70 37 44 80 58 34 72 79 58 600 17
Lancaster 70 34 34 60 91 56 26 83 89 57 600 17
Birmgham 75 48 33 37 83 55 36 79 80 69 600 17
KingsColl 69 58 35 10 84 60 37 79 84 68 585 20
Glasgow 71 61 34 27 89 58 42 74 68 61 585 20
Sheffield 74 45 29 38 91 55 31 79 80 60 585 20
Sussex 73 41 38 38 77 59 41 69 88 59 585 20
The guide produces a ranking of universities using a single value system (Table 3-2).
This may in some sense rank the universities in terms of prestige, but is only one of the
many perspectives on universities. For example, a university having a mission with a
strong commitment to lifelong learning might consider research ratings, entry
qualifications and student accommodation as relatively unimportant measures of
performance compared to value added and thus see the rankings based on equal values
as largely irrelevant. This diversity of perspective will also be reflected in the attitude
of many applicants to the league table, as again different individuals will wish to apply
their own values in selecting a short list of universities to apply to, rather than simply
accept the top six of The Times league table. DEA allows a diversity of weights, and its
use in measuring university performance from the applicant's perspective is now
explored.
DEA measures the relative performance of organisational units, in this case
universities, where there are multiple incommensurate inputs and outputs. In DEA
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terms The Times criteria are outputs that are equally weighted in producing an aggregate
performance measure, whilst DEA allows flexibility in the weights used in determining
an aggregate measure.
To accommodate the diversity of values of the applicants, DEA was first used to
assess the desirability (performance) of universities to six hypothetical applicants. The
six model applicants were as in Table 3-3.
Table 3 -3: Hypothetical applicants to universities
Applicant	 Description
Strong An academic high flyer expecting top A-level grades, giving a high priority to a research
environment, the proportion of firsts awarded, teaching quality and high entry qualifications.
Typically 18 years old and leaving home for the first time so concerned about the
accommodation available. Considers employment prospects, staff/ student ratios, library
spending and value added less important.
Less Able A student who is not so strong academically and is looking for an institution geared to
supporting students with lower A-level grades or alternative qualifications. Teaching quality,
employment and staff student ratios are of the highest priority, with accommodation also
important. The library budget and numbers of firsts may be considered but not weighted
heavily.
Mature An older person who wants to upgrade his/ her qualifications to improve career prospects.
Money is likely to be tight ,due to mortgages, and possibly dependants; so library facilities are
important. Planning to live at home, so accommodation irrelevant. Teaching quality,
employment and staff/ student ratios weighted heavily. Next come firsts and library spending.
Research ratings of lesser importance.
Local A school leaver of average ability who is planning to live at home perhaps for family reasons
and possibly financial ones. Employment and teaching quality top priorities, followed by library
spending, staff/ student ratios and firsts. Accommodation and research quality not important.
Strong Overseas Good accommodation provision is very important. Proportion of firsts equally important ,as is
entry grades, research and teaching quality, and the proportion of overseas students. A slightly
lower priority given to employment, library spending, student/ staff ratios and value added.
Less Able Overseas Gives highest priority to accommodation, staff student ratios, teaching quality and proportion of
overseas students. Firsts and library spending also seen as important. Employment and
research quality not a high priority.
To develop appropriate DEA models for each category of applicant, it is necessary to
categorise each factor/ performance indicator as either an input or an output, and then
convert the applicants' priorities into restrictions on the weights for each factor (for
more on weights restrictions, see Allen et al. 2 on absolute weights restrictions, and
chapter 6 on virtual weights restrictions). The Times guide considers each factor to be
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an output in DEA terms, and weights them all equally. Categorising entry qualifications
as an output implies that the more difficult it is to gain entry to a university, the more
desirable to the applicant, but this may be consistent only with the priorities of the
,
strong applicants. It is possible that weaker candidates could still chose to have A-level
points demanded by the course they wish to enrol on as an output to reflect the
'reputation' of the course. However, some candidates, specially those with very low
grades, might be looking for a more value-added approach. Thus, for the remaining
applicants the factor entry qualifications was taken as an input, with the universities
seeking to maximise other criteria such as firsts awarded and employment. Hence, the
aggregate performance measure now has a value-added orientation, so the specific
value-added measure needs to be excluded.
The selection of inputs and outputs for the DEA models and their presumed relative
importance is shown in Table 3-4 and Table 3-5.
Table 3-4: Selection of inputs and outputs for the DEA models
Student Prototypes
Variable Strong Less Able Mature Local LA OS Strong OS
entgrad 0 I I I I 0
staffstud 0 0 0 0 0 0
libspend 0 0 0 0 0 0
accomm 0 0 0 0 0
teachass 0 0 0 0 0 0
overstud 0 0 0
firsts 0 0 0 0 0 0
gradempl 0 0 0 0 0 0
research
valadd
other
0
0
Nominal I
0 0 0 0
0
Nominal I
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Table 3 -5: Prototypes preference structures
Prototype Preference Structure
Strong accomm,
entgrad,
firsts,
research,
teachass
> gradempl,
libspend,
staffstud,
valadd
> overstud  0.05
Less able gradempl,
staffstud,
teachass
> accomm  firsts,
libspend
 0.05
Mature gradempl,
staffstud,
teachass
 firsts,
libspend
> research  0.05
Local gradempl,
teachass
> firsts,
libspend,
staff stud
> accomm,
research
 0.05
Overseas (weak) accomm,
staffstud,
teachass,
overstud
> firsts,
libspend
 gradempl,
research
 0.05
Overseas (strong) accomm,
entgrad,
firsts,
research,
teachass
overstud
> gradempl,
libspend,
staffstud,
valadd
 0.05
The basic constant returns to scale DEA model with an output orientation is used
(see Appendix 3-1). As The Times' data is based on indices and percentages, the use of
a VRS model would be more appropriate. Where a nominal input is used the CRS
model reduces to VRS, given the output orientation of the models. However, when the
range of scale sizes is narrow, as is the range of entry grades here, the difference
between CRS and VRS estimates tends to be small. The use of weights restrictions
frequently renders VRS models infeasible making CRS the only plausible alternative
here, although admittedly, not ideal. The models developed subsequently in the thesis
are mostly in terms of volume measures where a CRS assumption is more readily
sustainable.
The basic CRS DEA model (without weights restrictions) with the above inputs and
outputs determines weights for each university which would show that university in the
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most favourable light. So, for example, the model would put a very high weight on
library spending for Oxford, whilst putting no weight on accommodation for a
university with a low proportion of university accommodation. The results would thus
be inconsistent with the priorities of many categories of applicant and would therefore
not be useful in helping select a shortlist of choices. To incorporate priorities into the
models, restrictions were placed on the virtual outputs (the product of the output factor
value and its weight), so that the contribution of any factor to the aggregate performance
measure could be controlled relative to other factors. The factors were placed into three
categories, with the first category factors given higher virtual weights than the second,
and the second higher than the third, hence acknowledging the relative importance of
different factors (very important, important, less important). A minimum virtual weight
of 5% is imposed, in order not to let any university disregard some of the factors in the
model. This represents a use of virtual assurance regions, which is further discussed in
chapter 6. The results of applying the DEA models with the weights constraints are
shown in Appendix 3-2.
In each table, the universities are ranked by their DEA score which has a maximum
of 100 for the most desirable universities for that category of applicant. The tables also
show The Times' rank. For the academically strongest students the two sets of rankings
are very similar with a rank order correlation coefficient of 0.879 (a coefficient of 1
would indicate perfectly matching ranks). Cambridge which topped The Times ranking
is again top, and the top ten are almost a perfect match. The rankings of most
universities are within ten of each other with the greatest differences including King's
College, London which drops from 20th to 49th, equal with Buckingham, which
dropped from 30th place.
For the less able students the main difference in the assessments is that entry
qualifications are taken as an input, which the universities convert into qualifications
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and jobs, so there is a value-added orientation to the DEA score and rankings. Robert
Gordon's is now ranked at the top, with Luton moving from 96th to 3rd. It is worth
noting that the DEA model does not capture length of study as a criterion for choosing a
degree course, which could be used as a counter-balance to the low grades demanded by
some Scottish universities, like Robert Gordon. However, should an applicant not wish
to incur an extra year of study, Scottish universities could be left out of the DEA
assessment, or used as an a posteriori criterion to select universities from the table of
results. This sort of judgements, that are not modelled directly in DEA will be further
discussed later on in this chapter. Many of the 'old' universities such as LSE (93rd
from 4th in The Times table) and Birmingham (80th from 17th) are unable to
compensate for their high entry qualifications although Imperial and UCL remain highly
ranked. (For example, the position of LSE was a consequence of having very high entry
grades, but a relatively poor staff/ student ratio, whereas Imperial has a favourable staff/
student ratio). The tables are not, however, strongly inversely related and the
correlation coefficient of -0.0895 indicates no particular relationship at all. The
rankings for mature and local students show a very similar pattern.
For academically strong overseas students, the pattern is similar to the strong UK
student, although Buckingham with its high overseas proportion which was given the
highest priority, moves from 30th to 21st. The greatest change is Kent, moving from
39th to 25th. For the less able overseas student the rankings are similar to the less able
UK students although it should be observed that the less able students (in terms of A
levels), whether overseas or not, would find it difficult to gain a place at a university
such as Imperial which requires high grades on entry.
The focus on the potential applicant leading to the introduction of diversity in values
amongst applicants demonstrates that, although The Times league table may be
appropriate for the most able students, it is not useful in terms of assisting in the choice
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of university for other categories of applicants. The DEA approach with its greater
flexibility, however, is able to produce league tables more consistent with the
requirements of different categories of applicants.
Applicants, of course, do not fall neatly into six categories, and are also interested in
subject as well as university information. The Times does produce subject league tables
but, as with the overall table, they are not appropriate for all categories of applicant. In
the next section a system for selection is proposed, which can be tailored to the
individual applicant, and includes both subject and university wide information.
3.4 Kenilworth School Case Study
After demonstrating that general league tables such as those produced by The Times
are only catering for the most academically able students, the aim was to facilitate the
design of customised league tables to the individual applicant's preference structure.
This part of the research involved working with groups of students at the Castle Sixth
Form Centre of Kenilworth School, a comprehensive school with an A level programme
of some three hundred students, the majority of whom seek admission to universities
across the entire spectrum of institutions. An A level programme of studies comprises
two years: Y12 (lower sixth) and Y13 (upper sixth), at the end of which students take
national examinations (A levels) in the subjects of their choice.
In order to understand the process of student decision making when choosing a
university the following questions need to be answered:
• What criteria do applicants use to assess universities?
• What are the sources they gather information from?
• What relative importance is given to each criterion?
• How is the information aggregated into a meaningful result?
In addressing these questions the studies done by HEIST (Higher Education
Information Systems Trust), in collaboration first with PCAS (Polytechnics Central
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Admissions System) and after 1992 with UCAS (Universities and Colleges Admissions
Service), into the perceptions of traditional 3 , mature4, and international 5 applicants; and
university students6 are relevant.
,
The case study comprised two parts: the first part looked at the process of decision
making retrospectively, making use of Y13 students' experience in applying to
university, and the second used that insight to build a model that would help Y12
students in their choice of universities to apply to.
In a first visit to the school a group of Y13 students was invited to discuss the theme,
'How have you chosen the universities you applied to?' Factors that had influenced
their choice were discussed, as were the people they had talked to and the prospectuses,
guides, newspapers and books they had read. Exhibitions, videos, television
programmes and electronic databases were also recalled. The general discussion was
followed by brainstorming sessions in small groups to obtain more systematic
information. By this process a list of criteria taken into consideration when selecting
universities, and a list of sources of information used was obtained (Table 3-6 and Table
3-7).
From the literature and the information gathered in the case study, the list of factors
that influence the choice of universities was determined (see Table 3-6). These factors
were divided into two groups: DEA variables and non-DEA variables, depending on the
fact if, in principle, they can be modelled or not in a DEA program.
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People	 Purpose-made materials
Teachers
Students
Family
Friends
Careers advisers
Careers library
Open days
CD-ROM databases
Universities prospectuses
Alternative prospectuses
UCAS books
Newspapers, videos and television
Exhibitions
The Times Good University Guide
Table 3-6: Factors that influence university selection
DEA variables	 Non-DEA variables
Entry requirements
Teaching quality
Research quality
Pass rates
Employment prospects
Living costs
Housing / accommodation
Age ratios
Gender ratios
Race ratios
General facilities
Academic support facilities
Social facilities
Sports facilities
Course content
Teaching methods
Course assessment
	
,
Reputation/ recommendation
Sponsorship
Town/ city/ area
Distance from home
Campus/ city-based
Size of university
First impression/ atmosphere
The sources of information used by prospective students (see Table 3-7) can also be
divided between the information collected through people, and through a more
structured category of purpose-made materials. The latter tend to aggregate quantitative
information about the factors influencing applicants' choices.
Table 3-7: Sources of information about universities
In a second visit to the school the students were asked to answer via a questionnaire,
how they rated the importance of the different criteria generated on the previous visit.
The results appear in Figure 3-1 (from 1 = not at all important to 5 = very important).
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Figure 3-1: Importance attached to different criteria used in university selection
Whereas a lot of the factors that influence university selection are quantitative
variables for which information can be easily collected, a lot of them are qualitative
variables, which are more difficult to assess and collect information on. However, as
can be seen from Figure 3-1, variables such as atmosphere of the institution and
reputation are heavily weighted by most students and thus play an important part in their
process of choice. This finding is consistent with the fact that many of the published
sources of information contain quantitative information, but applicants also talk to a
variety of different people in order to assess the softer variables, such as atmosphere and
reputation, and are clearly influenced by both kinds of information.
The concept was tested in a second part of the case study, where the DEA models
were used as a decision support tool in a university selection workshop, with Y12
students of different academic abilities interested in management and business studies
and about to apply to university. The use of DEA for selection follows Doyle and
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Green7, concerning the choice of computer printers, and is effectively using DEA as a
multicriteria decision making tool as considered by Belton and Vickers 8 , and Stewart9.
The sources of information used by the students indicated the availability of data,
,
and a match was sought between the available data and the factors mentioned in the first
part of the case. From this the inputs and outputs of the model were obtained. The
importance given to the different factors were translated into weights restrictions in the
DEA models. These different steps in the decision making process and their translation
into the DEA models used in the experiment are shown in Table 3-8:
Table 3-8: Comparing universities using DEA
Decision-making	 DEA model
Sources of information	 Availability of data
Criteria	 Selection of I/O
Relative importance of criteria	 Weights restrictions
• The sources of information used in the process of students' decision-making provide
the data that feeds the DEA model.
• The criteria used by the decision maker are either translated into inputs or outputs of
the DEA model, depending on factors that the applicant wants to minimise or
maximise, respectively. Only factors that are of the type the more the better/ the less
the better are modelled in DEA. Other factors have to be dealt with outside the DEA
model. Factors such as proportion of firsts awarded and student/ staff ratios, which
are used by The Times, were not considered, since they were never mentioned by the
students in our case study nor in the literature.
• Different preference structures can then be translated into the model by using
weights restrictions.
83
From the list of factors that could be modelled in DEA (see Table 3-6) likely to
affect university selection, data was available for all the universities offering
programmes in management and business studies on entry grades', teaching quoin?),
,
research quality m, employment prospects', cost of living", and availability of university
accommodation'. Data on age 12
 and gender ratios and support facilities expenditure'
was available only for the 'old' universities (i.e. not available for ex-polytechnics and
colleges of HE). In Figure 3-1 it can be seen that age and gender ratios were not
considered on average particularly important by the students anyway, although some
information is lost by dropping the support facilities criterion. It was decided that it was
better to use all universities (thus keeping a broader choice) in the models, even though
the data available was reduced in that case (thus reducing the number of discriminating
factors).
The necessity to drop variables from the prototype model has policy implications
with regard to the public availability of data. If the stated purpose of informing all
stakeholders on the performance of institutions and higher education in general is to be
honoured, the data availability policy needs to be changed. The University Management
Statistics and Performance Indicators" ceased to be published in 1995 (with data
concerning the academic year 1992/93) after eight annual volumes had been published.
The announced University Management Statistics - Institutional Level 1995/96, has still
to be published. This means that data on performance is not yet available and that it is
not always possible to obtain appropriate information from the raw statistics provided
by HESA. Moreover some of the data referred to by students as being important is not
provided even in a raw form. A factor such as living costs, for instance, is not
addressed in official publications.
In the workshop with the Y12, a pilot was held first with three students to help in the
development of the system. A second workshop was then held with eleven students
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who were first asked to choose whether to consider entry grades as an input (value-
added models) or as an output to be maximised according to their expected performance
in their A level exams. They then rated the factors to be maximised (outputs) into three
,
orders of importance: very important, important, and less important.
The approach used for the prototypes of students in the previous section would
impose two kinds of limitations in the weights flexibility: a minimum virtual weight of
5% for all factors; and very important factors weighted heavier than important ones, and
those in turn heavier than less important ones. That approach proved difficult to
implement in the workshops due to the large number of weights restrictions that could
be required (for example, if five factors were classed very important and five important,
25 restrictions would be necessary and these would be cumbersome to handle
particularly when students wished to change their priorities). As a consequence of this
the general approach of categorising by importance was retained, but ranges of virtual
weights were constructed for each category of factors. This represents the use of simple
weights restrictions, further discussed in chapter 6. The less important factors were not
allowed to have (virtual) weights bigger than a. Factors considered important would be
allowed to have weights in the range a to 2a, and very important ones allowed weights
of at least 2a. These are shown in Table 3-9. a was calculated in such a way that the
aggregate of the lower bounds on the virtuals determined 50% of the aggregate
performance measure retaining 50% for weights flexibility. The use of DEA in this way
can be thought of as a game, with the students selecting a space of permissible weights
representing their preferences, and the universities using the flexibility of the space to
present themselves in the most favourable light.
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Table 3-9: Weights restrictions
L  oc
a < I < 2a
2a < V
where a i + 2a v = 0.50
L = virtual weight for a less important factor
/ = virtual weight for an important factor
V = virtual weight for a very important factor
i = number of important factor
V = number of very important factors
As an illustration, one student selected entry grades as an input (value-added
approach), teaching quality, employment rates and availability of accommodation as
very important factors (virtual weights at least 14.3% from the formula in Table 9);
living costs as important (range 7.1% to 14.3%); and research quality as less important
(at most 7.1%). The Robert Gordon University had the highest aggregate performance
measure. The associated weights were 14.3% for teaching quality and employment,
which are at their lower bounds; 50.29% for accommodation, as Robert Gordon has
good availability relative to other institutions with low entry grades; 14.01% for living
costs, which is close to the top of its range; and 7.1% for research quality. The weights
for the other universities at the top of the student's list are presented in Table 3-10.
Table 3-10: Virtual weights for a customised league table
Unit
Top of Table
Rank	 Teaching	 Research	 Employment	 Living Costs	 Accommodation
RGORDON 1 14.3 7.1 14.3 14.01 50.29
ABERTAY 2 14.3 7.1 35.01 14.3 29.29
GLAMORGAN 3 64.3 0 14.3 7.1 14.3
LUTON 4 14.3 7.1 50 14.3 14.3
KINGSTON 5 57.2 7.1 14.3 7.1 14.3
NOTTTRENT 6 64.3 o 14.3 7.1 14.3
The decision-making process is an iterative one, so the workshop adopted an
interactive approach. This feature was obvious already in the pilot workshop, where a
student first considered entry grades as an input (value-added model), and then as an
output of less importance. She realised after analysing the resulting table of the first
choice, that her expected A level results would allow her to consider universities with
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higher entry grades at the bottom of the table. By then selecting entry grades as an
output to be maximised, but not so important as to dominate other factors considered
more important to her, she obtained a more satisfactory table in relation to her
,
preference structure. This example shows that the positioning of A-level entry
requirements as an input or output will depend very much on the candidate at hand, and
for the same candidate both situations might be explored. She then made adjustments to
her list by striking out universities according to their location. In accordance with this
example, the participants in the second workshop were able to rerun the models,
changing the choice of inputs/ outputs and/ or the relative importance of the criteria
under consideration. They were then asked to comment on the league tables obtained
for their suitability in helping them with their choice and how they would further refine
them.
In general the students considered the workshop useful. The customised league
tables obtained were commented on as 'being a good starting point', a 'rough guide to
investigate further', and 'two of the top universities in my list had low entry grades,
which is helpful as I don't think I will get high grades'. Some students mentioned that
an a priori selection of universities would be useful, as they wished, for example, to
consider only universities offering combined business studies and a language. The
elimination of some universities in this way would thus simplify the ensuing analysis.
As to what further judgements students would use to refine their shortlists, low living
costs seems to be an important factor for a lot of students: 'I would leave out
universities that were more than 30 miles away from Kenilworth because I can stay at
home and it will bring the cost down'. Other considerations mentioned are the
programme of study (structure/ content), the location and type of university (distance
from home, accessibility, area, type of campus, atmosphere, age distribution), and the
facilities provided (sports facilities, quality and price of accommodation).
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3.5 Towards a decision support system for university selection
This experiment led to the design of an ideal decision-making process for university
selection depicted in Figure 3-2.
Figure 3-2: Decision-making process for university selection using DEA
(1) 'Need to have' selection: Here the applicant answers the 'Need to have'
question associated with the qualitative variables, which are not modelled in DEA. An
initial selection of universities is made by eliminating some based on the course they
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want to attend, the distance from home, the location, etc. It corresponds to a selection
of units for the DEA model.
(2) Considering different scenarios: Depending on the expected results on their
,
exams students will consider different scenarios. The choice will be between a value-
added orientation, using entry grades as an input, or an output maximisation only, using
a nominal input in the DEA model. Middle-of-the-road candidates might wish to
explore both possibilities.
(3) Choice of relevant criteria: Here the students will choose which criteria are
relevant to them when choosing a university. These will be used as outputs in the DEA
model.
(4) Individual preference structure: The students will rate the relevant factors in
order of importance. These will be translated into the DEA model using weights
restrictions.
This task is not a straightforward one as there are several ways to do it, all of
them requiring the estimation of appropriate values for the constants in the restrictions,
to reflect the value judgements in the efficiency assessments. In this case, the
introduction of restrictions incorporating an ordering of the relative importance of the
factors to the decision maker was felt to be appropriate. This methodology was
introduced in Thompson et al. 15 for absolute weights restriction and Wong and Beasley16
for proportional virtual weights restrictions. See Appendix 3-1 for the formulations
used. The issue of weights restrictions will be further discussed in Chapter 6.
(5) Customised league table: The applicants will be provided with a ranked list of
universities in accordance with their choices. This corresponds to the DEA table of
efficiencies. They can now proceed to the next step or iterate through the process to
consider different scenarios, criteria and preference structures.
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(6) Refined league table: The applicants can now refine the previous table by
answering the 'Nice to have' question associated with the qualitative variables. What
kind of atmosphere did the university convey during the Open Day? Is it cheap to travel
,
there?, etc.
(7) Decision: The final selection is reached by using DEA and informed judgement.
3.6 Conclusion
This chapter focused on the evaluation of universities from the perspective of the
prospective student. Applicants to universities differ in their objectives and emphases
on different criteria when evaluating universities. DEA is used in an innovative way,
allowing for both the institution's and the applicant's views to be considered
simultaneously.
The Times' league table of universities was considered, and it was shown that a
single table weighting criteria equally is not adequate to rank universities given the
different missions of the institutions and requirements of prospective applicants. DEA
was then introduced as an approach to evaluating universities, which is capable of
recognising differences in institutional mission through allowing variability in the
weights, and the priorities of applicants by the introduction of weights restrictions.
Working with pupils of an A level programme, a prototype system was developed aimed
at supporting applicants in producing a shortlist of institutions.
DEA proved to be a useful technique for the aggregation of a confusing mass of
information. It can produce customised league tables for individual applicants, and
furthermore it can produce several tables, contingent on different preference structures,
to help the applicants clarify their ideas. These tables are a valuable aid in reaching an
informed decision about the choice of universities to apply to.
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Appendix 3-1: DEA model
As the factors under consideration were principally used as outputs, a CRS output
oriented model was used in the analysis, so that the aggregate of the virtual outputs (the
product of the output level and optimal weight for that output) summed to 1 (100%) for
each unit.
The most appropriate way to implement virtual weights restrictions is not fully
resolved. In this study, virtual assurance regions and simple virtual weights restrictions
have been used, as discussed in later in chapter 6.
For the student prototypes' preference structures (see Table 3-5) the following
restrictions are added to the model M4 (see Chapter 1, Introduction):
	
uvyvio  ulylio	 V denotes a very important factor
	
uLyijo
	 1 denotes an important factor
uL y Li° 0.05
L denotes a less important factor
In the workshop with the students from Kenilworth School (see Table 3-9) the
following weights restrictions were used:
uLY4,  a
	 V denotes a very important factor
a ulyik 2a	 1 denotes an important factor
2a uvyvia
L denotes a less important factor
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Appendix 3-2: DEA results for the student prototypes
Table 3-11: Strong student model
Unit
Top of Table Bottom of Table
APM	 DEA Rank	 Times Rank Unit APM DEA Rank Times Rank
CAMBRIDGE1 100 1 1 GUILDHALL84 38.04 83 84
OXFORD2 98.63 2 2 WESTENG66 37.96 84 66
STANDREWS4 87.5 3 4 SBANK80 37.74 85 80
IMPERIAL3 86.59 4 3 GLAMORGAN91 37.1 86 91
YORK7 84.2 5 7 CENTENG77 36.91 87 77
EDINBURGH4 81.1 6 4 CALEDONN95 36.37 88 95
LSE4 79.86 7 4 ANGLIA84 36.34 89 84
WARWICK8 79.05 8 8 JMOORES84 36.33 90 84
NOTTHAM8 78.89 9 8 HUDDFLD80 35.29 91 80
UCL8 78.67 10 8 NAPIER80 33.38 92 80
BRISTOL8 78.43 11 8 ELONDON91 32.61 93 91
UMIST12 77.46 12 12 BOURNMTH86 32 94 86
MANCHTER12 77 13 12 THAMESVAL88 31.64 95 88
BATH 12 75.6 14 12 LUTON96 31.19 96 96
SOTON12 75.49 15 12 HUMBRSIDE96 28.89 97 96
DURHAM12 74.89 16 12 Correlation 0.879
Table 3-12: Less able student model
Unit
Top of Table Bottom of Table
APM	 DEA rank	 Times rank UNIT APM DEA rank	 Times rank
RGORDON62 100 1 62 EANGLIA32 46.42 83 32
ELONDON91 99.2 2 91 SWANSEA42 46.34 84 42
LUTON96 90.89 3 96 ESSEX29 46 85 29
BUCKHAM30 87.6 4 30 ROYLHOLL24 45.92 86 24
ABERTAY91 82.74 5 91 KENT39 45.22 87 39
DUNDEE30 81.32 6 30 SHEFFIELD20 45.12 88 20
IMPERIAL3 80.3 7 3 SUSSEX20 45.03 89 20
DEMONTFT61 78.08 8 61 HUMBRSIDE96 44.79 90 96
UCL8 76.05 9 8 ASTON32 44.53 91 32
PAISLEY91 73.94 10 91 ULSTER54 43.32 92 54
BRIGHTON66 71.04 11 66 LSE4 43 93 4
OXBRKES57 70.13 12 57 CIT1'46 42.14 94 46
EDINBURGH4 67.94 13 4 QUEENSBEL47 41.02 95 47
BRISTOL8 66.85 14 8 QMWESTD42 40.07 96 42
NEWCASTLE17 66.68 15 17 KEELE51 39.26 97 51
GLAMORGAN91 65.85 16 91 Correlation -0.089
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Table 3- 13: Mature student model
Top of Table Bottom of Table
Unit APM DEA rank Times rank Unit APM DEA rank Times rank
ELONDON91 100 1 91 HUMBRSIDE96 47.6 -	 83 96
RGORDON62 100 1 62 SWANSEA42 47.5 84 42
LUTON96 98.63 3 96 ABRYSTTH42 47.3 85 42
DUNDEE30 85.62 4 30 ESSEX29 47.29 86 29
IMPERIAL3 85.32 5 3 DURHAM12 47.22 87 12
BUCKHAM30 84.51 6 30 EXETER35 47.09 88 35
DEMONTFT61 82.3 7 61 QUEENSBEL47 46.49 89 47
UCL8 81.13 8 8 ULSTER54 46.37 90 54
ABERTAY91 78.29 9 91 SALFORD51 46.24 91 51
BRIGHTON66 76.63 10 66 LSE4 45.88 92 4
WESTMSTR66 74.02 11 66 ASTON32 45.71 93 32
NAPIER80 72.8 12 80 HULL47 45.61 94 47
EDINBURGH4 70.55 13 4 KENT39 45.46 95 39
PAISLEY91 69.94 14 91 CI1Y46 42.86 96 46
BRISTOL8 69.19 15 8 KEELE51 41.06 97 51
NEWCASTLE 17 68.54 16 17 Correlation -0.118
Table 3 - 14: Local student model
Unit
Top of Table Bottom of Table
APM	 DEA rank Times rank Unit APM	 DEA rank Times rank
RGORDON62 100 1 62 SWANSEA42 49.64 83 42
ELONDON91 97.52 2 91 ABRYSTTH42 49.62 84 42
LUTON96 89.16 3 96 CARDIFF39 49.55 85 39
BUCKHAM30 80.4 4 30 ASTON32 49.16 86 32
ABERTAY91 79.62 5 91 SHEFFIELD20 49.12 87 20
BRIGHTON66 73.69 6 66 KENT39 48.77 88 39
PAISLEY91 72.17 7 91 BOURNMTH86 48.07 89 86
OXBRKES57 71.49 8 57 LSE4 47.93 90 4
DUNDEE30 69.61 9 30 HUDDFLD80 47.93 90 80
WESTMSTR66 68.7 10 66 QMWESTD42 47.3 92 42
KINGSTON57 66.67 11 57 CITY46 45.02 93 46
GLAMORGAN91 66.09 12 91 ULSTER54 44.53 94 54
TEESIDE74 64.38 13 74 QUEENSBEL47 44.4 95 47
IMPERIAL3 63.91 14 3 HUMBRSIDE96 44.29 96 96
NAPIER80 63.52 15 80 KEELE51 42.92 97 51
SUNDLAND77 62.42 16 77 Correlation 0.275
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Table 3-15: Strong overseas student model
Unit
Top of Table Bottom of Table
APM DEA rank Times rank Unit APM DEA rank Times rank
CAMBRIDGE1 100 1 1 GLAMORGAN91 39.82, 83 91
OXFORD2 100 1 2 GUILDHALL84 39.67 84 84
IMPERIAL3 90.07 3 3 PAISLEY91 39.48 85 91
LSE4 89.25 4 4 WESTENG66 39.2 86 66
STANDREWS4 87.5 5 4 JMOORES84 38.79 87 84
YORK7 84.22 6 7 CENTENG77 38.71 88 77
EDINBURGH4 81.48 7 4 CALEDONN95 37.73 89 95
BRISTOL8 80.19 8 8 ANGLIA84 37.7 90 84
NOTTHAM8 80.03 9 8 HUDDFLD80 36.93 91 80
WARWICK8 79.18 10 8 NAPIER80 34.63 92 80
NEWCASTLE17 78.3 11 17 ELONDON91 34.49 93 91
UMIST12 78.18 12 12 THAMESVAL88 34.26 94 88
UCL8 78.16 13 8 BOURNMTH86 33.89 95 86
MANCHTER12 78.02 14 12 LUTON96 32.99 96 96
BATH 12 77.61 15 12 HUMBRSIDE96 30.42 97 96
SUSSEX20 77.55 16 20 Correlation 0.898
Table 3 - 16: Less able overseas student model
Unit
Top of Table Bottom of Table
APM DEA rank Times rank	 Unit APM DEA rank Times rank
BUCKHAM30 100 1 30 CENTENG77 49.78 83 77
RGORDON62 100 1 62 BRADFORD51 49.76 84 51
ELONDON91 100 1 91 ASTON32 49.7 85 32
LUTON96 83.78 4 96 BIRMGHAM17 49.69 86 17
ABERTAY91 82.72 5 91 SHEFFIELD20 48.92 87 20
DUNDEE30 79.52 6 30 LDSMETR074 47.07 88 74
IMPERIAL3 78.23 7 3 HUDDFLD80 47 89 80
STAN DREWS4 77.81 8 4 JMOORES84 46.43 90 84
PAISLEY91 74.95 9 91 BOURNMTH86 45.66 91 86
UCL8 74.45 10 8 QMWESTD42 45.19 92 42
DEMONTFT61 73.77 11 61 HUMBRSIDE96 44.83 93 96
LAMPETER56 71.53 12 56 CI1Y46 44.72 94 46
BRIGHTON66 70.71 13 66 KEELE51 43.39 95 51
GLAMORGAN91 68.29 14 91 ULSTER54 41.76 96 54
OXBRKES57 68.29 14 57 QUEENSBEL47 40.73 97 47
YORK7 67.74 16 7 Correlation 0.044
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4. THE STATE PERSPECTIVE
4.1 Introduction
The last years have seen increased pressures for efficiency and effectiveness in the
public sector in general, and in the higher education sector idparticular. Universities
have only been significantly financed by the State since the Second World War.
However, since the beginning of the eighties funding cuts have been imposed, more
accountability demanded, and selectivity in the allocation of funds, increasingly
dependent on the results of performance assessment exercises, has become common
policy.
Currently the higher education sector in England funded by the HEFCE (Higher
Education Funding Council for England) includes over 200 institutions of higher
education - 72 universities, 16 directly funded schools of the University of London, and
50 colleges of higher education. It also funds prescribed courses of higher education at
74 further education colleges, who receive their main public funding from the Further
Education Funding Council. There are a further 21 in Scotland, 16 in Wales and 4 in
Northern Ireland. In 1995-96 a total of about 1.4 million students followed courses of
higher education in UK universities and higher education colleges. Of these about
82,600 were from outside the EU.
Most universities are multi-faculty institutions offering courses in all, or the
majority, of the main subject areas. The remaining institutions fall into two broad
groups:
• general colleges, offering a range of courses, usually narrower than the universities,
and often with a greater emphasis on business and management, or education;
• specialist colleges with more than half their students in one broad subject area.
Universities and colleges receive their income from a variety of sources, public and
private. The total amount the funding councils make available each year is determined
by Parliament. Funding is provided for teaching and research. The councils decide the
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basis on which grant is to be distributed and consult the sector on its funding methods.
An increased emphasis on quality and performance, and a systematic attempt to assess
performance is visible in several official papers:
,
'the general need to contain spending, the pattern of relative costs in
higher education, and the demands for capital investment, all mean that
a continuing drive for greater efficiency will need to be secured.' (DES,
1991)1
The Government believes that the real key to achieving cost
effective expansion lies in greater competition for funds and students.'
(DES, 1991)
The Council's funding methods are designed to promote stability as
far as possible, to maintain quality, deliver efficiency, and to fund
research selectivity' and 'is concerned to secure cost-effective use of
public funds.' (HEFCE, 1994)2
The growth of the higher education system has raised the question of effectiveness,
how the actual outcomes compare with the planned aims of the organisation, efficiency
how resources are deployed to produce different outputs, and economy, how the actual
resources utilised compare to the planned ones.
Effectiveness is built into the system of performance measurement by translating the
parameters defined at governmental level into operational procedures to be carried out
by the funding bodies. The efficiency of the system is linked to the assessment of the
universities by the funding councils of their teaching, research and financial activities.
Finally the economy of the system is regulated by the financial memorandum
established between the funding councils and the institutions they fund.
It is the aim of this chapter to explore the use of DEA to support the State and
funding councils on, what they claim, is their remit. A critique of how they go about
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performing their set objectives, specially concerning data collection and availability, is
undertaken. However, it is not the objective of the thesis to suggest what the remit of
the State and funding councils should be.
,
In order to become familiar with the work of the funding councils the author has read
several past documents published by the council and was part of their mailing list for
papers published during the period of writing the thesis. The author has also
participated in several meetings organised by the Society for Research into Higher
Education where people from the funding councils were speakers and delegates.
However, although the work in this thesis has been necessarily informed by contact with
the funding councils, the work was in no way commissioned or condoned by them.
4.1.1 The State and Higher Education
The State is responsible for the process of policy formation and implementation.
Thus the political parties and Parliament in general, and the DfEE (Department for
Education and Employment) in particular, concern themselves with the formation of
policy in higher education, and the higher education funding councils (HEFCE, SHEFC,
HEFCW, DENT) with its implementation.
Salter and Tapper (1994)3 point out how the idea of higher education and the
relationship between it and the State have changed with time, from more consensual
traditions to a more disputed economic ideology, which has created in the recent past a
situation of continuing ideological tension. At the beginning of the university era the
Christian-Hellenic tradition advocated that the chief duty of the university was to
produce good citizens. It should train an elite to be the future leaders in affairs and in
the learned professions. Later on a more liberal idea of education emerged, which saw
the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake as including the advancement of knowledge as
well as its transmission. By 1963, when the Robbins Report 4 was published the
traditional ideas of education are still expressed:
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• education of 'not mere specialists but rather cultivated men and women';
• the advancement of learning;
• the transmission of a common culture and common standard,s of citizenship;
but also a more market oriented aspect:
• instruction in skills.
This marks a changing idea of education and will ultimately give rise to a new
university model of higher education. The economic ideology of education considers it
as an economic resource, which should be organised in a way that maximises its
contribution to the UK's industrial development. As a consequence socially relevant, or
applied knowledge is more important than pure knowledge. Higher education should be
responsive to economic needs, and that it is the responsibility of the State to ensure that
universities are held accountable for carrying out their economic role appropriately.
Another change visible in the Robbins Report is the move towards mass higher
education, the commitment to the principle of 'social demand': higher education should
be available to all those qualified to receive it.
4.1.2 The Current University Model of Higher Education
The current working model of higher education, named by Salter and Tapper 3 a
'managed market', where pedagogical issues are still the concern of the academic
faculty but not necessarily matters such as planning, finances and administration.
The new model of higher education in the UK has resulted from the merger of two
traditions (former polytechnics and the old universities) under a common university
label, which have to continue to live within the framework of new mechanisms of
control brought about by the Further and Higher Education Act 1992 5. The new model
expressly negates the idea that universities have a common identity and shared
purposes; they are designed to be different kinds of institutions performing different
missions. The model is a pluralist one, in which different ideas of university are
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pursued. Their relative success will be dependent upon their ability to secure resources,
not only from the State but also the market.
The new model rests on a mass system of higher education, with a purposeful
,
attempt to stimulate demand among previously under-represented groups, which is more
responsive to the wider society, and in particular, to the needs of the economy. The
transfer of responsibility for the research councils to the Office of Science and
Technology in 1992 is another symptom of the ideological change.
Two potential areas for conflict between the State and higher education in the new
model will be: the level of resources committed to higher education and the mechanisms
that will enable the model to function.
The supply of public funds makes universities amenable to public scrutiny and
inevitably they will have to accommodate themselves to public policy determined by the
government of the time. Currently the relationship between the State and universities
can be described as an attempt on the part of the State to create a managed market
financed essentially by public money. The universities have institutional control over
their own affairs, while operating within centrally defined and regulated parameters that
are managed by the funding agencies.
The funding councils are expected to manage the universities within the framework
of ministerial directives designed to ensure that the public receives value for money in
return for state funds.
4.1.3 The Future University Model of Higher Education
According to the Dearing Report (NCIHE, 1997) 6, the aim of higher education in the
future should be to sustain a learning society. Its four purposes do not differ much from
the ones in the Robbins Report, with the economic aspect of higher education being
even more emphatic:
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• 'to inspire and enable individuals to develop their capabilities to the
highest potential levels throughout life, so that they grow
intellectually, are well equipped for work, can contribute effectively
,
to society and achieve personal fulfilment;
• to increase knowledge and understanding for their own sake and to
foster their application to the benefit of the economy and society;
• to serve the needs of an adaptable, sustainable, knowledge-based
economy at local, regional and national levels;
• to play a major role in shaping a democratic, civilised, inclusive
society.'
Since the 1987 White Paper Higher Education: Meeting the Challenge 7 the
expansion of student numbers has been a characteristic of the UK higher education
system. One in five of all 18-19 year-olds in 1992 entered higher education compared
with one in seven at the time of the 1987 White Paper. The projection of student
numbers in the 1991 White Paper Higher Education: A New Framework, indicated that
participation rates would continue to increase, and currently already one in three of all
18-19 year-olds enter higher education each year. This resulted in further erosion of the
unit of funding for higher education. In 1992 when it was recognised that the response
to the call to institutions for expansion had been so successful that participation rates
were far ahead of those predicted by the, at the time, Department for Education (DFE)
announced that it was going to move to a three year period of consolidation, which has
lasted since then. The Dearing Report recommends, however, that widening
participation would still be beneficial. It thus advises that students enter into an
obligation to make contributions to the cost of their higher education once they are in
work, in order to provide resources for growth. Students in this new higher education
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system will increasingly play the role of 'clients', which should encourage institutions
to be more responsive to student requirements:
'This will require students to be able to make informed choices
based on information about the offerings of higher education, its likely
costs, and possible future employment opportunities.' (NCIHE, 1997)6
The issue of data availability in the new 'market' of higher education, where
institutions compete for students and resources, will be further discussed in Chapter 5.
4.2 The Mission and Objectives of the Funding Councils
The 1992 Further and Higher Education Act put the control of the overall higher
education budget, projection of student numbers, the desire for a shift to science and
technology, and the steady pressure in favour of the separation of the teaching and
research functions into statutory context, reinforcing the role of the government and
funding councils. Hence, while the funding councils act on behalf of the universities to
government, and may have some policy influence, their main purpose 2 is to perform the
following functions:
• the assessment of the quality of higher education;
• the distribution of resources for teaching and research;
• the monitoring of the universities financial probity;
according to guidelines that are controlled at the centre both through legislation as well
as by the minister and department.
4.2.1 The Assessment of the Quality of Higher Education
Cave (1988) 8 reports pressures for accountability of the UK higher education system
in the same way as other public services that receive money from the Government. In
1985 the Jarratt Report 9, issued by the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals
(CVCP) in conjunction with the Government and the Universities Grants Committee
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(UGC), suggests that the universities should: work to clear objectives; achieve value for
money, and have strong management and planning structures.
The Jarratt Report suggested a major shift in evaluation methods from subjective
peer review to performance indicators as a means of performance measurement. It
recommended explicitly quantitative as well as qualitative judgements.
In 1986 Government, CVCP and UGC agreed on a Concordat that required changes
to be made for further finance to be released to universities. In 1987 the CVCP
launched University Management Statistics and Performance Indicators, 10 a publication
that lists 39 sets of comparative cost data and performance indicators relating to both
inputs and outputs in teaching and research for UK universities.
The UGC in 1987 was replaced by the Universities Funding Council (UFC) that
became responsible for the distribution of funds among universities under new contract
arrangements and a new Polytechnics and Colleges Funding Council (PCFC) was
established, which would also submit public sector institutions to a system of contract
funding. Performance would be monitored in accordance with those contracts. The
Government would thus be concerned to ensure that universities, as much as other
public sector institutions, meet objectives determined outside themselves, and
demonstrate they achieve these goals. It is in this context that PIs must be considered.
In 1987/88 the provision of Government funds already depended crucially on
evidence of real progress in implementing and building upon the proposed changes.
There was selectivity in the distribution of resources and rationalisation and, when
appropriate, even the closure of small departments as an incentive to better financial
management and improved standards of teaching.
Since then systematic evaluation of teaching and research has been undertaken,
currently in the form of the Teaching Quality Assessment (TQA) and the Research
Assessment Exercise (RAE).
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The Teaching Quality Assessment
The higher education funding councils assess the quality of education on a subject by
subject basis at higher education institutions on a rolling basis. Assessments are carried
out within 61 units of assessment of the quality of education (UAQE) 11 rather than the
broader 11 academic subject categories (ASC) used for funding. The first full cycle of
assessments started in 1993 and will be finished by the end of 2001.
The funding councils approach to quality recognises the diversity of institutional
mission within the higher education sector, and the quality of the education received by
the students is examined within the context of an institution's own aims and objectives.
The assessment is by peer review, based on an institutional self-assessment in the
subject, with supporting evidence; and on the judgement of the quality of education by a
team of assessors during an assessment visit to the unit under review. HEFCE's
Teaching Quality Assessment exercise 12 takes into account six aspects of provision
when assessing institutions: Curriculum design, content and organisation; Teaching,
learning and assessment; Student progression and achievement; Student support and
guidance; Learning resources; Quality assurance and enhancement.
When assessing the above, assessors take into account information requested from
the subject provider on: entry profile; progression and completion rates; student
attainment; employment and further study. This represents a departure from an early
outcome based PIs towards a more value-added approach.
Each aspect of provision is rated on a scale of 1 to 4, thus 24 being the highest
possible result for a subject being assessed.
The Research Assessment Exercise
The systematic assessment of research started in 1986 by peer review. Since then
four RAE's have been performed (1986, 1989, 1992, and 1996). Whereas in the first
two exercises all university ('old' universities) departments were assessed, from 1992
onwards institutions were allowed to select which staff and departments to submit. In
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the RAE96 the ratings were produced for 69 different units of assessment 13 at the same
point in time, unlike the teaching quality assessment.
Every time there has been a RAE some modifications to the assessment have been
introduced to improve it. Although a peer review exercise, institutions are asked, as
with the teaching quality assessment exercise, to provide relevant objective data, which
could have a bearing on the judgements to be made. For the last RAE96 14 exercise, the
funding councils collected data on the following categories: Overall staff summary;
Research active staff details; Publications and other public output; Research students;
Research studentships; External research income; Research environment and plans;
General observations and additional information. Ratings for the quality of research
were awarded in an ascending scale 1, 2, 3b, 3a, 4, 5, 5*.
4.2.2 The Distribution of Resources for Teaching and Research
One of the requirements of the new funding councils after the 1992 Further and
Higher Education Act was to develop sector wide funding methodologies for allocating
resources for teaching and research. These follow with a more or less degree of
discrimination the evaluative exercises described above, and are largely formula driven.
In addition to council funding, institutions have received undergraduate tuition fees
from the DfEE, which mainly flow through LEA's. Under the dual support
arrangements, funding council money provides for the cost of the basic infrastructure of
university research, other projects being funded by grants from the research councils.
Fees for both taught and research postgraduate programmes come principally from the
research councils, The British Academy and sponsoring trusts and companies.
• Teaching Funding
Teaching funding is a core-plus-margin method with institutions guaranteed a very
high percentage in real terms of their previous year's funding, the remaining funds being
distributed on a competitive basis. High quality provision will be given an advantage in
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the competition for the allocation of new funded numbers, low quality provision will be
ineligible to compete for additional funded places, and could even have their support
withdrawn.
'
Up to 1996/97 15 funding was distributed through 11 Academic Subject Categories
(ASCs), between two modes of study (full-time and sandwich, and part-time) and two
levels (undergraduate and postgraduate taught, and postgraduate research). This leads
to 44 'cells' for funding purposes. Throughout the method for funding teaching, the key
variable is the Average Unit of Council Funding (AUCF). For each institution and each
cell in which it is active this is determined by the total funding in the cell divided by the
total number of enrolled Home and EU students.
Research Funding
HEFCE allocates nearly all funds for research, as much as 95%, by reference to
research volume and quality ratings resulting from the RAE. The remaining funds
recognise and encourage generic research, and develop potentially excellent research in
institutions not previously funded for research (ex-polytechnics and colleges of higher
education). Funds have been attributed in an increasingly selective way, with 75% of
the funding provided going to 20 institutions after the results of the RAE92. By far the
largest part of volume measure is accounted for by academic staff (around 75%). Up to
the 1996/97 academic year the ratings were translated into funding by applying the
multiplier Q-1 (where Q is the RAE rating). From 1997/98 funding became more
selective, with ratings of 1 and 2 attracting no funding, while a rating of 5* attracts
approximately four times as much funding as a rating of 3b for the same volume of
research activity.
Proposed Funding
It is proposed that from 1997/98 for research 16, and 1998/99 for teaching 17 to
establish four basic levels of resource. These resource levels determine standard prices.
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The four groups proposed are Group A: Clinical, Group B: Science, Engineering and
Technology, Group C: Other high cost subjects with a studio, laboratory or fieldwork
element, and Group D: All other subjects18.
Accountability for Distributed Funds
For the first time in 1992-93 the grant to be allocated to universities was described
by the UFC as 'grant for research' and 'grant for teaching'. Although the money to be
distributed remained a block grant, there was a clearer implication that the UFC had
expectations, in broad terms, of how the money would be allocated. Although
accountability for teaching funds had been in place for some time, via an annual
Redistribution Survey, the same was not true for research:
'At present, for the most part, most institutions are not able to say in
detail or in an auditable way what was done with the money allocated
by HEFCE'. (HEFCE, 1993)19
By 1993, it was HEFCE's intention to achieve greater accountability also for the use
of its research funds, with a new survey, Accountability for Research Funds.
Currently, accountability for the funds provided by HEFCE is ensured by three
surveys each year. The Redistribution of HEFCE Funding for Teaching survey requires
institutions to show how they distribute their total grant for teaching. It is one of three
surveys required by the Council for funding purposes. This survey and the Higher
Education Students Early Statistics Survey are required from institutions which receive
HEFCE core funds for teaching. The data from these two surveys is then used to inform
the funding allocations for teaching in the following year. The data from The Research
Activity Survey is required only from institutions that expect to receive Council funding
for research, and will inform the Council's distribution of research funds for the
following academic year.
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4.2.3 The Monitoring of the Universities Financial Probity
Besides determining the overall level of its resource commitment, a major concern of
the State is to ensure that the institutions act in a financially responsible manner. Hence
,
the funding councils establish a financial memorandum between themselves and the
institutions they fund, to monitor the financial health of institutions.
Autonomy from State Funds
On the other hand, the funding councils encourage institutions to exercise their
autonomy to the maximum degree consistent with full accountability for their use of
funds provided by the councils20 . They recognise that institutions obtain funds from
other sources, which give them increased scope to pursue their own policies and to take
their own initiatives.
4.3 The Contribution of DEA to Inform the State/ Funding Councils in their
Remit
In the evaluation of universities by the State, there are different aspects to consider.
There is the issue of assessing the quality of provision of teaching and research, and the
allocation of resources to the different subject-based units of assessment, which is
informed by the quality assessment. The assessment of teaching and research by the
funding councils has been based on peer assessment, which is an expensive exercise,
and is often accused of being too subjective. The use of DEA to inform peer review
exercises to assess the quality of teaching and research can be explored. The single
aggregate performance measurement (APM) produced by DEA can be thought of as the
equivalent to the rating of such a peer review exercise. Once the assessment of teaching
and research is done, the result will inform the allocation of resources. The funding
bodies distribute funds for research selectively on the basis of quality. Teaching funds
are not selectively distributed on the basis of quality. However, funds are not allocated
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to units that are deemed not to attain a quality threshold, and when judging bids for
increased provision, quality is taken into account.
4.3.1 The Use of DEA to Inform the Assessment of Quality
Peer review assessment is an expensive exercise, in financial cost and human effort.
A funding bodies' recent survey put the aggregate cost to the sector of participating in
the 1996 RAE at £27.3M. Frequent RAE and TQA are diverting academic time away
from research and teaching. Nevertheless the funding councils do need mechanisms
which enable them to exercise judgements. These should be robust, widely accepted,
and preferably more efficient, effective, and transparent. The funding councils are
interested to know the possibilities offered by quantitative methods to assess the
performance of universities, specially in relation to research, as seen by the following
quotation:
'Question 16: If peer review is retained as the primary method of
assessment, should this be supplemented by quantitative methods, and if
so, how?' (HEFCE, RAE 2/97)21
Doyle et al (1996)22, as reviewed in Chapter 2, have suggested that future panels
might like to consider DEA as a decision support tool, which may improve the quality
and defensibility of their judgements. DEA, by making explicit what would otherwise
remain implicit, allows the decision makers to look for unwarranted policies, which may
have crept into their judgemental processes. To investigate the contribution that DEA
may give to answering this question, DEA models of teaching and research activity,
which incorporate quality measures, can be envisaged. The results could then be
compared to the teaching and research assessment ratings, to determine how they relate.
A DEA Model for the TQA
For the teaching model, and bearing in mind that the quality of teaching provision is
assessed by the funding councils on a value-added approach (unlike research), Model 1
1 1 1
is proposed. The model has a value-added approach to quality, as the TQA, with the
student entry profile as an input, and completion rates, exit qualifications, and
employment destinations, as outputs. FTE academic staff is a measure of input volume,
,
and FTE students, undergraduate and post-graduate taught (post-graduate research
students have been considered in the RAE for some time now) give a measure of
volume of teaching output for the unit under analysis.
Model 1 considers both quality and volume, which is consistent with the TQA
exercise, despite its name. If a pure assessment of quality were required a different
model could be envisaged.
Model 1 would be solved for each unit of assessment of the quality of education
(UAQE), and the APM obtained comparable to the rating of the TQA exercise. The
labels in Model 1 are generic input - output variables only, a detailed discussion of
which follows.
Model 1: Teaching Quality Assessment Model
Inputs	 Outputs
Academic staff
	
UG and PGT students
Student entry profile	 Completion rates
Exit qualifications
Employment destinations
Academic staff, measured in FTE, would relate to those academic staff who have
• teaching activities, and would be a measure of resource volume. UG and PGT students,
measured in FTE, would represent the volume of teaching activity undertaken. It should
be measured by the weighted average of the number of students with different
weightings for the mode of study. Information on FTE staff and students for each
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UAQE is not available at present, but could easily be available in the submission for the
TQA, as it is common for institutions to know the student/ staff ratio for each unit.
Student entry profile represents the quality of the student intake. It could be given by
,
the average A-level points for the students at each UAQE. This information is part of
the evidence presented to the assessors at the TQA exercise, although not publicly
available. Since the information on entry requirements is available via UCAS for each
degree, and again supposing that the mapping to the 61 UAQE is possible, this is a
likely measure. The caveat that in some institutions this is not a good measure because
of the increasing numbers of non-traditional applicants, whose qualifications cannot
readily be compared with A-level applicants, applies also to the TQA exercise.
Completion rates are given by the proportion of those that graduate out of the
corresponding cohort of students. Exit qualifications are given by the degree
classification. Employment destinations by the percentage of graduate in employment
or further study. Completion rates, exit qualifications, and employment destinations,
are all measures of outcome of the teaching process, and as with student entry profile,
are part of the evidence presented to the assessors at the TQA exercise, but not made
publicly available. They all have some caveats. Low completion rates may identify
problems with the applicant selection process, rather than less motivating teaching, and
the use of the measure might discourage wider access. Good degree results may reflect
high entry scores, but also more lenient standards. The percentage of graduates in
employment after graduation, does not capture either long-term employment prospects,
or poor 'job matching'. However the combined use of the three measures will tend to
balance the picture obtained.
As to the actual measures to be used, there are some problems in using indexes, such
as completion rates, in DEA 23 . One alternative would be to use measures of volume
moderated by the quality measures. For instance, entry profile, as the volume of
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students x average entry score. Level of teaching activity, as volume of students x
completion rates. As for degree results, the numbers that achieve a certain threshold,
e.g. above 2:1 could be used. The same reasoning could be applied to employment
destinations.
In conclusion, although the model cannot be solved at the moment, it could in
principle be used with existing information, which is unfortunately not publicly
available.
A DEA Model for the RAE
The research assessment is concerned only with assessing research quality, it places
emphasis on outputs, as opposed to context and research environment. It is a summative
process, not overtly concerned with producing formative or developmental outputs,
unlike the teaching quality assessment exercise, which has both formative and
summative purposes. These characteristics makes it a more likely candidate for
replacing it with a quantitative method, than in the teaching peer review process, which
produces recommendations for the unit assessed. The exercise informs future funding,
by assessing the quality of research conducted in the past. A rating is basically derived
based on the quality of published outcomes as well as other research output, produced
by those staff submitted for the assessment.
In the light of the considerations above a DEA model of the RAE, Model 2, is
proposed. The labels in Model 2 are generic input - output variables only, a discussion
of which follows.
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Model 2: Research Assessment Exercise Model
Inputs	 Outputs
Research active staff
	 Publications and other research output
PGR students
External research income
Model 2 should in principle be solved for each UOA, and the APM obtained
compared to the RAE rating.
Research active staff, measured in FTE, would be those staff submitted to the RAE.
It would be a measure of input volume. Publications and other research output, and
postgraduate research students, would be measures of output volume. Publications and
other research output could be divided in sub-categories and thus originate several
output measures, for instance, papers in refereed journals, chapters of books, etc.
Different importances attached to the different research outputs by the panel of
assessors could be translated via weights restrictions as suggested by Doyle et al.
(1996) 22 and Johnes and Johnes (1995) 24. Postgraduate research students, measured in
FIE, is another form of research output considered by the RAE.
The issue whether external research income should be an input or an output needs
clarification. We argue that it should be considered an input when the efficiency of
converting this money into research output is being measured (for instance, by the
research councils, to assess accountability for their funds). It should be considered an
output to measure the success of the DMU in attracting investors, i.e. the
competitiveness and reputation (perceived quality) of the unit, which is precisely the
case being studied. The idea here, as advocated by Doyle et a1 22, is to use DEA as an
analysis tool to improve the process of judgement by a RAE panel. The objective is not
to devise a model of what should be, as Beasley, 1990 25 ; and Johnes and Johnes, 199326
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propose, which has a concept of technical efficiency behind it. Johnes and Johnes in
their analysis of the 1989 24'26
 and Johnes in his analysis of the 1993 27
 RAE have shown
evidence that the panels under consideration have consistently used research grants and
,
contracts as an output (the more the better) in the process of judgement. In the spirit of
this thesis, of asking who is doing the assessment and for what purpose, should the
evidence of the use of research income explicitly change in future RAE, then its role in
the model should change accordingly.
Here it is furthermore argued that external research income can be considered a
measure of research quality, thus on the output side, as it reflects the prestige of the
UOA, and its ability to attract income over and above state appropriations on the input
side, which is overtly encouraged by the funding councils. Realising the known caveats
of this measure, it would be beneficial to add other measures of research output quality,
some of which are presented as evidence by some UOA in their submission to the RAE,
such as citation indexes. The number of citations for the outputs of selected
researchers, could moderate the volume produced. Another alternative is to use impact
factors of place of publication; bibliometric analysis could be undertaken to produce
hierarchies of journals within different research areas. As mentioned above, weights
restrictions can also be used to translate the relative importance of the output measures
to the panel of assessors. Unfortunately the sector has still not agreed on the publication
of research performance indicators, that could be used here, although the latter has been
planned for some time now.28
4.3.2 The Use of DEA to Inform Resource Allocation
As discussed above, the allocation of research money follows the ratings obtained in
the RAE, where these are translated into a funding scale, in a more or less arbitrary way.
The funding of teaching is not as selective, and the TQA informs on the units that
should be funded (provided a threshold of quality is attained) and to inform the
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allocation of further provision. The use of DEA to help make decisions on funding
could be envisaged. The idea is that funding should follow value-for-money for the
funding councils, i.e. given the money allocated to the unit, what level of output, both in
,
terms of quantity and quality is achieved. To this purpose, two DEA models are
suggested: Model 3 for teaching, and Model 4 for research.
Model 3: Value for Money for Teaching
Inputs	 Outputs
Redistributed teaching funds	 Teaching output
The DMUs for Model 3 would be those candidates in the bid for further student
places, the APM for each DMU would represent value-for-money in the teaching
activity to the funding council. The resulting top ranking from the solution to the
model, would be the shortlist of institutions to receive increased funding.
Redistributed teaching funds here is the way each institution chooses to distribute its
teaching grant from the funding council, and it represents the level of resources
available to the unit. It is only available by the 11 ASC, not for each of the 61 UAQE,
each year as average units of council funding (AUCF). So, if the other measures can be
mapped to the 11 ASC, then the model could, in principle, be solved for each ASC.
Since the existence of the teaching quality assessment has not as its main purpose, to
inform funding, it will likely remain as a formative exercise, and to inform students of
the quality of the education provided by the different units. Thus teaching output
measures can be calculated directly by measures of volume, e.g. FTE students,
moderated by a quality measure, e.g. a teaching quality rating. Otherwise the quality
variables for both input and output sides as in Model 1 should be used.
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Model 4: Value for Money for Research
Inputs	 Outputs
Redistributed research funds Research output
As to research, Model 4 would give a direct measure to be used in funding, instead
of the current procedure of translating the research quality rating into a somewhat
arbitrary funding scale. Another obvious advantage is to fund according to value-for-
money (value-added approach) rather than on outcome basis (as at present), that take
into account the conditions the research unit faces (the reason Beasley 25, and Johnes and
Johnes26 give to use research income on the input side). Units that perform well relative
to their input levels, currently might not see their performance rewarded in the funding
mechanism. Whereas with this value-added DEA approach, they would receive 'fair'
funding, which would allow them to produce outputs accordingly.
Redistributed research funds is the only input in the model. As to the internal
redistribution of funding council research funds, the first question concerns the units or
subject divisions used for reporting on the allocation of research grant to the funding
council. A range of options including the units of allocation used to allocate the
research grant (72 UOA in RAE92, 96 UOA in RAE96), the cost centres (35 up to
1996/97, 41 since), or the 11 academic subject categories (ASC) used in allocating
funding for teaching. Up to the academic year 1996/97, HEFCE has concluded that
institutions should be required to report on their allocation of research funding using
their own allocation units 29 . This resulted in a range of approaches to reporting and
. summation of the results that was difficult for comparison purposes. HEFCE therefore
imposed a greater degree of standardisation 30. Institutions are from academic year
1997/98 required to account for the distribution of their research funds by cost centre.
Central costs, such as for libraries, computing services and administration, may be
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shown in the non-departmental cost centres or split out proportionally to the funds in
each academic cost centre. When HEFCE collates the data, it allocates central costs to
academic cost centres. This means that the required data will be available by academic
,
cost centre, and since HEFCE provides a mapping of UOA and ASC to ACC, the model
could , in principle, be solved for each ACC.
Research output measures would be as in Model 2, or if the outcome-based research
assessment exercise were kept (either in its current or DEA version) to inform the sector
at large on the quality of research undertaken in different research units, research output
measures could be calculated directly by measures of volume, e.g. FTE research active
staff, moderated by a quality measure, e.g. a research quality rating.
4.3.3 The Link Between Quality Assessment and Resource Allocation
A theoretical framework (see Table 4-1) for using DEA for the assessment of
teaching, which can then inform the allocation of resources can now be summarised:
Assessment of the quality of teaching:
1. Selection of DMUs for Model 1, is based on the choice of the subject based units
for the assessment of the quality of education defined by the funding councils. It is not
always clear to which unit a department should be submitted to.
2. The relevant criteria should be decided by the panel of assessors. This will
correspond to the inputs and outputs in Model 1. If the relative importance of criteria
can be established by the panel (e.g. firsts awarded > other classifications, etc.), these
should be translated by weights restrictions. The final evaluative model is obtained.
3. A quality teaching rating is obtained that corresponds to the APM obtained by
solving Model 1.
4. Some moderation might be necessary to accommodate factors that have not been
included in the model. And/ or iterations in the preceding steps are deemed necessary to
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arrive to the final teaching quality rating. These will inform applicants to university on
the quality of provision by different departments, and funding by the funding councils.
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Funding for additional places:
1. The funding councils might, based on the teaching quality rating previously
obtained, bar units that do not achieve a certain threshold to be considered for the
provision of further student places for the subject under consideration. The ones that
bid for additional provision, and are suitable candidates, will be the DMUs for Model 3.
2. The relevant criteria should be decided by the funding councils. This will
correspond to the inputs and outputs in Model 3. If the relative importance of criteria
can be established by the panel (e.g. students from ethnic minorities > other students, if
wider access is the objective, etc.), these should be translated by weights restrictions.
The final value-for-money model is obtained.
3. A ranking of institutions is obtained in terms of value-for-money to the funding
council. The institutions at the top of the shortlist should be receiving the further
provision.
4. Some moderation might be necessary to accommodate factors that have not been
included in the model, for instance, issues of location of provision around the country.
And/ or iterations in the preceding steps are deemed necessary to arrive to the final
decision.
In the same way a theoretical framework (see Table 4-2) using DEA for the
assessment of research, which then informs the allocation of resources can now be
summarised:
Assessment of the quality of research:
1. Selection of DMUs for Model 2, is based on the choice of the UOA defined by the
funding councils. It is not always clear to which unit a department should be submitted
to, and this step might need iteration, as the panel of assessors might wish to refer it to
another UOA panel.
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2. The appropriate criteria, that might change for different research areas, should be
decided by the panel of assessors. This will correspond to the inputs and outputs in
Model 2. The relative quality of outputs will be established by the panel, and these
should be translated by weights restrictions. The final evaluative model is obtained.
3. A quality research rating is obtained that corresponds to the APM obtained by
solving Model 2.
4. Some moderation might be necessary to accommodate factors that have not been
included in the model. And/ or iterations in the preceding steps are deemed necessary to
arrive to the final teaching quality rating. These will inform applicants to university on
the quality of provision by different departments, and funding by the funding councils.
Selective funding for research:
5. The funding councils might, based on the research quality rating previously
obtained, consider just the top of the league for research funding (as it currently does),
or keep all the units in and make the decision on which ones to fund on the value-for-
money ranking instead. The units considered for funding will be the DMUs for Model
4.
6. The relevant criteria should be decided by the funding councils. This will
correspond to the inputs and outputs in Model 4. The relative importance of criteria
should be translated by weights restrictions. The final value-for-money model for
research is obtained.
7. A ranking of institutions is obtained in terms of value-for-money to the funding
council.
8. Some moderation might be necessary to accommodate factors that have not been
included in the model. And/ or iterations in the preceding steps are deemed necessary to
arrive to the final decision. Institutions can then be funded proportionally to their
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efficiency score, or again the funding councils might choose to fund only institutions
that achieve a minimum efficiency score.
,
In conclusion, two purposes for measuring performance at subject level by the
funding councils are presented. The first assesses the quality of teaching and research
to inform the 'clients' of higher education, the second assesses the efficiency in the use
of past resources to inform the allocation of future funds. The assessment of quality
informs to different extents the allocation of resources for teaching and research.
4.4 The Performance of the University Sector
Once resources have been allocated to universities, based on the results of the
assessment of teaching (mostly in the long run) and research (mostly in the short and
medium run), how are these used? On the one hand, there is the issue of accountability 
for research and teaching funds allocated to universities; on the other hand the councils'
encouragement of autonomy of universities from state funds. What is the overall 
performance of universities in achieving simultaneously these two objectives?
The efficiency of the use of resources, either from the state or not, is also of interest.
In fact, when the funding councils allocate extra student places, they take into
consideration unit costs for the units applying, in order to assure value for money.
Finally, the effect of subject mix in the measurement of performance of universities
will also be considered.
Again, DEA models that take into account both teaching and research activities can
be envisaged to address these issues. The results will elucidate such policy questions,
• as the difference of institutional performance between the 'old' and 'new' universities.
Is it fair to assess both types using the same premises, as they were for so long managed
and resourced in different ways? Are their performances really different? There is also
evidence in previous studies (Johnes and Taylor, 1990) 31 , that, at least for the 'old'
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universities there were differences of performance between English and peripheral (non-
English) universities. Is that still true for the new enlarged sector? There is also the
issue of Oxbridge performance. Given their preferential treatment in terms of funding
,
for tuition, do they consequentially deliver more value added accordingly? Or, as some
contest (THESIS, 1997) 32 the money would be better used if re-allocated to other
institutions?
4.4.1 Accountability for and Autonomy from State Funds
In the State/ funding councils perspective, good performance is not only to provide
good quality teaching and research, at value for money, but also to ensure some degree
of autonomy and financial health. Basically, a comprehensive performance model will
be useful, that takes both accountability to state funds and desired autonomy of the
institution into consideration. This model would measure the effectiveness of state
investment, in triggering off external investment on universities, without leaving out the
efficiency of universities in the use of state funds. This is translated in Model 5, where
state appropriations are the input to the model, teaching and research are outputs, and
so is earned income, as a measure of autonomy. The resulting APM is as a measure of
overall performance of the university from the state perspective. The model would be
solved for each university.
Model 5: Overall Performance
Inputs	 Outputs
State appropriations Teaching output
Research output
Earned income
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State appropriations ideally would be in the form of funding councils grants plus
mandatory academic fees channelled through the LEAs. Earned income would be any
income over and above the state appropriations, such as full-cost fees, research grants
,
and contracts. Teaching output could be obtained by summing a measure of volume,
e.g. FTE students, moderated by a measure of quality, e.g. the teaching quality rating,
for all UAQE across the institution. Research output could also be obtained by
summing a weighted sum of measures of volume provided in the RAE (FTE research
active staff, research assistants and fellows, and research students), multiplied by a
measure of quality, e.g. RAE rating, for all UOA across the institution.
4.4.2 Efficiency in the Use of Resources
If the State/ funding councils perspective is considered, the main objective is to
provide good quality teaching and research at value for money. Thus when considering
future funding, specially when broadening provision, the funding councils look for
universities that use resources more efficiently, to award extra provision (for instance,
in the allocation of more student places). The efficiency of a university's operation is
translated in Model 6, where total resources are the input to the model, and teaching
and research are outputs. The resulting APM is as a measure of efficiency (value for
money) in the use of resources. The model would be solved for each university.
Model 6: Efficiency
Inputs	 Outputs
Total resources Teaching output
Research output
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4.4.3 Disentangling the Subject Mix Factor from the Measurement of
Performance
In the above two models (Model 5 and Model 6), the subject mix factor is not
considered. However there is evidence from previous studies31 , that this is an important
factor. Handling subject mix in the context of comparing universities' performance has
been a problem. It is proposed the use of weights restrictions that link the input-output
divide to deal with subject-mix effects in this context. The procedure used in this
chapter follows the method proposed by Thanassoulis et a133 to link factors across the
input-output divide. It prevents units from taking undue advantage of weight flexibility
irrespective of the established links between certain inputs and outputs. The method is
applied to the present problem of taking account of subject mix in the measurement of
performance. To be able to disentangle the subject-mix factor in the measurement of
performance Model 7 and Model 8, corresponding to Model 6 and Model 5 respectively,
are proposed. Inputs and outputs are disaggregated into the summed values for different
subject cost bands, so they can be linked through weights restrictions, as will be shown
in the next section
Model 7: Overall Performance Taking Account of Subject Mix
Inputs	 Outputs
State appropriations for cost band X Teaching output for cost band X
Research output for cost band X
Earned income for cost band X
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Model 8: Efficiency Taking Account of Subject Mix
Inputs	 Outputs
Total resources for cost band X Teaching output for cost band X
,
Research output for cost band X
Traditionally, researchers have considered a science/ non-science divide when
assessing the subject mix on university performance. However, HEFCE proposes 16' 17
four empirically derived cost bands: Clinical; Science, engineering and technology;
Other high cost subjects with a studio, laboratory or fieldwork element; and All other
subjects. Considering these bands, the number of inputs would raise to four, and the
number of outputs from three to twelve! These might lead to lack of discrimination
between the units being assessed, which the use of weights restrictions to link outputs to
inputs might counteract.
In the next section, an application to the university sector for the academic year
1995/96 to test the usefulness of the proposed models, is described.
4.5 An Application to the University Sector for the Academic Year 1995/96
As discussed above neither Model 1 nor Model 2 can be solved at the moment,
because, although data is collected for the inputs and outputs considered, not all is in the
public domain. Model 7 cannot be solved either, because data on earned income by cost
band is not collected, thus not available. Model 5, Model 6 and Model 8 can however
be solved, despite some caveats, that will be discussed. The data used can be found in
Appendix 4-1.
4.5.1 Units of Assessment
The unit of assessment for Model 5, Model 6 and Model 8 is the university. Out of
the 96 universities (eight of the London University colleges are directly funded by
HEFCE, and thus are treated as independent institutions) for which The Times compiles
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the average teaching and research ratings, seven were excluded for different reasons.
University of London, Goldsmiths' College concentrates its activities in cost bands B
and C; University of London, Imperial College concentrates its activities in group B,
and has very little activity in groups C and D; London Guildhall University is the only
institution that has zero research activity for some of the groups where it is active in
teaching; University of London, LSE is mainly active in group D, with only some
activity in group C; UMIST is mainly active in group B, with some activity in groups C
and D. University of Wales, Lampeter is the smallest of all institutions and is mainly
active in group D, with only some activity in group C; University of London, Queen
Mary and Westfield College dedicates more than half of its resources to group A. From
The Times list three universities were already excluded: the Open University for having
very different characteristics from the other institutions; Cranfield University for being
mainly a postgraduate institution; and Buckingham, which does not receive funds from
HEFCE, and therefore does not have the quality of its teaching and research assessed.
The exclusion of these institutions guarantees a well-conditioned data matrix. This
will be specially important in the use of weights restrictions in Model 8 to link inputs to
outputs in the same cost band. The models have therefore been solved for 89
universities.
All data used is available from HESA reference volumes Students in Higher
Education Institutions34 and Resources in Higher Education Institutions 35 , with the
exception of average teaching and research ratings obtained from the Times Good
University Guide.36
4.5.2 Experimental Design
Model 5: Overall Pelformance was subdivided into two models with different
degrees of disaggregation, as in Table 4-3.
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Table 4-3: Model 5 Specification
Variable Sets
Model Inputs	 Outputs	 ,
51	 HEFCS_INC	 NON_HEFCESINC
TEACHING
RESEARCH
52	 HEFCS_INC	 NON_HEFCSINC
TEACH_UGS
TEACH_PGS
RESEARCH
The variables used are defined as follows:
HEFCS_INC: Funding Council Grants income in £ thousands. It is directly
available from HESA statistics. It includes institutional funds for academic and other
purposes allocated primarily by the Higher Education Funding Councils for England,
Wales, and Scotland, and by the Department of Education for Northern Ireland acting as
a funding agency for the two Northern Ireland universities.
NON_HEFCS_INC: sum of Academic Fees and Support Grants, Research Grants
and Contracts, Other Operating Income, and Endowment Income and Interest
Receivable, in f thousands. All elements are directly available from HESA statistics.
Academic Fees and Support Grants includes all income received in respect of fees for
students on courses for which fees are charged. Research Grants and Contracts
includes all income in respect of externally sponsored research carried out by the
institution for which directly related expenditure has been incurred. Other Services
Rendered includes all income in respect of services rendered to outside bodies,
including the supply of goods and consultancies.
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TEACHING: is the total number of FTE students, as the measure of volume,
multiplied by the average teaching rating for the university, as a measure of quality.
FTE students by university is directly available from HESA statistics. Teaching rating
,
uses the average score for each university in the funding council assessment completed
by the end of 1996. Not all subjects have yet been assessed, but those covering a
majority of students now have. In principle, the teaching output should be calculated
for every UAQE, and the sum for all UAQE by university obtained. However, as not all
units have been assessed and FTE students are not available by UAQE, the average for
each university is used instead.
TEACH_UGS: is the total number of FTE undergraduates, as the measure of
volume, multiplied by the average teaching rating for the university, as the measure of
quality.
TEACH_PGS: is the total number of FTE postgraduates, as the measure of volume,
multiplied by the average teaching rating for the university, as the measure of quality.
RESEARCH: is the total number of FIE academic staff, as the measure of volume,
multiplied by the average research rating for the university, as measure of quality. FTE
academic staff is deemed the most important measure of volume by HEFCE, and was
thus chosen. Other measures of volume (e.g. research assistants and fellows,
postgraduate researchers) used by HEFCE are not readily available by institution. FTE
academic staff is not directly available from HESA statistics. A weighted average of
FT+0.5PT was used instead. Research rating is based on the average score for each
university in the RAE96 carried out by the three funding councils. The averages are
calculated for all university academic staff, rather than only those entered for the
assessment.
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Variable Sets	 Variable Sets
Model Inputs	 Outputs	 Model	 Inputs	 Outputs
611	 TOTAL_INC	 TEACHING
RESEARCH
612 TOTALING TEACH_UGS
TEACH_PGS
RESEARCH
613	 HEFCS_INC	 TEACHING
NON_HEFCS_INC RESEARCH
614	 HEFCS_INC	 TEACH_UGS
NON_HEFCS_INC TEACH_PGS
621	 TOTAL_EXP	 TEACHING
RESEARCH
622 TOTAL_EXP TEACH_UGS
TEACH_PGS
RESEARCH
623	 ACAD_DEPTS_EXP TEACHING
CENTRAL_EXP	 RESEARCH
624	 ACAD_DEPTS_EXP TEACH_UGS
CENTRALEXP	 TEACH_PGS
RESEARCH	 RESEARCH
Model 6: Efficiency was subdivided into eight models with different degrees of
disaggregation both on the input and output sides, to test the robustness of the results.
Despite total income and total expenditure by university having a correlation coefficient
of 1.00; there are two 'families' of models: Model 61x and Model 62x with income and
expenditure variables, respectively, on the input side; again to test for robustness.
Table 4-4: Model 6 Specification
The variables used for Model 6 are defined as follows:
TOTAL1NC: Total income by institution in £ thousands, directly available from
HESA.
HEFCS_INC: As above.
NON_HEFCS_INC: As above.
TOTAL_EXP: Total expenditure by institution in £ thousands, directly available
from HESA.
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ACAD_DEPTS_EXP: Academic Departments expenditure available directly from
HESA statistics, it includes expenditure directly incurred by or on behalf of academic
departments, which is not reimbursable by Research Councils or other bodies in respect
,
of work carried out on their behalf. For 1995/96 there are 35 departmental cost centres
to which this expenditure can be attributed.
CENTRAL_EXP: It is the sum of Academic Services, Administration and Central
Services, Premises, Residences and Catering Operations, and Research Grants and
Contracts expenditures, in £ thousands. Academic Services includes expenditure
incurred on centralised academic services such as the Library, Learning Resource
Centres, Central Computers, etc. Administration and Central Services includes
expenditure incurred on central administration, general educational expenditure and
staff and student facilities and amenities. Premises includes all expenditure incurred on
the maintenance of premises and on roads and ground. Residences and Catering
includes expenditure incurred in providing the residence, catering and any conference
operations, including the cost of maintenance of residential and catering premises,
salaries and any other identifiable costs relating to these operations. Research Grants
and Contracts includes the total of the direct costs attributed to research grants and
contracts.
The variables on the output side are as in Model 5.
In Model 8: Efficiency Taking Account of Subject Mix, to disentangle the subject-mix
effect from the measurement of institutional efficiency, the four cost band groups
proposed by HEFCE are considered: Group A: Clinical, Group B: Science, Engineering
and Technology, Group C: Other high cost subjects with a studio, laboratory or
fieldwork element, and Group D: All other subjects. The mapping of this groups to the
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information on expenditure by ACC, on FTE students by HESA subject categories, and
FTE staff by UOA is given in Table 4-5.
Table 4-5: Subject Groups Based on Four Cost Bands
Cost bands	 Academic expenditure	 FTE students by HESA FTE staff by 69 UOA
by 35 ACC
	
19 subject areas
Group A:
Clinical
Group B:
Science
Engineering
and
Technology
Group C:
Other high
cost subjects
with a studio
laboratory or
fieldwork
element
01 Clinical Medicine, 02 Clinical
Dentistry, 03 Veterinary Science
04 Anatomy & Physiology, 08
Pharmacy, 09 Pharmacology, 10
Biosciences, 11 Chemistry, 12
Physics, 13 Agriculture &
Forestry, 14 Earth Marine &
Environmental Sciences, 15
General Sciences, 16 General
Engineering, 17 Chemical
Engineering, 18 Mineral
Metallurgy & Materials
Engineering, 19 Civil
Engineering, 20 Electrical
Electronic & Computer
Engineering, 21 Mechanical Aero
& Production Engineering, 22
Other Technologies
05 Nursing & Paramedical
Studies, 06 Health & Community
Studies, 23 Architecture Built
Environment & Planning, 24
Mathematics, 25 Information
Technology & Systems Sciences,
26 Catering & Hospitality
Management, 28 Geography, 33
Design & Creative Arts
Medicine and dentistry,
Veterinary science
Biological sciences, Agriculture
and related subjects, Physical
sciences, Engineering and
technology
Subjects allied to medicine,
Mathematical sciences,
Computer sciences, Architecture
building and planning, Creative
arts and design
01 Clinical Laboratory Sciences,
02 Community Based Clinical
Subjects, 03 Hospital-Based
Clinical Subjects
04 Clinical Dentistry, 05 Pre-
Clinical Studies, 06 Anatomy, 07
Physiology, 08 Pharmacology, 09
Pharmacy, 11 Other Studies and
Professions Allied to Medicine,
12 Biochemistry, 14 Biological
Sciences, 15 Agriculture, 16
Food Science and Technology,
17 Veterinary Science, 18
Chemistry, 19 Physics, 20 Earth
Sciences, 21 Environmental
Sciences, 26 General
Engineering, 27 Chemical
Engineering, 28 Civil
Engineering, 29 Electrical and
Electronic Engineering, 30
Mechanical Aeronautical and
Manufacturing Engineering, 31
Mineral and Mining Engineering,
32 Metallurgy and Materials
10 Nursing, 13 Psychology, 22
Pure Mathematics, 23 Applied
Mathematics, 24 Statistics and
Operational Research, 25
Computer Science, 33 Built
Environment, 34 Town and
Country Planning, 35 Geography,
43 Business and Management
Studies, 64 Art and Design, 65
Communication Cultural and
Media Studies, 66 Drama Dance
and Performing Arts, 67 Music,
68 Education, 69 Sports Related
Subjects
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Group D: All
other subjects
07 Psychology & Behavioural
Sciences, 27 Business &
Management Studies, 29 Social
Studies, 30 Librarianship
Communication & Media Studies,
31 Language Based Studies, 32
Humanities, 34 Education, 41
Continuing Education
Social economic and political
studies, Law, Business and
administrative studies,
Librarianship and information
science, Languages, Humanities,
Education, Combined studies,
36 Law, 37 Anthropology, 38
Economics and Econometrics, 39
Politics and International Studies,
40 Social Policy and
Administration, 41 Social Work,
42 Sociology, 44 Accountancy,
45'American Studies (Canada
the Caribbean Latin America and
the USA), 46 Middle Eastern and
African Studies, 47 Asian
Studies, 48 European Studies, 49
Celtic Studies, 50 English
Language and Literature, 51
French, 52 German Dutch and
Scandinavian Languages, 53
Italian, 54 Russian Slavonic and
East European Languages, 55
Iberian and Latin American
Languages, 56 Linguistics, 57
Classics Ancient History
Byzantine and Modern Greek
Studies, 58 Archaeology, 59
History, 60 History of Art
Architecture and Design, 61
Library and Information
Management, 62 Philosophy, 63
Theology Divinity and Religious
Studies
Model 8 was sub-divided into two models: Model 81 for universities with clinical
studies and Model 82 for universities without clinical studies. Two models are
necessary because of the need to have well-conditioned data matrices with the adopted
weights restrictions. Unfortunately, this means that comparison of performance of
universities with and without clinical studies is not possible.
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Model 81: Universities with Clinical Studies
Variable Set
Inputs Outputs Weights Restrictions	 , Type
GROUP_A_EXP TEACH_A TEACH_A + RES_A > GROUP_A_EXP Virtual
GROUP_B_EXP TEACH_B TEACH_B + RES_B > GROUP_B_EXP Virtual
GROUP_C_EXP TEACH_C TEACH_C + RES_C > GROUP_C_EXP Virtual
GROUP_D_EXP TEACH_D TEACH_D + RES_D > GROUP_D_EXP Virtual
CENTRAL_EXP RES_A GROUP_A_EXP > 4.5 GROUP_D_EXP Absolute
RES_B GROUP_B_EXP > 2.0 GROUP_D_EXP Absolute
RES_C GROUP_C_EXP > 1.5 GROUP_D_EXP Absolute
RES_D GROUP_D_EXP > 0.05 Virtual
CENTRAL_EXP > 0.40 Virtual
Model 82: Universities without Clinical Studies
Variable Set
Inputs Outputs Weights Restrictions Type
GROUP_B_EXP TEACH_B TEACH_B + RES_B > GROUP_B_EXP Virtual
GROUP_C_EXP TEACH_C TEACH_C + RES_C > GROUP_C_EXP Virtual
GROUP_D_EXP TEACH_D TEACH_D + RES_D > GROUP_D_EXP Virtual
CENTRAL_EXP RES_B GROUP_B_EXP > 2.0 GROUP_D_EXP Absolute
RES_C GROUP_C_EXP > 1.5 GROUP_D_EXP Absolute
RES_D GROUP_D_EXP > 0.05 Virtual
CENTRAL_EXP > 0.40 Virtual
The variables used in Model 8 are defined as follows:
GROUP_A_EXP: The sum of Academic Departments expenditure for ACCs
belonging to Group A in £ thousands, from HESA statistics.
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GROUP_B_EXP, GROUP_C_EXP, GROUP_D_EXP: As in GROUP_A_EXP, but
for ACCs belonging to groups B, C, and D, respectively.
CENTRAL_EXP: It is the sum of Academic Services, Administration and Central
Services, Premises, Residences and Catering Operations, and Research Grants and
Contracts expenditures, in £ thousands, from HESA statistics.
TEACH_A: It is the total number of FTE students in the subject areas (from HESA
statistics) belonging to Group A, as the measure of volume, multiplied by the average
teaching rating for the university, as a measure of quality. In principle, the teaching
output should be calculated for every UAQE, and the sum for all UAQE belonging to
Group A obtained. However, as not all units have been assessed and FTE students are
not available by UAQE, the average for each university is used instead.
TEACH_B, TEACH_C, TEACH_D: As in TEACH_A, but for subject areas
belonging to groups B, C, and D, respectively.
RES_A: It is the total number of FTE academic staff in U0As (from the RAE96
database) belonging to Group A, as the measure of volume, multiplied by the average
research rating for the university, as measure of quality. In principle, the research
output should be calculated for every UOA, and the sum for all UOA belonging to
Group A, for each university, obtained. However, this information is not readily
available.
RES_B, RESS, RES_D: As in RES_A, but for UOA belonging to groups B, C, and
D.
The weights restrictions reflect the following:
• Teaching and research output virtual weights combined for each group should be at
least the same as the departmental expenditure virtual weight for that group. This
reflects the fact that both departmental expenditure and a proportion of central
expenditure contribute for the departmental output.
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• The absolute weight for Group A should be at least four times that for Group D, for
Group C 2.5 times, and for Group B 1.5 times. This reflects empirical evidence
collected by HEFCE.
	
,
• The two last virtual weights restrictions reflect the evidence in the data; that for all
units under assessment, at least 5% of the total expenditure is academic departmental
expenditure in Group D, and at least 40% of the total expenditure is in central
activities.
4.5.3 Results
The models in the previous section were solved using an output expansion
orientation, which translates the funding agencies objective to calculate, given the
resources each institution possesses, the level of activity they can deliver, both in terms
of volume and quality. The results are in Appendix 4-2, where COUNT gives the
number of units under consideration, #EFF is the number of units that appear efficient,
RADIAL is the efficiency score, and the virtual weights for each factor are denoted by
the name of the factor with the suffix V.
For Model 5 (see Table 4-9 and Table 4-10) concerned with the overall performance
of the university from the state perspective, i.e. good quality teaching and research at
value for money, plus evidence of autonomy from state appropriations: on average,
English universities perform better than peripheral universities, as do old universities
compared to new universities. These results are robust for different assumptions of
returns to scale and different degrees of disaggregation of outputs. As to the difference
in virtual weights for different outputs, English universities put more weight on
attracting non-funding-council funds, than their non-English counterparts, the same for
old compared with new universities. Both Oxford and Cambridge are efficient for all
variants of Model 5. The most marked difference between old and new universities, is
the weight given to research activity, this being almost negligible for new universities in
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all models. Old universities keep closer to the old rule of the UFC of a 1:2 ratio for
research and teaching activity levels, respectively.
As for the efficiency given by Model 6, the results using the income variables, family
,
Model 61x, on the input side (see Table 4-11 to Table 4-14), and using the expenditure
variables, family Model 62x, on the input side (see Table 4-15 and Table 4-18) are not
fully congruent. English universities, on average, are more efficient than peripheral
universities for both families of models, under different assumptions of returns to scale,
and different degrees of disaggregation of variables. However, as to the old/ new
universities divide, the results are not conclusive. If the family Model 61x is
considered, then old universities show, on average, to be more efficient than new
universities. Whereas if the family Model 62x is used, then the results are not
consistent for different returns to scale assumptions, and different degrees of
disaggregation. Cambridge University is considered efficient for all variants of Model
6, whereas Oxford only achieves 100% efficiency for Model 623 and Model 624. As to
the virtual weights assigned to the different outputs, again there is a marked difference
between old and new universities for all variants of Model 6. Old universities have a
more balanced distribution of virtual weights among their activities, whereas new
universities give clear preference to teaching over research activity. If teaching output
is disaggregated, it shows that the substantive difference is in the undergraduate
teaching activity, as the weights given to postgraduate teaching are similar to those of
the old universities. Strictly speaking, because of the possibility of alternative optimal
weights in DEA, the above results cannot be interpreted accurately. However, the use
of weights restrictions decreases the possibility of alternative weights. Also, we are
comparing the averages of the optimal weights of all the universities rather than
individual weights.
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The results for Model 8, taking into account the effects of a university's subject mix
in the measurement of efficiency, are shown in Table 4-19 for universities with clinical
studies (Model 81), and in Table 4-20 for universities without clinical studies (Model
,
82). All 21 universities with clinical studies are old universities, 16 of which are
English and 5 Non-English. The small number of DMUs, and the large number of input
and output variables leads to lack of discrimination in the results, that even the imposed
weights restrictions are not able to counteract: 15 units show 100% efficiency under
CRS, and 20 under VRS, there is no visible difference between the efficiency and
virtual weight allocation of English and Non-English universities. Oxford is efficient
for both returns to scale assumption, whereas Cambridge is inefficient (96.98%) under
CRS. The sample of universities without clinical studies is bigger, which improves the
degree of discrimination of the results. When subject mix is taken into account, the
difference in efficiency between English and Non-English universities decreases, and
the new universities show, on average, to be more efficient than their old counterparts.
The allocation of virtual weights between teaching and research activities remains,
however, similar to previous models. As before, old universities, in general, give more
weight to their research output and less to their teaching output than new universities.
4.5.4 Conclusion
Handling subject mix in the context of comparing universities' performance has been
a problem. The use of weights restrictions that link the input-output divide to deal with
subject-mix effects in this context, is a novel application of the method presented in
Thanassoulis et a133.
English universities seem to perform better, both when the State/ funding councils
overall objectives are taken into consideration, and when efficiency is being studied,
than more peripheral universities; confirming the conclusions of previous studies.
English universities, as well as old universities seem to fare better in their autonomy, as
140
they are able to attract more non-funding-council funds than non-English and new
universities. Old universities, as expected from years of UGC funding 37
 based on that
teaching and research should be pursued in a ratio of approximately 2:1, have a more
,
balanced portfolio of activities, whereas new universities concentrate heavily on the
teaching activity. When disaggregation of outputs is considered, however, the weight
given to postgraduate study does not seem to differ between the old and new sector,
raising the question to what extent postgraduate teaching is, in fact, facilitated by
departments pursuing research activity, or merely a natural extension of basic
undergraduate study, that does not necessarily necessitate research activity to flourish.
As to the comparison of efficiency between the old and new sector, the results are not
conclusive when the subject mix factor is not taken into account, although the allocation
of weights given to teaching and research remain similar. When subject mix is taken
into account, a division between universities with clinical studies and without is
necessary. The group of universities with clinical studies is relatively small, which
leads to lack of discrimination in the results. Even so, Cambridge is one of the few
universities that does show to be inefficient under CRS assumption. However, Oxford,
with a similar funding structure shows up efficient. This incongruence in the results for
Oxbridge, keeps the debate open as to the legitimacy of their different funding structure.
As to the bigger group of universities without clinical studies, the difference in
efficiency between English and Non-English universities decreases, which may lead to
the conclusion that there is not after all a strong English/ periphery divide, but simply
different subject-mix structures in their provision. New universities, also show up more
efficient than old universities, when their subject mix structure is taken into account,
even with the similar distribution of weights between teaching and research, as in
models that do not take subject mix into account.
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4.6 Concluding Remarks
The relationship between universities and the State is characterised by both
increasing accountability to state appropriations for teaching and research, and the
.,
State's desire of increasing universities' autonomy from state funds. Funding councils,
responsible for implementing governmental policy, undertake systematic evaluation of
teaching and research activities to inform their allocation of resources to universities,
and to inform the public at large.
The recent emphasis on a value-added approach to the evaluation of universities,
makes DEA, with its ability of dealing with multiple inputs and outputs, a natural
technique to be used in this context. It could inform peer judgement in the teaching
quality and research assessment exercises. To this end, DEA models of the TQA and
RAE are proposed. Unfortunately the lack of publicly available data has made it
impossible to empirically test the models, and further the debate on the use of
quantitative methods to inform qualitative evaluations. Moreover DEA could inform
the allocation of resources on a value-for-money approach. This approach would be
'fairer' than the current consideration of unit cost in the allocation of new student
places, or the output-oriented funding scale for research. A theoretical framework using
DEA to assess the quality of teaching and research, and how it can be linked to the
allocation or resources was proposed, but unfortunately could not be tested.
As to the comparison of total (i. e. teaching and research) university performance
DEA models were also suggested, for the measurement of overall performance from the
state perspective, and for efficiency, and then taking also into account the subject mix of
each institution. Handling subject-mix in the context of university performance
measurement has been a problem. The use of weights restrictions that link inputs and
outputs concerning the same subject cost band, is a novel application in this context of
the method proposed by Thanassoulis et a1 33 . Although it is possible to solve these
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latter models, there are currently some caveats in the use of data currently readily
available. The accuracy of the results obtained would be improved if the ideal measures
discussed were used instead of the ones currently possible. This is especially significant
,
for the implementation of Model 8, where a necessarily not completely accurate
mapping of different units needed to be drawn.
Taking into consideration the previous caution, it seems that the use of DEA gives
enough flexibility for the evaluation of a post-1992 heterogeneous group of universities
with different identities and purposes; which are designed to be different kinds of
institutions performing different missions. The currently used evaluative-funding
models are charged to be biased towards the pre-1992 model of university, and up to
now the merged sector has not been able to agree on a common set of quantitative
performance measures. In fact, in an efficiency model that takes into account the
subject mix of each university, the new universities seem to be performing better than
the old ones, when both teaching and research activities are taken into consideration.
However, when the relative success of a university becomes increasingly dependent
upon its ability to secure resources not only from the State but also the market, the old
universities seem to be better prepared for the challenge, as do English universities
compared to those in the periphery.
A theme that is not fully resolved by the proposed models is the legitimacy of
Oxbridge in securing extra resources from the State relative to the rest of the university
sector.
It is hoped that the models proposed when solved with better quality data (which has
started now to become available, and will probably become even more so, in the context
of a market of higher education, where fee-paying students will increasingly play the
role of 'clients') will help to shed more light in the issues dealt in here.
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Appendix 4-1: Data
Table 4-6: Data for Model 5 and Model 6
DMU PER NE
IPH W
ER Y
Inputs Outputs
HEFCS NON_H TOTAL ACAD	 CENTR TOTAL
_INC	 EFCS I _INC	 DEPTS AL_EX _EXP
NC	 _EXP	 P
,
TEACH TEAC TEACH/ RESE
_UGS	 H PG NG	 ARCH
S
Anglia 0	 1 29292 35031 64324 29576 33733 63309 242190 20132 262322 324
Aston 0	 0 17741 21808 39549 17326 25516 42842 75133 11031 86164 1170
Bath 0	 0 27691 38865 66556 25170 41150 66320 94956 25404 120360 4130
Birmingham 0	 0 68611 135213 203824 89030 111691 200721 263143 87272 350415 10347
Boumemouth 0	 1 17226 20020 37246 20953 15987 36940 140494 8487 148981 198
Bradford 0	 0 24477 36665 61142 29034 30844 59878 108966 19381 128347 2702
Brighton 0	 1 31456 32576 64032 32893 28999 61892 191408 19881 211290 1043
Bristol 0	 0 56655 98153 154808 69737 86053 155790 191463 51655 243118 9051
Brunel 0	 0 32377 40739 73116 32252 36789 69041 161874 41666 203540 2365
Cambridge 0	 0 86314 180868 267182 101354 152557 253911 239816 95860 335676 23459
Central_England_Birmingham 0	 1 34285 37510 71795 37358 34346 71704 237803 35890 273693 573
Central_Lancashire 0	 1 35935 28812 64747 28610 34171 62781 231722 17606 249327 415
City 0	 0 19149 44447 63596 33530 27563 61093 85895 42660 128555 1591
Coventry 0	 1 36359 36114 72473 31606 38068 69674 231303 19008 250311 709
De_Monfort 0	 1 55757 51156 106913 52242 52885 105127 226102 38148 264250 1768
Derby 0	 1 20274 22792 43066 18729 23809 42538 171025 12336 183361 260
Durham 0	 0 34948 53071 88019 34830 51641 86471 154909 44404 199313 4540
East_Anglia 0	 0 25897 41853 67750 29924 36945 66869 129361 32310 161671 3624
East_London 0	 1 30604 24819 55423 27365 28364 55729 177931 28177 206108 637
Essex 0	 0 17824 30019 47843 18835 28510 47345 85674 21837 107511 2471
Exeter 0	 0 32528 41743 74271 32936 40338 73274 132441 32785 165227 3065
Greenwich 0	 1 39946 45148 85094 35614 49341 84955 221022 36737 257759 657
Hertfordshire 0	 1 37746 47123 84869 40310 43188 83498 230029 21920 251950 713
Huddersfield 0	 1 28172 25798 53970 26460 28377 54837 139814 26018 165832 713
Hull 0	 0 27295 42364 69659 31819 39463 71282 135430 32349 167778 2952
Keele 0	 0 17043 35179 52222 23250 30084 53334 98352 34906 133258 2262
Kent 0	 0 22047 40906 62953 24803 38621 63424 126677 30671 157348 2577
Kings_College 0	 0 47989 89099 137088 56771 78261 135032 178980 43772 222752 6369
Kingston 0	 1 36430 34384 70814 34114 30831 64945 184053 25755 209808 614
Lancaster 0	 0 30562 47975 78537 37206 52067 89273 143937 40094 184031 4302
Leeds_Metropolitan 0	 1 38657 29736 68393 32386 35979 68365 205989 22475 228465 432
Leeds 0	 0 75059 140380 215439 94804 118987 213791 309727 70697 380424 11165
Leicester 0	 0 35748 73271 109019 45166 65141 110307 141794 87857 229650 5554
Lincolnshire_and_Humberside 0	 1 25171 20291 45462 19971 22142 42113 191180 13866 205046 230
Liverpool_John_Moores 0	 1 44632 39164 83796 42185 44724 86909 242922 24491 267413 993
Liverpool 0	 0 62732 92930 155662 63133 92901 156034 211703 42515 254218 7206
Loughborough 0	 0 34296 56455 90751 36610 50168 86778 148852 30956 179807 4048
Luton 0	 1 18495 23221 41716 21656 21859 43515 206831 8708 215539 311
Manchester_Metropolitan 0	 1 64784 48388 113172 55753 55193 110946 385152 56531 441683 1388
Manchester 0	 0 86863 158062 244925 100825 148743 249568 290028 82865 372893 12992
Middlesex 0	 1 40495 47200 87695 31500 52554 84054 287617 40833 328450 917
Newcastle 0	 0 58667 89113 147780 58803 91640 150443 190861 51405 242266 8393
North_London 0	 1 31590 23601 55191 21724 29454 51178 179165 19195 198360 545
Northumbria_at_Newcastle 0	 1 38672 49940 88612 50390 39228 89618 271503 34487 305990 779
Nottingham_Trent 0	 1 47634 51308 98942 52814 43600 96414 304831 22451 327282 940
Nottingham 0	 0 55569 118564 174133 77811 97226 175037 253694 55689 309384 8550
Oxford_Brookes 0	 1 25149 37999 63148 30066 32014 62080 146533 29511 176044 981
Oxford 0	 0 85106 187175 272281 87615 173686 261301 239408 92817 332225 22229
Plymouth 0	 1 41849 45216 87065 48313 37557 85870 300048 23823 323871 1328
Portsmouth 0	 1 36652 41578 78230 45887 32877 78764 210621 18879 229500 1378
Reading 0	 0 37493 63127 100620 47571 50899 98470 143791 57873 201665 4584
Royal_Holloway 0	 0 18712 27711 46423 18105 27337 45442 89389 13376 102765 2259
Salford 0	 0 23125 43984 67109 26084 39643 65727 105592 21579 127171 1906
Sheffield_Hallam 0	 1 51138 43782 94920 47106 48704 95810 284237 36221 320458 1158
Sheffield 0	 0 60985 117551 178536 73386 110206 183592 284826 95691 380517 9113
South_Bank 0	 1 41478 43431 84909 43290 41400 84690 242524 54908 297432 622
Southampton 0	 0 51780 102984 154764 54548 94612 149160 186714 47538 234252 7828
Staffordshire 0	 1 31023 30053 61076 33353 33169 66522 213611 16778 230389 635
Sunderland 0	 1 30017 29109 59126 28495 31035 59530 211462 12194 223656 454
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DMU PER NE
IPH W
ERY
Inputs Outputs
HEFCS NON_H TOTAL ACAD_ CENTR TOTAL
_INC	 EFCS I _INC	 DEPTS ALEX _EXP
NC	 _EXP	 P
TEACH
_UGS
TEAC
H PG
S
TEACH! RESE
NC
	 ARCH
Surrey 0	 0 24500 64052 88552 39466 42703 82169 102662 35716 138379 3433
Sussex 0	 0 31091 39774 70865 29211 41604 70815 125675 34772 160447 4261
Teesside 0	 1 23306 25222 48528 24078 22036 46114 ' 149375 12834 162209 316
Thames_Valley 0	 1 25681 30336 56017 31408 22062 53470 216974 22999 239973 161
UCL 0	 0 89808 187863 277671 88645 182005 270650 195926 81761 277687 16495
Warwick 0	 0 41241 93090 134331 50368 79842 130210 172950 89231 262181 7797
West_of_England_Bristol 0	 1 43208 45971 89179 46600 40403 87003 284046 41124 325170 917
Westminster 0	 1 42663 32356 75019 40330 36755 77085 183246 41158 224404 859
Wolverhampton 0	 1 39523 41866 81389 35402 39823 75225 308710 29441 338151 421
York 0	 0 23795 49918 73713 26516 45965 72481 97936 31505 129441 4553
Aberystwyth 1	 0 24391 28120 52511 19908 32538 52446 111277 21799 133076 1766
Bangor 1	 0 21382 35129 56511 25069 31891 56960 87581 26056 113637 1698
Cardiff 1	 0 50263 63353 113616 46399 63891 110290 223740 52419 276159 6046
Glamorgan 1	 1 27868 24422 52290 21928 28074 50002 204562 11836 216397 261
Swansea 1	 0 30935 39847 70782 34899 37062 71961 131943 31835 163778 3004
Aberdeen 1	 0 37911 58990 96901 37730 62284 100014 156265 25736 182001 4657
Abertay_Dundee 1	 1 12578 8072 20650 9878 9731 19609 63864 5256 69120 188
Dundee 1	 0 34210 46922 81132 33616 45939 79555 118724 24135 142859 3470
Edinburgh 1	 0 85908 136870 222778 82503 136829 219332 272661 51964 324624 12819
Glasgow_Caledonian 1	 1 33025 20105 53130 27298 24354 51652 172245 27330 199574 561
Glasgow 1	 0 82943 101975 184918 80442 106465 186907 280629 45204 325833 8350
Heriot_Watt 1	 0 23068 40576 63644 19717 42614 62331 74983 27525 102507 2087
Napier 1	 1 27939 18162 46101 26339 18700 45039 128526 15067 143593 343
Paisley 1	 1 22040 13479 35519 17141 17894 35035 102150 9359 111509 174
Robert_Gordon 1	 1 21936 25658 47594 19568 28026 47594 113291 11549 124840 496
St_Andrews 1	 0 21030 33953 54983 22491 33536 56027 101302 13118 114419 3165
Stirling 1	 0 20649 29760 50409 19809 30187 49996 96647 18728 115375 1815
Strathclyde 1	 0 59901 75681 135582 60154 74853 135007 216118 77334 293451 5099
Queens_Belfast 1	 0 60035 61534 121569 51528 68340 119868 224083 54722 278805 4094
Ulster 1	 0 55507 43038 98545 46186 59959 106145 256362 51371 307733 2835
Table 4-7: Data for Model 81
DMU PER NE
IPH W
ERY
Inputs Outputs
GROU
P A_E
XP
GROU
PBE
XP
GROU GROU CENTR
PCEPDEALEXP
XP	 XP
TEAC TEACH TEAC TEACH RES RES RES RES
H A	 _B	 H C	 _D	 _A	 _B	 _C	 _D
Birmingham 0	 0 17776 31689 7958 31607 111691 30714 119222 35038 207771 101 215 146 134
Bristol 0	 0 20714 22185 6270 20568 86053 33487 71104 28264 155764 85 178 83 143
Cambridge 0	 0 18585 41346 10696 30727 152557 37256 68256 39709 220954 78 277 142 232
Hull 0	 0 991 6966 6566 17296 39463 111 35517 18090 141122 16 55 82 103
Keele 0	 0 696 4973 5503 12078 30084 144 5923 20669 127171 9 46 56 92
Kings_College 0	 0 11891 17943 12094 14843 78261 21214 39524 86793 91046 70 141 77 102
Leeds 0	 0 19060 34488 11315 29941 118987 31240 131200 38940 210750 88 201 165 135
Leicester 0	 0 10586 12692 2873 19015 65141 17157 47362 6940 174082 74 87 58 94
Liverpool 0	 0 18453 21710 9994 12976 92901 37989 73610 43462 129947 81 195 99 98
Manchester 0	 0 24658 29259 11729 35179 148743 41759 83314 59986 217025 132 211 181 200
Newcastle_upon_Tyne 0	 0 14953 22335 8520 12995 91640 25970 83163 39406 116698 115 146 106 93
Nottingham 0	 0 12312 28461 17660 19378 97226 22695 97961 76133 168943 89 170 126 107
Oxford 0	 0 13617 34607 6440 32951 173686 17819 87291 30910 238564 129 238 110 327
Sheffield 0	 0 17187 20457 14470 21272 110206 32886 108178 88146 197745 100 168 134 138
Southampton 0	 0 7165 23265 10182 13936 94612 17425 86459 48155 113611 52 178 119 107
UCL 0	 0 33289 24651 11435 19270 182005 36144 93283 61348 104667 143 200 117 162
Aberdeen 1	 o 8019 15513 3472 10726 62284 18470 68860 24280 94880 65 85 51 92
Dundee 1	 0 10080 8150 8210 7176 45939 19778 27121 42835 63584 60 88 93 56
Edinburgh 1	 0 23379 24585 9527 25012 136829 36920 95118 31793 181293 114 238 118 165
Glasgow 1	 0 25350 27325 7867 19900 106465 47472 92152 32693 174103 122 210 116 148
Queens_Belfast 1	 0 11513 18469 6173 15373 68340 24070 78028 38180 177342 54 169 59 114
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Table 4-8: Data for Model 82
UNITS PER! NEW
PHE
RY
Inputs Outputs
GROU
PBE
XP
GROU
PCE
XP
GROU CENTR
PDE ALEX
XP	 P
TEACH
B
TEACH
C
TEACH	 RES RES RES
D	 _B	 _C	 _D
Anglia_Polytechnic 0 1 4238 14918 10421 33733 29683 84518 171917 41 155 87
Aston_Birmingham 0 0 9014 1140 7172 25516 18611 16521 59632 51 45 9
Bath 0 0 13490 3045 8245 41150 47889 28905 57451 102 65 39
Bournemouth 0 1 5642 10454 4857 15987 24606 57393 72027 27 58 34
Bradford 0 0 14614 3675 10745 30844 47196 23259 74400 79 56 47
Brighton 0 1 5976 15401 11516 28999 19670 84277 116445 63 203 39
Brunel 0 0 12230 8137 11885 36789 73516 36357 112957 67 67 33
Central_England_Birmingham 0 1 5527 18837 12994 34346 33476 119381 116559 56 236 82
Central_Lancashire 0 1 7470 9987 11153 34171 51173 65179 148946 55 119 82
City 0 0 7895 11819 13816 27563 21782 62702 82690 49 146 29
Coventry 0 1 11481 10876 9249 38068 103496 60684 92888 90 147 39
De_Monfort 0 1 12613 22235 17394 52885 57480 146007 147251 111 211 124
Derby 0 1 3532 6863 8334 23809 29463 40763 119289 56 90 48
Durham 0 0 10933 4315 19582 51641 51459 16546 144092 81 103 113
East_Anglia 0 0 9251 8512 12161 36945 32815 32495 102422 71 65 84
East_London 0 1 7625 6714 13026 28364 49538 58459 91932 49 124 73
Essex 0 0 5390 2154 11291 28510 23196 10850 93139 38 20 96
Exeter 0 0 9426 4592 18536 40338 34642 11347 143958 66 94 88
Greenwich 0 1 8353 14867 12394 49341 53390 86412 131157 80 161 59
Hertfordshire 0 1 13569 15610 11131 43188 73510 82122 105691 107 177 51
Huddersfield 0 1 5450 10802 10208 28377 37729 50609 110676 52 115 54
Kent 0 0 6708 4663 13432 38621 29693 15715 129782 47 68 115
Kingston 0 1 9494 12897 11723 30831 57825 61321 107113 57 165 51
Lancaster 0 0 11330 1944 23932 52067 33415 14781 161366 54 94 95
Leeds_Metropolitan 0 1 2405 15557 14424 35979 27000 79843 141487 56 165 98
Lincolnshire_and_Humberside 0 1 4812 6543 8616 22142 38546 51406 113787 33 97 47
Liverpool_John_Moores 0 1 11602 13964 16619 44724 60744 81369 148393 102 140 102
Loughborough 0 0 19332 5493 11785 50168 75832 18365 97696 105 112 48
Luton 0 1 3360 6968 11328 21859 24549 39217 140407 32 116 66
Manchester_Metropolitan 0 1 14229 16589 24935 55193 76016 80968 295605 112 319 170
Middlesex 0 1 3683 15501 12316 52554 34481 82862 212385 45 189 97
North London 0 1 5197 5528 10999 29454 21188 30682 153217 31 66 73
Northumbria_at_Newcastle 0 1 6406 26233 17751 39228 46508 106733 158145 42 291 111
Nottingham_Trent 0 1 15017 16123 21674 43600 81607 96183 195667 66 204 100
Oxford_Brookes 0 1 7666 12111 10289 32014 26529 63749 100764 50 114 38
Plymouth 0 1 16070 19020 13215 37557 116983 83971 125277 100 132 72
Portsmouth 0 1 15314 15267 15306 32877 64751 75184 107305 92 183 84
Reading 0 0 20629 8397 18545 50899 58771 25313 144766 93 138 93
Royal_Holloway 0 0 5385 4891 7829 27337 27423 18167 64301 39 64 63
Salford 0 0 11342 7775 6967 39643 59050 28074 59914 82 43 45
Sheffield_Hallam 0 1 13735 18386 14985 48704 55377 97363 174891 95 286 62
South_Bank 0 1 11075 19422 12793 41400 63341 86844 134791 111 176 80
Staffordshire 0 1 6352 12973 14028 33169 45717 68011 123582 65 132 94
Sunderland 0 1 9866 6762 11867 31035 57983 68472 98754 72 117 45
Surrey 0 0 19494 10563 9409 42703 60421 36947 76950 115 64 29
Sussex 0 0 10570 3743 14757 41604 52448 18818 116784 91 70 126
Teesside 0 1 5314 11217 7547 22036 28722 59585 91555 47 145 46
Thames_Valley 0 1 789 16722 13897 22062 3001 90863 169244 6 30 33
Warwick 0 0 17687 3572 28882 79842 78495 32132 209356 92 146 133
West_of_England_Bristol 0 1 8534 19378 18688 40403 65000 94796 156763 83 257 103
Westminster 0 1 5979 13186 21165 36755 36417 86608 138935 60 163 78
Wolverhampton 0 1 5663 14082 15657 39823 33950 100933 225634 38 232 83
York 0 0 9217 6026 11273 45965 39006 16861 81852 65 53 103
Aberystwyth 1 0 6682 3886 9340 32538 39362 16685 83048 48 54 80
Bangor 1 0 9591 4611 10867 31891 44996 16345 71181 79 82 45
Cardiff 1 0 18661 7703 20035 63891 68182 47832 181181 137 130 104
Glamorgan 1 1 6240 7158 8387 28074 43517 52906 136550 48 97 70
Swansea 1 0 10647 8311 15941 37062 52445 26803 112544 68 103 86
Abertay_Dundee 1 1 4523 2050 3305 9731 21188 17550 33210 33 44 25
Glasgow_Caledonian 1 1 7992 9584 9722 24354 34922 63137 102648 68 125 48
Heriot_Watt 1 0 12904 1795 5018 42614 46893 24196 60838 86 57 18
Napier 1 1 9615 7355 9369 18700 44925 31469 70450 67 107 44
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UNITS PERI NEW
PHE
RY
Inputs Outputs
GROU
PBE
XP
GROU
PCE
XP
GROU CENTR
PDE ALEX
XP	 P
TEACH
B
TEACH
C
TEACH	 RES RES RES
D	 _B	 _C	 _D
Paisley 1 1 7230 5097 4814 17894 26740 11011 91050 48 78 32
Robert_Gordon 1 1 7497 7950 4121 28026 30330 51656 50209 67 100 34
St_Andrews 1 0 9528 1971 10992 33536 28728 8577 73966 54 39 81
Stirling 1 0 3001 1477 14225 30187 23837 6630 102877 34 64 72
Strathclyde 1 0 23970 7779 28405 74853 86891 41540 221048 129 199 85
Ulster 1 0 11174 15076 19936 59959 55986 98709 157713 80 248 79
Appendix 4-2: Results
Table 4-9: Results for Model 51
COUNT #EFF RADIAL HEFCS_INC V NON HEFCS INC V TEACHING_V RESEARCH _V
CRS	 All 89 6 72.95 141.87 32.57 53.34 14.09
English 69 6 75.75 136.00 34.60 52.06 13.34
Non-English 20 0 63.27 162.13 25.55 57.76 16.69
Old 49 5 78.29 130.94 32.73 42.67 24.60
New 40 1 66.40 155.27 32.37 66.41 1.22
VRS	 All 89 16 82.26 102.66 23.93 64.95 11.12
English 69 15 84.96 96.06 25.32 63.60 11.08
Non-English 20 1 72.95 125.40 19.14 69.59 11.27
Old 49 12 83.55 108.12 32.25 48.06 19.69
New 40 4 80.69 95.96 13.74 85.64 0.62
Table 4-10: Results for Model 52
COUNT #EFF RADIAL HEFCS INC V NON HEFCS
INC V
TEACH UGS
V
TEACH PGS_ RESEARCH_V
V
CRS	 All 89 8 75.18 137.07 25.49 47.93 13.50 13.08
English 69 8 78.02 131.52 26.30 47.37 13.57 12.76
Non-English 20 0 65.40 15624 22.67 49.85 13.26 14.21
Old 49 7 79.97 128.02 33.44 34.45 8.43 23.68
New 40 1 69.32 148.16 15.75 64.44 19.70 0.10
VRS	 All 89 18 83.86 97.47 22.12 56.32 11.28 10.28
English 69 17 86.42 92.53 23.44 55.91 10.18 10.47
Non-English 20 1 75.01 114.55 17.57 57.75 15.04 9.64
Old 49 12 85.00 100.02 30.71 39.67 11.29 18.33
New 40 5 82.45 94.36 11.60 76.72 11.26 0.43
Table 4-11: Results for Model 611
COUNT #EFF RADIAL TOTAL_INC V TEACHING_V RESEARCH _V
CRS	 All 89 2 75.08 135.68 66.25 33.75
English 69 2 76.25 133.18 66.62 33.38
Non-English 20 0 71.03 144.29 65.01 34.99
Old 49 1 77.24 132.14 47.46 52.54
New 40 1 72.42 140.01 89.28 10.72
VRS	 All 89 4 81.97 106.31 72.87 27.13
English 69 3 83.31 101.55 73.52 26.48
Non-English 20 1 77.34 122.76 70.63 29.37
Old 49 1 82.41 110.34 55.52 44.48
New 40 3 81.43 101.37 94.12 5.88
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Table 4-12: Results for Model 612
COUNT #EFF RADIAL TOTALINC V TEACH UGS V TEACH PGS_V RESEARCH _V
CRS	 All
English
Non-English
Old
New
VRS	 All
English
Non-English
Old
New
89
69
20
49
40
89
69
20
49
40
5
5
0
3
2
13
11
2
7
6
83.17
84.62
78.17
83.42
82.87
86.99
88.07
83.26
87.31
86.60
122.06
119.81
129.81
121.68
122.53
106.38
102.73
118.97
102.41
111.24
46.25
46.51
45.36
31.87
63.87
52.14
52.98
49.24
36.19
71.67
'
28.78
29.18
27.40
25.81
32.42
26.56
25.96
28.63
28.33
24.39
24.97
24.31
27.24
42.32
3.71
21.31
21.07
22.13
35.48
3.94
Table 4-13: Results for Model 613
COUNT #EFF. RADIAL HEFCS_INC V NON HEFCS INC V TEACHING _V RESEARCH_V
CRS	 All 89 6 81.41 44.59 80.15 66.23 33.77
English 69 4 81.69 47.63 76.46 67.62 32.38
Non-English 20 2 80.44 34.11 92.90 61.42 38.58
Old 49 3 82.55 60.96 61.96 48.49 51.51
New 40 3 80.01 24.53 102.43 87.96 12.04
VRS	 All 89 14 86.04 50.01 55.82 72.03 27.97
English 69 11 86.79 54.06 48.38 73.55 26.45
Non-English 20 3 83.45 36.06 81.51 66.82 33.19
Old 49 8 86.36 53.28 53.84 55.42 44.58
New 40 6 85.66 46.01 58.25 92.38 7.62
Table 4-14: Results for Model 614
COUNT #EFF.	 RADIAL HEFCS INC
V
NON HEFCS IN TEACH UGS TEACH PGS RESEARCH
C V	 V	 V	 V
CRS	 All 89 11 85.63 44.07 74.34 48.94 22.53 28.54
English 69 2 86.32 49.87 67.49 49.20 24.11 26.69
Non-English 20 9 83.25 24.03 97.97 48.02 17.06 34.92
Old 49 6 85.65 48.88 69.46 33.29 21.14 45.57
New 40 5 85.61 38.17 80.31 68.10 24.22 7.67
VRS	 All 89 19 89.19 43.35 58.24 54.49 21.97 23.54
English 69 15 90.01 49.06 50.65 55.13 22.81 22.06
Non-English 20 4 86.35 23.66 84.45 52.31 19.04 28.64
Old 49 11 89.30 44.66 55.67 37.54 24.21 38.26
New 40 8 89.05 41.75 61.40 75.27 19.22 5.52
Table 4-15: Results for Model 621
COUNT #EFF. RADIAL TOTAL_EXP V TEACHING_V RESEARCH _V
CRS	 All 89 2 76.25 133.44 68.51 31.49
English 69 2 77.56 130.79 68.82 31.18
Non-English 20 0 71.74 142.59 67.47 32.53
Old 49 1 76.17 133.75 50.61 49.39
New 40 1 76.36 133.07 90.45 9.55
VRS	 All 89 5 81.35 11028 74.13 25.87
English 69 4 82.70 105.04 74.59 25.41
Non-English 20 1 76.66 128.37 72.55 27.46
Old 49 1 80.71 108.46 59.06 40.94
New 40 4 82.12 112.52 92.59 7.41
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Table 4-16: Results for Model 622
COUNT #EFF. RADIAL TOTAL_EXP V TEACH UGS_V TEACH PGS V RESEARCH_V
CRS All	 89	 8	 83.09	 122.26	 47.56	 28.37	 24.06
English
	 69	 8	 84.57	 119.96	 47.70	 28.84	 23.46
Non-English	 20	 0	 77.96	 130.21
	
47.09	 26.76	 26.14
Old	 49	 3	 82.47	 123.14	 33.20	 '	 27.59	 39.21
New	 40	 5	 83.84	 121.19	 65.16	 29.34	 5.50
VRS All	 89	 14	 86.52	 107.70	 51.77	 27.54	 20.69
English	 69	 12	 87.68	 104.06	 52.53	 27.18	 20.28
Non-English	 20	 2	 82.51	 120.26	 49.13	 28.76	 22.11
Old	 49	 6	 86.69	 102.86	 36.21	 30.69	 33.10
New	 40	 8	 86.31	 113.63	 70.82	 23.68	 5.50
Table 4-17: Results for Model 623
COUNT #EFF. RADIAL ACAD_DEPTS EXP V CENTRAL_EXP V TEACHING_V RESEARCH _V 
CRS All	 89	 6	 80.39	 61.14	 65.09	 68.48	 31.52
English	 69	 6	 81.27	 55.90	 68.96	 68.59	 31.41
Non-English	 20	 0	 77.35	 79.21	 51.73	 68.09	 31.91
Old	 49	 2	 80.00	 67.37	 59.08	 51.52	 48.48
New	 40	 4	 80.86	 53.51	 72.44	 89.25	 10.75
VRS All	 89	 10	 85.18	 56.10	 54.46	 72.75
	
27.25
English	 69	 9	 85.81	 48.56	 58.44	 73.03	 26.97
Non-English	 20	 1	 83.01	 82.11	 40.72	 71.79	 28.21
Old	 49	 2	 84.81	 65.23	 45.12	 57.45	 42.55
New	 40	 8	 85.63	 44.92	 65.89	 91.50	 8.50
Table 4-18: Results for Model 614
COUNT #EFF. RADIAL ACAD DEPTS CENTRAL_EX TEACH UGS TEACH PGS RESEARCH_V
_EXP V	 P V	 V	 V 
CRS All	 89	 10	 85.62	 56.14	 62.31	 49.28	 25.29	 25.43
English	 69	 10	 86.76	 53.52	 63.32	 49.43	 25.75	 24.83
Non-English	 20	 0	 81.71	 65.16	 58.83	 48.79	 23.70	 27.51
Old	 49	 5	 85.25	 56.53	 62.35	 33.15	 26.30	 40.55
New	 40	 5	 86.09	 55.66	 62.25	 69.04	 24.04	 6.91
VRS All	 89	 23	 89.36	 51.42	 54.59	 53.07	 24.88	 22.04
English	 69	 20	 89.89	 46.03	 56.95	 53.77	 24.56	 22.06
Non-English	 20	 3	 87.56	 70.03	 46.47	 50.66	 26.01	 23.33
Old	 49	 12	 89.75	 54.39	 47.58	 37.01	 28.37	 34.62
New	 40	 11	 88.90	 47.80	 63.18	 72.75	 20.61	 6.64
Table 4-19: Results for Model 81
C #E RADIAL GROU GROU GROU GRO CENT TEAC TEAC TEAC TEAC RES RES RES RES
0 FF.	 PA_PB_ PC UPDRAL_ HA_HB_ HC HD AV BV CV DV
UN	 EXP EXP EXP _EXP EXP V	 V	 V	 V
V	 V	 V	   
CRS All	 21 15	 98.28 22.99 15.92 15.33 5.62 42.17 12.37 9.50 10.26 2.30 18.79 20.69 12.81 13.29
Engl.	 16 11	 98.14 21.45 15.41 16.74 5.82 42.84 12.41 10.21 10.47 2.39 17.24 18.45 14.61 14.23
N. E.	 5 4	 98.74 27.92 17.58 10.84 5.00 40.00 12.25 7.24 9.61 2.00 23.74 27.85 7.04 10.27
VRS All	 21 20	 99.95 20.95 12.58 10.97 5.60 40.49 11.26 9.62 10.40 7.07 20.92 14.94 11.54 14.25
Engl.	 16 15	 99.93 20.05 12.45 12.66 5.78 40.64 11.63	 9.84 12.11	 6.68 19.05 14.25 11.70 14.76
N. E.	 5	 5 100.00 23.81 12.99	 5.55 5.00 40.00 10.07	 8.94	 4.95 8.34 26.90 17.15 11.03 12.62 
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Table 4-20: Results for Model 82
COU #EFF. RADIAL GROUP GROUP GROU CENTR TEACH TEACH TEACH RES B RES C RES D
NT	 _B EX _C EX P D E ALEX BV CV DV _V	 _V	 _V
PV PV XPV PV
CRS All 68 31 93.16 21.55 20.96 7.33 58.50 15.37 17.22 10.58 22.16 17.06 17.61
Engl. 53 24 93.06 19.40 21.26 7.11 60.80 16.03 19.89 '11.66 19.14 16.31 16.97
NonE. 15 7 93.49 29.16 19.93 8.11 50.39 13.06 7.77 6.76 32.82 19.69 19.90
Old 28 7 87.52 23.65 24.05 8.61 59.23 11.18 7.54 11.31 29.32 19.08 21.58
New 40 24 97.11 20.09 18.80 6.44 57.99 18.31 24.00 10.07 17.14 15.64 14.84
VRS All 68 51 97.37 15.00 18.87 6.32 51.58 12.26 18.59 14.13 27.37 10.50 17.15
Engl. 53 39 97.49 14.33 18.27 6.26 51.74 11.53 20.11 15.90 26.47 9.46 16.53
NonE. 15 12 96.94 17.37 21.00 6.52 51.01 14.88 1321 7.85 30.53 14.17 19.36
Old 28 17 94.94 17.93 20.02 7.43 53.77 11.29 8.17 9.06 33.22 14.73 23.53
New 40 34 99.07 12.95 18.07 5.53 50.05 12.94 25.89 17.67 23.27 7.54 12.69
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5. THE INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE
5.1 Introduction
The universities write their own mission statements, develop their own plans, and
define their own strategies for achieving their goals. But, needless to say, they
undertake these tasks in circumstances not of their own choosing. Moreover, they have
to be sensitive to the fact that these circumstances may change, which could require
them to modify their strategies. If diversity is the main characteristic of the new
university system model, then the constant changing of its context is the main pressure
to which it has to adjust.
In this thesis three different classes of stakeholders interested in universities
performance measurement were differentiated. The wider society represented by
Government, whose policy is implemented by the funding councils; the applicant who is
in the process of choosing a university; and the institutions themselves, 'sandwiched'
between the external assessment by the two former classes and their own objectives.
The present chapter will focus on the institutional level, and the contribution of DEA to
inform management is explored and illustrated in an application to the University of
Warwick.
Dyson et al (1994) 1 show how definitions of efficiency in DEA may conflict with the
mission of the organisation being assessed. Only by taking into account the mission and
objectives of the organisation can DEA have an effectiveness orientation.
Different institutions will have different objectives. But, in general, all will want,
first of all, to attract students; then to develop competencies in them, with different
emphases on teaching and research, regional and national scope, vocational and
comprehensive courses; and, finally, regardless of their mission, they will want to keep
financially sound to survive as an organisation. As to the purposes of measuring
performance, there is a summative purpose, for instance, when allocating resources, but
also a formative one in the search for enhanced performance.
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The evaluation that a university makes of its departments will be considered, taking
into consideration the objectives of the university itself, and its external evaluation by
applicants and the State. It is important to note that direct comparison of departments of
,
different disciplines is not a legitimate exercise. Thus in this study the departments are
initially compared to their counterparts in other universities, in an external
benchmarking exercise; and only afterwards are the departments' performances
compared with other departments at the university being studied.
In the following section a theoretical framework for institutional performance
measurement is described, that takes into account the interfaces between its internal and
external environments. A section describing the application of the methodology to the
University of Warwick then follows, and, finally, some conclusions are derived.
The application to the University of Warwick was not commissioned by any body of
the University, nor are the results necessarily condoned by its authorities. However,
part of the data for the application was supplied by the University and authorisation was
obtained from the Registrar to publish the results.
5.2 A Framework for Institutional Performance Management
The framework developed in this chapter supports the analysis of the performance by
a university of its departments taking account of both external and internal dimensions.
The idea of analysing the performance of an organisation as a portfolio of businesses (in
the present case a portfolio of departments belonging to a university), dates back to a
technique to support strategic option formulation, the Boston Consulting Group (BCG)
matrix2 developed in the 1960s (see Figure 5-1). The BCG matrix views the corporation
as a portfolio of businesses, each one offering a unique contribution to an externally
dependent dimension - market growth rate, and an internal performance dependent
dimension - relative market share. The assumptions here being that the corporation's
objectives are growth and profitability, and that these are determined by market share
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and market size. The advantage of addressing the different units within the corporation
as having to some extent independent performances in relation to market growth and
market share is the ability to transfer resources from worse performers to more
,
promising ones. Hence increasing the aggregate performance of the firm. All the
businesses of the firm are located in the four-quadrant grid, offering a compact picture
of their strengths and weaknesses. It identifies the capacity of each business to generate
cash and its requirements for cash. The stars are best performers, they have high market
growth and high relative market share. They generate large amounts of cash, but also
require significant amounts of cash to sustain their competitiveness. As a result the net
cash flow is modest. The cash cows, on the other hand, generate large positive cash
flow for the organisation, because of their very high competitive strength in static or
declining markets. The question marks are attractive because of the high market
growth, however, they still have not achieved significant shares of their markets. The
net cash flow is likely to be significantly negative. Before deciding to invest or divest in
these businesses, the firm must decide if they are worth promoting or liquidating,
according to the nature of the competition. As to the dogs, the conclusion is inevitably
to divest. If they do generate net cash flows, they are mainly to maintain their own
operations, and are not adding up value to the firm. Ideally a business would evolve
from a question mark to a star, and eventually to a cash cow, which can then generate
the funds to invest in new attractive question marks that go on to be stars, in a
continuous healthy life circle.
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Cash cow
Star
Dog
,
high
	
	 low
Relative market share
Figure 5-1: Growth - share matrix
Adopting and transforming the portfolio approach, Dyson et al. (1990) 3 and
Boussofiane et al. (1991)4 showed how DEA can be used to generate efficiency vs.
profitability matrices (see Figure 5-2). In this case it is argued that, even for profit-
making organisations, profitablility should not be the only measure of performance, the
reason being the effect that environmental factors outside the control of the firm might
have on its performance. In deciding about the performance of units, and how to
allocate resources between them, both efficiency and profitability are relevant. A
profitable unit may be managed efficiently or simply be enjoying favourable
environmental factors, while an unprofitable unit may be badly managed or simply be
experiencing adverse conditions. Star units are best performers in both dimensions, and
are possibly operating under favourable conditions. The sleepers, however, although
profitable, are inefficient. They have a potential for greater efficiency and thus for
increased profits. Units located on the question mark quadrant are under-performing on
both performance dimensions, having the potential for increased profitability as well as
efficiency. Finally, dog units are efficient but have low profitability, presumably due to
unfavourable environmental conditions. Thus, it might make sense to divest these units
and reallocate the resources to more promising ones.
Athanassopoulos and Thanassoulis (1995) 5 have developed a similar concept with
reference to the pubs of a major brewery. Market efficiency reflected the ability to
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attract customs and profitability measured as profit per pound of turnover. This analysis
had the advantage of disentangling performance due to environmental factors and
performance due to quality of management. Another advantage of the analysis is the
'
possibility of benchmarking, where the practice of pubs showing good performance can
be disseminated across the sector.
Profit
Sleeper
?
Star
h
Dog
nnn
Efficiency
Figure 5-2: The efficiency - profitability matrix
In this chapter the use of matrices of different dimensions of performance is further
explored for a portfolio of departments of a university. The methodology considers two
interfaces between internal and external environments: the interface between the
applicant and the institution, and the interface between the State and the institution. In
the first case, a dimension of performance - reality - for the department, in what it has to
offer to the applicant, is taken into account in conjunction with a second dimension of
performance - image - of the department as perceived by the market - potential
applicant. In the second case, a dimension of performance - accountability -
representing the performance of the department in complying with objectives defined by
the State, when allocating funds to the university, is analysed in association with a
dimension of performance - autonomy - which represents the contribution of the
department to the autonomy of the institution in the pursuit of its own objectives,
regardless of the State's.
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The measurement of the dimensions under consideration for a department is initially
in relation to other departments of the same discipline in other universities. This
approach represents a departure from other studies (see for instance Sinuany-Stern et al,
-
19946) where a direct internal comparison of departments of different disciplines
belonging to a single university has been performed. The latter approach does not
assure comparability between the units of assessment. As demonstrated by Johnes and
Taylor (1990) 7, the subject factor is of extreme importance in the assessment of
university performance.
5.2.1 The Applicant/ Institution Interface
Different factors affect university selection by prospective students, some 'soft'
factors such as atmosphere of the university and reputation are difficult to model, as
discussed in Chapter 3, The Applicant's Perspective. However, significant input/ output
factors such as entry requirements *, teaching and research ratings, employment rates,
accommodation availability, library spending, can be used to construct a DEA model for
each department of the university (see Figure 5-3), that measures its performance,
depending on the preferences of the catchment population for the department. Note that
a DEA model is solved for each discipline. The resulting aggregate performance
measure (APM), for each department, will reflect the real performance of the
department in comparison with other departments of the same discipline in other
universities, from the perspective of the applicant.
* Attained entry scores rather than entry requirements might be a more suitable measure. However, the latter
are widely available, whereas the former are not.
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entry requirements teaching rating
research rating
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Figure 5-3: A DEA model of Reality
On the other hand, the perceived performance, i. e., the image of a programme of
studies might not coincide with this real performance. The most immediate measure of
image can be provided by the entrance requirements for the programme of studies.
However, these vary considerably among subjects, and do not give a fair means of
comparison between departments. A better measure would be the difference between
the entrance requirements for the subject and the national average entrance requirements
for that subject. Subjects with a positive image value would be above average and those
with negative image value below average. Perhaps a more appropriate measure for
universities that aim to be at the top of the league tables, in terms of quality of
applicants, is the distance between the entry requirements of the subject and the national
maximum observed entrance requirement for that subject. This measure is also more in
accordance with a frontier (best practice) method like DEA. The university will then be
able to use this two dimensional analysis of performance, reality vs. image, to guide the
development of the department. In Figure 5-4, four general situations: best practice,
improve marketing, query, and review, are possible:
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Reality
Improve marketing Best practice
,
Review
Image
Figure 5-4: Image vs. Reality
Best practice: The real performance of the department is good and so is the image.
This is a benchmark department and its practice should be analysed and emulated by
others, where possible.
Improve marketing: The objectively measured reality is good but the image the
market has does not accompany it. This department/ programme of studies might well
benefit from better marketing and publicity to improve its image and the appropriateness
of applicants.
Query: The department is not performing well in both dimensions. This might
indicate a genuinely bad performer with little chance of improvement, whose activity
should be ceased. Alternatively it may be a new or under-resourced unit that needs
investment to achieve its full potential and eventually move towards the best-practice
quadrant.
Review: This is a situation that is unlikely to occur, since students and their families
are increasingly well informed about higher education. It is an unsustainable position,
as bad performance will eventually catch up with an out-of-date good image. In the
unlikely case that it does occur, a concerted effort to improve performance is required.
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5.2.2 The State/ Institution Interface
The main purpose of the funding councils is to perform the following functions: the
distribution of resources for teaching and research; the assessment of the quality of
,
higher education; and the monitoring of the universities financial probity; according to
guidelines that are controlled at the centre, both through legislation as well as by the
Secretary of State for the sector.
Again, as with the applicant, a DEA model for each discipline (see Figure 5-5) can
be constructed, that captures the performance of the department from the perspective of
the State. The resulting APM, for each department in relation to the other departments
of the same discipline in other universities, will indicate accountability to state
objectives.
funding council funds teaching output
research output
financial health indicator
Figure 5-5: A DEA model of Accountability
Funding council funds are the money allocated to the department distributed mainly
by formula, which takes account of the size and activities of the individual department
and the quality of its research8. The teaching and research outputs can be considered as
the volume of research and teaching moderated by a quality factor, by calculating a
measure of volume x quality rating. Teaching volume can be given by the number of
FTE students by department. Research volume by the number of FIE academic
research active staff (those submitted for the research assessment exercise) by
department. The teaching and research quality can be translated by the ratings resulting
from the teaching quality assessment and the research assessment exercises. A list of
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Accountability
Exploit Best practice
Review
financial indicators that measure the financial health of the institution are published by
HESA at institutional level only. The amount of funding council funds are also only
available via HESA at institutional level.
"
In contrast to accountability, the pursuit of state objectives, universities will also
want to pursue objectives related to their own independence, that might or might not
coincide with state ones. This autonomy aspect of performance can be measured by the
amount of non-funding-council funds the department is able to attract. This internal
value added can be measured in terms of earned income, such as from overseas and full-
cost-fee students, research councils and charities, other research grants and contracts,
services rendered, etc. From the interaction of the two measures of performance,
autonomy and accountability, emerging from the relationship between the State and
institution, different possibilities arise as seen in Figure 5-6.
Autonomy
Figure 5-6: Autonomy vs. Accountability
Best practice: The department is producing good quality teaching and research at the
desired level, while keeping financial probity. At the same time it is raising a good
amount of income in contribution for the autonomy of the institution. Its practice
should be disseminated to other departments, where possible.
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Exploit: The department is not exploiting to the full its capacities. Although it is
performing well, keeping to its contract with the funding councils, it should be possible
to go beyond and engage in other activities that will bring even more resources.
,
Query: This position represents a question mark that needs to be investigated further.
Either it is a unit which no longer is important and closure be considered, or it is a new
department that is worth nurturing for its future prospects.
Review: This is either a case that legitimately is pursuing objectives quite different
from the State but important for the institution, in which case the situation might be
sustainable. Or the department is not keeping to its contract with the State, and needs to
improve in the accountability dimension in order to assure basic state funding.
5.2.3 The University 'Sandwiched' Between Different External Evaluations
The juxtaposition of these different dimensions of performance will raise questions
for the management of the institution under analysis (see Figure 5-7). How to allocate
resources: reward the stars?, help the weak?, is there congruence or conflict between the
different perspectives? It is possible that a department will not be in the same quadrant
of performance for both internal/ external interfaces, as is the case of department D1 in
Figure 5-7.
Image/ Autonomy
Figure 5-7: PM dimensions: congruence or conflict?
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In conclusion, the framework for institutional performance management developed
in this section takes into account different levels of stakeholders interested in the
performance of universities. It explicitly explores the interaction between external and
'
internal performance measurement at two interfaces: the applicant/ institution, and the
State/ institution. Departing from previous studies, that directly compare departments
of the same institution; here departments are first compared against their peers in other
universities, and only afterwards are their performances compared internally to other
departments of the university being studied.
The fact that there is no data publicly available at the required level of
disaggregation makes it impossible at present for the analysis of the accountability
dimension at departmental level. To answer the questions raised by the interaction of
the different perspectives on university performance, an implementation of the
framework, slightly modified because of the absence of the accountability dimension, is
put into practice, and the results discussed in the next section.
5.3 An Application to the University of Warwick
5.3.1 Image vs. Reality
In the following analysis the applicant to the University of Warwick (UW) under
consideration will be the traditional 18-year-old undergraduate, directly out of school.
The analysis can be extended to other categories of applicants, with different profiles as
considered in Chapter 3.
UW collects information from its prospective students during open days. The
Warwick applicant is very much aware of the university as being at the top end of
league tables, such as the Times'9, where it was placed fifth. Individual determining
factors mentioned for choosing Warwick are its success (completion and employment)
rates, the quality, reputation and rank compared to other universities, and teaching
standards. The atmosphere of its campus, friendliness of staff and students is also
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mentioned, and UW is aware of this contribution from the high conversion rate from
students attending open days. High entry requirements have the luxury-item effect'
recognised in marketing, the higher the price, the higher the demand. This has
'
happened, for instance, with the mathematics degree, which has seen a dramatic
increase in applications, since raising entry requirements to the level of Cambridge, a
direct competitor. The course structure is an obvious factor, and distance from home is
also mentioned. This is not only related to the so called 'laundry visit', but also with the
increasing awareness of student debt, both by the students and their families.
In conclusion, the UW applicant can be characterised as a high academic achiever,
who is interested in factors relating to the programme of studies, such as teaching and
research quality, and employment prospects; and factors relating to the institution, such
as facilities available to students, availability of student accommodation, and living
costs. These characteristics can be translated into a DEA model, see Figure 5-8. There
will be a similar model for each discipline under consideration. For each model the
comparator set of DMUs is based on those departments of the same discipline, which
are research active. The reason being that Warwick considers itself as a research-led
institution. For a description of the model used, see Appendix 5-1. The analysis was
performed for ten subjects of the UW that have already been subjected to assessments
of both teaching and research: applied social work, business and management,
chemistry, computer science, English, history, law, French, German, and sociology.
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Figure 5-8: A DEA model of Reality for the UW
Teaching and research ratings for the departments are the result of the last teaching
quality assessment and research assessment exercises undertaken by the funding
councils for England, Wales, and Scotland. The teaching score is on a scale of 1 to 24,
and the research score on a scale of 1 to 7 (the original scale being 1, 2, 3b, 3a, 4, 5, 5*).
The employment score is the proportion of home students from the department taking
up employment or going on to further study. The accommodation score represents the
proportion of students in residential accommodation maintained by the university.
Library spending is an indication of the level of facilities offered to students by the
university. Data on teaching and research ratings, accommodation, and library spending
is available from the Times Higher Education Supplement Internet Service 10. Data on
departmental employment scores was provided by HESA. 'Cheapness' of living is a
measure derived from the average student debt, whose data is collected in the PUSH
guide", and is computed as a 'saving' when considering the most expensive location to
study, corresponding to the highest debt. The PUSH guide uses debt as a proxy for cost
of living. However, it should be borne in mind that debt might be more dependent on
the kind of personal circumstances incurred by the students attending a particular
institution, rather than the cost of living in the area.
All indicators comply to the rule 'the more the better', which will allow the use of an
output oriented model, with the sum of the virtual weights of all the factors being one.
168
This property will enable the intuitive application of virtual weights restrictions that
translate the different importance of different factors (see Appendix 5-1). Since all
factors included in the model are deemed important for the Warwick applicant, they are
,
made to have a minimum contribution of 5%. Important factors are then weighted at
least the double of less important factors, and very important factors at least the double
of important ones. In general, it is for the decision maker to decide on the importance of
the different factors. In the current application the valuation of the factors was inferred
from the analysis of data concerning the typical UVV applicant, thus for a different
university the valuation would be different. To be completely accurate a survey of the
order of importance for the factors should have been made for all departments, as it is
natural to expect that the characteristics of the applicants will vary from subject to
subject. Unfortunately data was not available at departmental level. The results for the
dimension of reality for the subjects under analysis are given in Table 5-2 to Table 5-11,
Appendix 5-2. Image was calculated as the difference between the average entry
requirements of the subject and the national maximum observed average entrance
requirement for that subject. The A-level entry points are calculated attributing 10
points to grade A, 8 to grade B, etc. The maximum possible score is 30, however, in
some subjects, the observed maximum is below this.
The resulting matrix of performance is as in Figure 5-9. The values that are used for
the axes that delineate the quadrants should be decided judgementally according to what
is thought to be good performance by the organisation under analysis.
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Figure 5-9: Image vs. Reality matrix at the UW
All subjects at UW are in the top 5 of the reality league with APM scores above
80%, when compared to departments of the same discipline in other universities, except
for chemistry (see Appendix 5-2). Despite this there are significant differences on how
a department can still improve in relation to the best performers of its discipline. For
instance, business and French achieve the same ranking, when compared with their
peers, but there is significantly more scope for improvement in French with an APM of
84% than business studies with an APM of 96%.
As to image, again most departments perform well in relation to their peers, with the
expected exception of chemistry. German, English and especially sociology seem to
have an image that is poorer than what they have in reality to offer. These departments
may well benefit from marketing their strengths. Chemistry, the most worrying case,
was the subject of the dilemma close/ invest after the outcome of the 1996 RAE, the
result of which was to invest (more senior positions were allocated to the department),
since it was considered a discipline of strategic importance to the university. (A
strategic objective of UW is developing the science and technology base of the
University).
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5.3.2 Autonomy vs. Accountability
Given that funding council funds are not publicly available at the desired level of
disaggregation, the measurement of accountability, at present, can only be calculated
,
when the unit of assessment is the institution, and not the department. This analysis and
the comparison of institutions from the State perspective was dealt with in Chapter 4.
At the moment, teaching ratings will be available by 63 subjects of study. Up to
September 1996, the assessment of 23 subjects had been completed. The completion of
the first full cycle of subject assessments will only be finished by December 2001.
Research ratings are the result of the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE), which has
been performed 4 times, since 1986. In the RAE96 the ratings were produced for 69
different units of assessment (UOA), which might or might not coincide with the subject
categories used for the teaching quality assessment exercise. Data on students, staff,
and expenditure by 35 academic cost centres (ACC) has been compiled, for the first
time, for the academic year 1995/96 12
 for English institutions by HEFCE. Since then,
HEFCE proposed extending the number of academic cost centres to 39 13 , and later on
the number of ACC were increased to 4014.
When teaching assessment of all disciplines has been completed, and data on the
academic cost centres made available, then the methodology proposed could, in
principle, be used to compare all academic cost centres, assuming that a mapping of the
teaching and research ratings to these ACC is possible.
The dimension of autonomy, however, can be studied at departmental level by the
institution. In Figure 5-10 four measures that contribute to autonomy are displayed for
the ten departments under analysis. They represent the contribution of the department
to university income from overseas-student fees, research grants, research contracts, and
other earned income, in pounds per full-time-equivalent staff for the academic year
1994/95. Only overseas-student fees and other earned income are truly discretionary
income that can be used on other projects that the university is interested in. Most
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income from research grants and contracts is spent on the projects they were meant to
fund anyway. However, they are included because they fund activities that the
departments are interested in undertaking, beyond the normal activities funded by the
'
funding councils. They represent the pursuit of departments' own interests and project
their activities to the larger academic and industrial community, bringing recognition
and possibly more resources. Even the funding councils recognise this effect, taking
account of this external research income in their funding formula, rewarding the ability
of the department in attracting funding from alternative sources.
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Figure 5-10: 'Absolute' Autonomy at the UW
As with the other dimensions of performance, ideally the measurement of autonomy
should be in relation to the department's peers, as it is not legitimate to compare the
amount of earned income obtained by a business studies department and an English
department, for example. However, once again, the information is not available at the
level of disaggregation required for all the factors considered. Information is only
available for external (non-funding councils) research income attracted by each
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department, obtainable from the RAE96 database 15 . Figure 5-11 shows the external
income attracted by UW departments during the three academic years (1992/93 -
1994/95) preceding the RAE96 per FTE academic staff, in relation to the average and
observed maximum for that subject, which is more in line with the framework
developed.
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Figure 5-11: 'Relative' Autonomy at the UW
Business studies at UVV is the benchmark for the subject in all universities, as it
achieves the observed maximum. Chemistry, law, social work, and sociology are all
above average, although, except for law, the situation can still be significantly
improved. History has a lot of scope for improvement in this measure. As for the
languages, English, French, German, and Italian, the situation is identical for all the
sector, which shows difficulty in attracting external research income.
5.3.3 The Whole Picture
Although, the juxtaposition of the two interfaces as in Figure 5-7 cannot be
implemented, because of the lack of information on the accountability dimension, a
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visual compact picture of the interaction of the three remaining dimensions: image,
reality, and autonomy, is presented in Figure 5-12. The Reality dimension is measured
by the DEA score of the Reality model (see Figure 5-8). Image is measured by the
difference between the average entry requirement of the subject and the national
maximum observed for that subject. Autonomy, as for Image, is the difference between
the income attracted by each department and the national maximum observed for that
subject.
Figure 5-12: Image vs. Reality vs. Autonomy
The positioning of the disciplines on the floor of the picture, represents their
performance on the image and autonomy dimensions, over which UW can probably
change the situation more quickly than in the reality dimension. Quadrant A being the
best practice quadrant (nearer the frontiers of the two dimensions), and C representing
weak performance on both dimensions. B represents good performance on the image
dimension, and not so go in the autonomy dimension. In D are located the disciplines
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with good performance on the autonomy dimension, and not so good on the image
dimension. The height of the spikes for each discipline represent how well they
perform on the reality dimension. Clearly business studies, sociology, and computer
science are best performers in the reality dimension, above the 85% APM line. Six
categories emerge from the analysis of Figure 5-12, summarised in Table 5-1.
Table 5-1: Summary of global performance
Image x Autonomy
Reality
<85%	 > 85%
A (+, +) Engl bus
Fren
law
hist
socw
B (+, -) comp
C (-, -) chem
D (-, +) Germ soc
Business studies is the star discipline with very good performance in all dimensions.
English, French, law, history, and social work perform very well in the image and
autonomy dimensions, but could still significantly improve the reality dimension.
Computer science is quite well positioned on the image and reality dimension, but could
further exploit the autonomy dimension. German and sociology can substantially
increase their image value in the market for undergraduates, but both perform well in
the autonomy dimension. German can additionally increase its performance in the
reality dimension, whereas sociology is already quite well positioned relatively to its
peers in other universities. Chemistry is clearly lagging, having disappointing
performances in all dimensions.
In conclusion, the application of the framework for institutional performance
management to the UW, although not complete for lack of data, has shown to give some
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insights into the performance of different disciplines within UVV. The interaction of
three different dimensions of performance, reveal different groupings, for which
different strategies are required. Best performers, such as business studies can be used
as benchmark departments, whose practice can be emulated by others performing less
well. Perhaps the easiest situation to address is when the reality is good, and only better
marketing for the department or more exploitation of the autonomy dimension is
required. On the other hand, bad performance on the reality dimension will probably
take more time and resources to address, maybe through recruitment of new staff and/ or
targeted investment from central management. Ultimately, decisions on allocation of
resources, flux of funds to reward good performers, increase funds to units to improve
their performance, or even closure of units, will remain with the decision makers.
5.4 Concluding Remarks
This chapter presents a novel approach for the comparison of departments of
different subjects within the same institution. Departing from previous studies, which
compare different subject departments directly, in this approach departments are firstly
judged against those of the same discipline in other universities to ensure comparability;
and then their performance, thus assessed, compared to the other departments of the
same university.
Different classes of stakeholders have different motivations to measure performance.
Institutions will be affected on the one hand by the State evaluation of them, and on the
other by the applicant's. Institutions can benefit from the information provided by
matrices of performance that take into account these two interfaces between the
institution and the applicant on the one hand, and the institution and the State on the
other. The methodology proposed enables the institution to allocate resources among
departments in a more informed way and thus enhance its performance as a whole.
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The application of the methodology to the University of Warwick faced the
constraints of data availability. Information on performance is vital to enhance
performance, but regrettably universities have not been able to agree on a common way
of measuring this performance. This stems from the fact that universities have been
systematically submitted to evaluations that do not take into account their mission and
objectives. The problem has been aggravated since the 1992 merging of the polytechnic
with the university sector, bringing more heterogeneity to the university sector. It seems
that all parties involved would profit from having information readily available at the
required level of disaggregation (most performance measurement is only meaningful at
subject level), so that they could use the information to guide their choices in a
admittedly diverse new system of higher education.
Appendix 5-1: DEA model
As the factors under consideration were principally used as outputs, model M4
(output oriented CRS) was used in the analysis, so that the aggregate of the virtual
outputs (the product of the output level and optimal weight for that output) summed to 1
(100%) for each unit.
For the reality dimension the following restrictions are added to M4 to express the
preference structure of the traditional undergraduate UVV applicant:
u v yvja  2u l yoo	 V denotes a very important factor
u lyijo . 2uLy14. 	 I denotes an important factor
uL yLio  0.05	 L denotes a less important factor
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Appendix 5-2: Results for Reality for UW departments
Table 5-2: Results for business - top of
table
Table 5-4: Results for computer science
- top of table
Unit APM Rank Unit APM Rank
LANCASTER 100 1 CAMBRIDGE 100 1
OXFORD 98.01 2 OXFORD 99.13 2
CAMBRIDGE 96.49 3 YORK 93.19 3
WARWICK 96.42 4 WARWICK 89.04 4
UMIST 95.03 5 ST_ANDREWS 83.73 5
ST_ANDREWS 88.67 6 MANCHESTER 82.81 6
LSE 88.05 7 IMPERIAL 81.64 7
READING 87.41 8 SOUTHAMPTON 81.24 8
IMPERIAL 87.05 9 KENT 80.68 9
SOUTHAMPTON 86.78 10 EXETER 79.84 10
Table 5-3: Results for chemistry - top of
table
Table 5-5: Results for English - top of
the table
Unit APM Rank Unit	 APM Rank
OXFORD 100 1 OXFORD	 100	 1
CAMBRIDGE 99.7 2 CAMBRIDGE	 99.03	 2
ST_ANDREWS 87.32 3 YORK	 88.7	 3
DURHAM 85.66 4 ST_ANDREWS	 86.13	 4
BRISTOL 82.17 5 WARWICK	 83.28	 5
HULL 81.73 6 DURHAM	 82.44	 6
SOUTHAMPTON 81.48 7 LANCASTER	 81.39	 7
IMPERIAL 81.03 8 SUSSEX	 80.75	 8
NOTTINGHAM 80.5 9 BIRMINGHAM	 80.24	 9
MANCHESTER 80.1 10 BRISTOL	 79.88	 10
YORK 79.84 11
LEICESTER 78.63 12
BIRMINGHAM 76.34 13 Table 5-6: Results for French - top of
EDINBURGH 76.29 14 the table
SUSSEX 75.38 15
READING 75.11 16 Unit	 APM Rank
SHEFFIELD 74.88 17 CAMBRIDGE	 100	 1
CARDIFF 74.78 18 OXFORD	 97.57	 2
UMIST 73.89 19 ST_ANDREWS	 86.61	 3
EXETER 73.88 20 WARWICK	 84.44	 4
NEWCASTLE 73.28 21 DURHAM	 82.22	 5
WARWICK 73.08 22 READING	 82.17	 6
NEWCASTLE	 80.49	 7
SUSSEX	 80.14	 8
HULL	 79.81	 9
ROYAL_HOLLOWAY	 79.77	 10
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Table 5-7: Results for German - top of
the table
Table 5-10: Results for social work - top
of the table
Unit APM Rank Unit APM Rank
CAMBRIDGE 100 1 YORK 100 1
OXFORD 97.68 2 STIRLING 100 1
ST_ANDREWS 86.8 3 LANCASTER 95.27 3
WARWICK 84.82 4 WARWICK 91.28 4
EXETER 83.35 5 KEELE 91.24 5
NOTTINGHAM 82.24 6 EAST_ANGLIA 89.17 6
SWANSEA 82.16 7 BRISTOL 86.06 7
MANCHESTER 81.33 8 HULL 85.44 8
DURHAM 78.58 9 SOUTHAMPTON 83.01 9
LEICESTER 77.27 10 SWANSEA 82.64 10
Table 5-8: Results for history - top of the
table
Table 5-11: Results for sociology - top
of the table
Unit APM Rank Unit APM Rank
OXFORD 100 1 CAMBRIDGE 100 1
CAMBRIDGE 98.11 2 LANCASTER 98.53 2
ST_ANDREWS 90.73 3 WARWICK 97.05 3
WARWICK 89.23 4 YORK 94.59 4
YORK 85.45 5 ESSEX 94.3 5
DURHAM 84.96 6 OXFORD 94 6
LSE 84.62 7 LOUGHBOROUGH 91.37 7
HULL 84.16 8 MANCHESTER 90.87 8
LANCASTER 81.79 9 SURREY 89.62 9
ROYAL_HOLLOWAY 80.76 10 SUSSEX 85.68 10
Table 5-9: Results for law - top of the
table
Unit APM Rank
OXFORD 100 1
CAMBRIDGE 98.65 2
MANCHESTER 82.74 3
DURHAM 82.36 4
WARWICK 82.33 5
LSE 81.59 6
SHEFFIELD 80.66 7
NOTTINGHAM 80.22 8
BRISTOL 80.02 9
ESSEX 79.35 10
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6. THE USE OF VIRTUAL WEIGHTS RESTRICTIONS
IN DATA ENVELOPMENT ANALYSIS
6.1 Introduction
The application of DEA to concrete situations has motivated the use of weights
restrictions to curb the complete freedom of variation of weights allowed by the original
DEA model. The problem of allowing total flexibility of the weights, is that the values
of the weights obtained by solving the unrestricted DEA program are often in
contradiction to prior views or additional available information.
Thompson et al. (1986)' were the first authors to propose the use of weights
restrictions to increase discrimination of the results of a DEA problem to support the
siting of a laboratory, where only six alternatives were under consideration. Their
technique included the imposition of acceptable bounds on ratios of multipliers, to solve
a choice problem. Dyson and Thanassoulis (1988) 2 were concerned about the omission
of particular inputs or outputs from the efficiency score, through the assignment of zero
weights. They suggested imposing meaningful bounds directly on individual multipliers
based on average input levels per unit of output. Charnes et al. (1990) 3, in another
approach to the problem, suggested transforming input-output data to simulate weights
restrictions, where DMUs are assessed on the basis of the input-output levels of pre-
selected DMUs which were a priori recognised by experts as being efficient.
One of the problems with directly restricting the multipliers, i.e. absolute weights
restrictions, is that they are dependent on the units of measurement of the inputs and
outputs. Virtual input/ output, the product of the input/ output level and optimal weight
for that input/ output, however, is dimensionless. The virtual inputs and outputs of a
DMU reveal the relative contribution of each input and output to its efficiency rating.
The higher the level of virtual input/ output, the more important that input/ output is in
the efficiency rating of the DMU concerned. Therefore use of virtual inputs and outputs
can help to identify strong and weak areas of performance. In order to avoid the
problem of absolute weights restrictions, Wong and Beasley (1990) 4 proposed the use of
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virtual weights restrictions, and in particular, the use of proportional virtual weights
restrictions, which were intended to make it easier for the decision maker to quantify
value judgements in terms of percentage values. Because of the intuitive approach to
,
setting up value judgements, virtual weights restrictions have been widely used in this
thesis.
A comprehensive review of the evolution, development and research directions on
the use of weights restrictions can be found in Allen et al. (1997) 5 . In this review the
consequences for the interpretation of the results from DEA models with weights
restrictions has been analysed for absolute weights restrictions. The analysis of the pros
and cons of the use of virtual weights restrictions is proposed as a further direction of
research. This chapter proposes to contribute to that analysis.
The intention of incorporating value judgements might be, as seen above, to
incorporate prior views or information regarding the assessment of efficient DMUs. On
the other hand, there might be two levels of decision-making, the DMU (for instance, a
department or university), and the corporate top management or external evaluator (for
instance the State, or the applicant in relation to a university or department). The DMU
might use its value judgements if it wants to use the assessment for benchmarking itself
against other DMUs (as in Chapter 5, The Institutional Perspective). However, if the
evaluation is done by an external agent, the expressions DMU and decision maker might
be misleading, as the decision maker is, in fact, at a different level. In this case, the
DEA assessment becomes a game between the unit of assessment (UOA) trying to show
itself in the best possible light, and a higher level decision maker, i.e. a controller
imposing its preference structure. In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 the institution or
department is the UOA with the applicant or the State being the controller. A similar
situation occurs in the regulated industries where the regulator is the controller.
184
Allen et al. (1997) 5 point out that the substantial changes to the UOA's current mix
of input and output levels indicated by the imposition of weights restrictions might be
beneficial. It might lead to the conclusion that the current mix is inadequate given the
controller's preferences. The same goes for the deterioration of current levels of some
inputs and outputs.
In the next sections different methods of setting up virtual weights restrictions are
discussed, and their pros and cons, in terms of their effect on the efficiency value, target
setting, and peer comparators.
6.2 The Use of Proportional Virtual Weights Restrictions
The method developed by Wong and Beasley (1990) 4 to restrict flexibility in DEA is
based upon the use of proportions. Conceptually the proportional virtual output r of
UOA j represents the importance attached to the output measure (a similar reasoning
can be applied to an input factor). Thus the controller can set limits on this proportion
to reflect value judgements, as follows:
y riur
a,. < s	  br for an output factor, and
yriur
r=1
xuv,
c, < 	  di
 for an input factor.
Ex, v;
i=1
Note that these kinds of restrictions are UOA specific, which raises questions for
their implementation, namely to which U0As should the restrictions apply, and what
effect they have on other UOAs. The authors suggest the following three different
alternatives. Since the models in this thesis have an output orientation, an output
oriented model (i.e. where
r=1 ydo ur =1) is considered to explore the consequences
of the use of the different approaches. The use of an input oriented model would lead to
similar conclusions.
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6.2.1 Proportional virtual weights restrictions apply only to the target UOA jo.
When proportional weights restrictions are applied to the target UOA Jo, each U0A
is assessed with two additional constraints for each factor (output or input) being
restricted:
yr] 
°	
U r 	XijoVi
	
a r < s 	 <br,Vr and ci < 	 < doVi
Y riOUr	 xoo V
	
r=1	 i=1
Note that, so far as the target unit is concerned, the above constraints reduce to:
x.;
a  ), ;14 b Vr and c < 	 < d,
rio r	 rl	 — m
Ix.. viuo
i=1
Adding the weights restrictions to the multipliers formulation, it becomes:
1
—= min E xu. vi
eo	 i=i
S. t.
Y riotir
r=i
_	 yrjur
r=1
Yriour
rioUr
Ur
1
• 0,	 j
• ar ,	 Vr
Vr
• 0,	 Vi
• 0,	 Vi
• E,	 Vi
• E,	 Vr
Since these kinds of restrictions are UOA specific, as they are dependent on the
target unit's input/ output levels, the target unit will thus be `imposing' different, and
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possibly unreasonable, restrictions on the virtuals of the other units when assessing the
target unit. The virtual output r for UOA jo will be yria Ur . For a unit j i with output
level inferior to that of unit Jo' the virtual output will be constrained to be
a r . yri, U r yrio Ur br • For a unit j r„ with output level superior to that of unit jo, the
virtual output will be constrained to be a,. yr./o ur yri. ur  br . In all cases the
allowable virtuals for a unit j # 10 will be more restrictive than for the target unit, i.e.
the assessment is more 'lenient' to the target UOA.
The consequences for the measure of efficiency and target setting can be better
appreciated from the envelopment formulation:
= max 00 + a ra r — br fl r +	 +	 sr+
eo	 r=1
	 r=1	 i=1	 r=1
S. t.
yrio 00	 Yrj tj
j=1
+xuoy xu. 
i=1
—x,„ (S.+ Ic1,8 ; 	+51
'JO	 vo
i=1
-FY !h a r
	 rlo r
xue,	 Vi
+sr+
	0,	 er
00
	 free
0,	 Vj
05
	
0,	 Vi
a,., $,.,	 sr+ 	 0,	 Vr
The targets for UOA Jo will thus be:
n	 ,nnt
I1..*i = x,f0 1-7 i* + Ec i y: +	 Ecli8
J=1 
F'
y, Yrj A; = Yrjo (0 0 + oc: — frr ) + sr vr
—3'1 * ,Vi
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Two new variables oc r and fi r
 appear in the objective function of the linear
program, which might not be negligible in comparison with 00. The efficiency
measure, e0 will no longer necessarily approximate the inverted radial expansion factor
1 / O, as it would in an unrestricted model. Moreover this measure will depend on the
limits imposed for the proportional virtual outputs in an output oriented model (and on
the limits imposed for the proportional virtual inputs in an input oriented model).
As to the targets, two different situations arise for inputs and outputs. For both input
and output factors, the targets obtained can mean either an improvement or a
deterioration in the current level. However, for an input factor, its target will also
depend on the limits imposed ( c, and ci, ) for all the proportional virtual inputs.
Because of this characteristic, it would seem more appropriate to impose this kind of
weights restriction only on the virtual outputs for an output oriented model, and only on
the virtual inputs for a virtual input model. This procedure would be more in line with
'classical' DEA, where in the input oriented models, one focuses on maximal movement
towards the frontier through proportional reduction of inputs, whereas in the output
oriented models, one focuses on maximal movement via proportional augmentation of
outputs, but not both simultaneously. The choice of model will depend on which factors
under consideration are more easily controlled by the UOA.
In conclusion, this alternative makes the assessment of performance more 'lenient' to
the target UOA, in comparison with all other U0As. Also, in an output oriented model,
the restrictions applied to the target unit for the outputs affect the efficiency score and
output targets, whereas the restrictions applied to the inputs will affect the input targets
in an unconventional way.
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6.2.2 Proportional virtual weights restrictions apply to all U0As j
As seen in the previous section, applying proportional virtual weights restrictions
only to the target UOA actually biases the analysis in favour of the target unit, as the
other units have to endure tougher restrictions than the target UOA. The second
approach, however, proposes that all virtual weights restrictions should apply to all
U0As:
x..v.
a r  SY rjU r	 b r ,V r j and ci 	 cloVij
Yri ur	 E xu V
r=1	 i=1
This approach is computationally expensive, as for each input or output factor being
constrained, 2n inequalities are added to each linear program.
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Adding the weights restrictions to the multipliers formulation, it becomes:
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The envelopment formulation becomes:
1
— = max 0 0 + ar a ro —Ibr P ro +EIsi +els;
e0 	 r=1
	 r=1	 i=1	 r=1
S. t.
EXu A i +	 xo ..—I Ci y 0 - 5 0 +Idi t50 +Si 	= x Vi
j=1	 j=1	 i=1
	
i=1
Yrjo 
	 Yrjjj Yrjoaro	 roi= 1
ri =1 	 r=1	 r=1
i io
00
A
The targets:
*i =x 	 Ly u 	 —6;
j=1	 J=1	 i=1	 i=1
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As with the previous approach the efficiency score eo* will no longer necessarily
approximate the inverted radial expansion factor 1 / tro . Moreover, the interpretation of
the targets becomes increasingly difficult. The targets for a factor (either input or
output) become dependent, not only on the value of that factor for the target unit, but
also on the value of that factor for all the other units. Additionally, they become
I[Yri(ari — / a rari P ri +b
free
Si
s r
>0,
>0,
> 0,
>0,
> 0,
Vj
Vij
Vi
Vrj
Vr
+s; = 0, Vr
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dependent on the limits imposed for the virtuals (a,. and hr for outputs and c, and d,
for inputs) of all other factors.
The argument that this alternative is computationally expensive is probably the least
of its caveats as software and hardware become increasingly more powerful. This
approach applies each unit's restrictions to all the other units, and is thus applying the
'worst case' to each unit. As a consequence, and more worrying is the propensity of
this approach to lead to infeasible linear programs, as will be shown later in this
chapter.
6.2.3 Proportional virtual weights restrictions apply to target and to an 'average'
artificial UOA ja
In order to keep to the spirit of their second approach (6.2.2), but to avoid its
computational problems, the authors favour a third approach involving an artificial
'average' UOA. The logic behind it is that the proportional weights restriction should
not only apply to the target UOA, but to the average UOA in the set. The average
n x i n yr]
artificial U0A ja is defined as: (x,m yri )=(yH,,I,_), and the following
J=1 n J,, n
restrictions are added to each linear program in the initial approach (6.2.1):
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Thus, when this approach is implemented, each UOA is assessed with four additional
constraints for each factor being restricted:
1
— = min x,,
eo	 i=1
S. t.
3
E Yriour
r=1
_E Yr"	
•	
0,	 Vj
r=1
• ar,	 Vr
rioUr
• —br, Vr—yrioUr
• 0,	 Vi
• 0,	 Vi
tyri ur_ar Es En	 Ur 
0,	 Vr
:1 =1	 r=1	 j=1
s	 n Y •_ L -Yri ur +br (E	 0,	 Vr( j= , n	 r=1 j=1 n
• 0,	 Vi
• 0,	 Vi
• E,	 Vi
• E,	 VrUr
This averaging construct will penalise units with small or large, input or output
values, as it imposes a 'majority rule', which is clearly against the spirit of traditional
DEA.
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The envelopment formulation becomes:
1
— = max 0 0 +Ia ra r —Ibrp r +sEsi +elsr÷
eo	 r=1
	 r=1	 i=1	 r=1
S. t.
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The obtained targets are then:
*	 M	 *	 in
J	 flo
j=1	 i=1	 i=1
(*
	
m	
*	
m
—Iciyi-3*,.,,+Icli<
IYr,A*,= Y r,o (OO a: — Irr)-E
j=1
S
(
	
	
s
*
+ .yri a ra — Ea ra r - f3 r„ ± I brP:
ai
r=1	 r=1
Being a compromise between the first (6.2.1) and second (6.2.2) approaches, the
third approach has characteristics of both of them. As in the previous approaches, the
i=1	 i=1
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efficiency measure, eo will no longer necessarily approximate the inverted radial
expansion factor 1 / 0. And, the targets are increasingly difficult to interpret: not only
are they dependent on the current levels of input and output of the target UOA, they are
also dependent on the average value of all the units. As with the previous approach, this
alternative can also easily lead to infeasible linear programs, as will be shown later in
this chapter.
6.3 A New Classification of Virtual Weights Restrictions
Although inspired by Wong and Beasley's virtual weights restrictions, the virtual
weights restrictions used in this thesis are different. It will be shown that the
restrictions used present advantages relative to the ones proposed by Wong and Beasley.
Thompson et al. (1990) 6 proposed a classification of absolute weights restrictions
into simple absolute weights restrictions and assurance regions. They named ART the
absolute weights restrictions that incorporate into the analysis the relative ordering or
values of the inputs or outputs; and ARII restrictions that translate relationships across
the input and output divide. In fact, information about a numerical range to translate the
importance of the input or output factor as in simple direct restrictions on the
multipliers, in general, might be difficult to obtain, and an ordering of preferences might
be more suitable.
For this reason, in this section a similar classification for virtual weights restrictions
is proposed. That is, to have virtual weights restrictions equivalent to simple absolute
weights restrictions, as well as equivalent to assurance regions of type I (ARI) and of
type II (ARM. Thus the ordering of preferences by applicants to universities in Chapter
3 are translated by virtual weights restrictions of the type I. Indeed, most applicants
would not be able to specify explicit weights. The linking of teaching and research
outputs produced by a cost group in each university to the inputs available to that cost
group, used in Chapter 4, is an example of virtual weights restrictions of type II.
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All virtual weights restrictions, used in this thesis, can be described by the general
set of w./...t weights restrictions, applying to the target unit:
l aiw x,fo vi +1, b,w y „jo u r lc,„	 V w
i=1
	
r=1
This expression encapsulates the three different kinds of virtual weights restrictions,
of the new classification presented below.
6.3.1 Simple virtual weights restrictions
Simple virtual weights restrictions involve constraining the virtual of a single factor.
This approach is equivalent to using proportional virtual weights restrictions applied to
output virtuals in an output oriented model. If applied also to input virtuals in an output
oriented model, it will only be equivalent for the units that are efficient, and therefore
define the frontier. They are of the form:
a iw x;J.	 k,i= it
= 0,V r
for restricting the virtual input i'; and
b„yrio  k,„r = r'
= 0,V r r'
aiw=0,Vi
for restricting virtual output r'.
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6.3.2 Virtual ARI
Virtual ARI restrictions are equivalent to absolute weights restrictions ART. They
link virtual inputs or outputs to translate an ordering in preference. They are:
Ean„xuovi  0
i=1
b, = 0, Vr
to link virtual inputs, and
Eb,yrjo ur  0
r=1
an, = 0,Vi
to link virtual outputs.
6.3.3 Virtual ARII
Finally, virtual ARII restrictions are equivalent to absolute weights restrictions ARIL
They link the input-output divide. They can be translated by:
„,
E an,x0o vi +Ebn„yrio ur O,
i=1	 r=1
where at least one a , # 0 and one b„ # 0.
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6.4 Virtual Assurance Regions with Factor Linkages
6.4.1 Virtual weights restrictions apply to the target UOA jo
When combinations of different types of virtual weights restrictions are used in a
model, the multipliers formulation becomes:
—
1
 = min yx,vi
e0	 i=i
s.t.
Y rinUr
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y ritir
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The effect on the envelopment formulation is as below:
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And the targets:
= xuo (1 — Iaiw p w)—
j=1	 w=1
j=1 
rl A..* = rlo °
	 b,p*w)+ sr, Vr
If the model includes simple virtual weights restrictions, where either a minimum
and/ or maximum virtual is imposed for some or all factors, then the efficiency score eo
will no longer necessarily approximate the inverted radial expansion factor 1 / tro , as
the objective function contains a term with the new variable p w to be maximised. On
the other hand, if the model contains only virtual weights restrictions of the type AR!
and AR!!, the efficiency score will converge to be 1 / O. As for the targets, their
interpretation is easier than in the models with proportional virtual weights restrictions.
Either an improvement or deterioration of current levels of the factors is possible, but in
any case they can still be interpreted as a contraction or expansion of the current levels
of the factors of the target unit.
The same problems discussed, when proportional virtual weights restrictions apply
only to the target unit, occur. Restrictions applying to all units can be envisaged, as in
the next section.
199
xuo,
0,
free
Vi
Vr
> 0, Vj
> 0, Vw, j
> 0, Vi
> 0, Vr
S. t.
	
xij A	 w
	
+si
	
j=1	 j=1 w=1
n
	
Y do e° —11 Y 'I	 +1, b nvY rj P tvj
	
.1 =1	 j=1 w=1
0 0
P wj
6.4.2 Virtual weights restrictions apply to all UOA j
The multipliers formulation with the virtual weights restrictions applying to all
UOAs are as below:
1
— = min
e0	 i=1
S. t.
xijovi
Edo" r
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yX ul;
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y ritir
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0, Vj
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The effect on the envelopment formulation would be as below:
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n	 t
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200
And the targets:
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As in the previous section, if the model includes simple virtual weights restrictions,
where either a minimum and/ or maximum virtual is imposed for some or all factors,
then the efficiency score e
	
no longer necessarily approximate the inverted radial
expansion factor 1 / tro . On the other hand, if the model contains only virtual weights
restrictions of the type ARI and ARII, the efficiency score will converge to be 1 / 0.
However, the interpretation of the targets as a contraction or expansion of the current
levels of inputs or outputs, depending on the controller's preferences translated by the
weights restrictions imposed, no longer applies. The expression of the targets for the
UOA under analysis has a new term, that not only depends on the current levels of the
factor for the target unit but also for all the other units. However, it is still an
improvement from the targets obtained from the use of proportional virtual weights
restrictions applying to all units, in that the target for the factor under analysis does not
depend on the virtual limits imposed on all the other factors.
In conclusion, the use of virtual assurance regions applying to the target UOA jo
seems to be the best approach. This approach was widely used in this thesis. It allows
for the natural representation of preference structures; linkages between inputs and
outputs translating established patterns; and finally, the meaning of the efficiency score
and targets are most easily interpreted.
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6.5 Using Absolute Weights Restriction with a 'Virtual' Meaning
A problem with virtual weights restrictions is that they are UOA specific. Allen et al
(1997)7 have suggested that virtual weights restriction, as proposed by Wong and
Beasley's second alternative (6.2.2), could be converted into absolute weights
restrictions, in the following manner:
When considering a lower bound on output r, of a„ such as a,. y rf ur ,V j , clearly
the virtual restriction corresponding to the UOA with the lowest output level can be
binding. Similarly, if a virtual upper bound restriction were imposed on an output r, of
br, such as yo ur  br ,Vj , the binding virtual restriction would be the one
corresponding to the UOA with the largest input or output level. The authors conclude
that a more economical approach to Wong and Beasley's would be to add only the
required binding absolute restrictions. However, this alternative also presents some
problems.
Consider the example of a factor, whose importance should, according to the
controller, be between 5% and 15%. If the maximum value for this factor is 100, and
the minimum 1 (as is the case in some of The Times league table factors, for example),
the following expression is derived:
5% y ri u r 15% ,V j
Using Allen et al's 7 approach, it would lead to the following:
0.05	 0.15
	 < u < 	 <=> 0.05	 0.0015!
min(yrj )	 r max(Y ri)
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In conclusion, the alternative will easily lead to infeasible results for some 'intuitive'
set of bound on the virtuals. In fact, for the use of proportional virtual weights
restrictions to be feasible for all units in each linear program, the bounds have to be
carefully chosen, such that:
	
a	 br
	 ,r	< u < 	
min(y	
r
rj )	 max(yrj)
is feasible for all the units. This will mean:
• setting up the lower limit ar, and then calculate the upper limit hr as follows:
max(yri)
rar yrj ur 	 „ a .br,Vr,j
min(yrj)
• or, setting up the upper limit br, and then a,. is calculated as follows:
min(yri
ar < 	 „ br  yriur  br,Vr,j
max( yr./ )
Going back to our previous example, if ar were set at the 5% level, then hr would
have to be at least 500%, for the restriction to be feasible for all U0As in section 6.2.2.
If hr were set at the 15% level, then a,. could not exceed 0.15%. These results are
clearly no longer intuitive, as promoted by Wong and Beasley4.
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A similar reasoning for approach 6.2.3, where the restrictions apply to both target
and average unit simultaneously, can be made:
< < br
<=>
Y rio
a
r <	 <
Yrjo	 Yrja
ar	br
<	 <
u 
r
yariro
ar 
<
yrja
< 
b
r
u
Y rjo	 r Y rja
Ur
Y rj„	 Y rioU
Yrja Yrj
for each linear program.
Two situations arise, either the level of the output for the target unit is less than the
average, or greater than the average. However, for all linear programs to be feasible, in
either case, the same conclusion as for 6.2.2 is reached:
min(yrj)
a,. < 	  br .
max(Yd)
Wong and Beasley4 were optimistic that obtaining the limits, a,- and hr corresponding
to value judgements, was 'not too difficult', but the multicriteria decision making
(MCDM) perspective on the use of DEA disagrees (see, for instance, Belton and
Vickers, 1993 8; Stewart, 19969 ; Belton and Stewart, 1997 m). Recently, Belton and
Stewart l ° on a discussion on the interactions between MCDM and DEA, point out that
the DEA field could learn from the extensive experience of MCDM in eliciting and
working with value judgements. They consider that it is difficult to set meaningful
bounds on the weights, specially in the case of multiple input - multiple output
problems, except in terms of ratios. The realisation that using explicit boundaries for
weights is a difficult task, has favoured the use in this thesis of virtual ARs, rather than
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the simple direct restrictions on the virtuals. Moreover 'intuitive' limits expressed as a
percentage, as seen, can easily lead to infeasibility in approaches 6.2.2 and 6.2.3 above.
6.6 DEA and MCDM	 ,
The primary focus of DEA is that of comparing a number of U0As which differ in
the quantities of inputs which they consume and in the outputs they produce. The aim is
not, in general, to select a UOA, although it can be. The intention is, normally, to
identify those U0As which are inefficient, and to assess where the inefficiencies arise.
Nevertheless, the efficiency score also implies some form of rank ordering of the U0As.
This characteristic was used in Thompson et al" to solve a choice problem using DEA.
By contrast in MCDM, it is assumed that there are a number of alternatives between
which the controller has to decide, where each alternative is described by its
performance on each of a number of criteria. The aim of MCDM is to provide support
to the controller in the process of making the choice between alternatives, which may,
as in DEA, lead to some form of preference ranking. Several authors have shown that
the MCDM and DEA formulations coincide if inputs and outputs are viewed as criteria
for evaluating U0As, with minimisation of inputs and/ or maximisation of outputs as
associated objectives (see Doyle and Green, 1991"; Belton and Vickers, 1993 8 ; and
Stewart, 1990). The differences arise on how to suitably constrain the weight
flexibility in DEA, if the controller's judgemental values are to be meaningfully
incorporated.
Stewart (1996)9 has demonstrated the equivalence of the conventional DEA ratio
form of efficiency definition, and a distance to the Pareto frontier in a linear value
function model, which lends itself better to the value elicitation and sensitivity studies
which have been developed within the MCDM context. In MCDM terms, the aggregate
output and aggregate input are two high level criteria, of which the individual inputs and
outputs are sub-criteria. From either DEA or MCDM, Pareto optimality is the important
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consideration. Hence, if for any UOA j (or 'alternative') there exists another UOA Jo
such that xy _ x,10 ,\Ii and yrj yrjo ,Vr , then j is dominated by Jo; that is Jo is more
efficient (thus 'preferred to') J. It is useful, therefore, to examine for each UOA Jo
whether it is possible to find positive weights such that:
yyrjo ur — yxuo vi	 yrj r — yxu ,„ Vi
r=1	 i=1	 r=1	 i=1
in which case UOA Jo is efficient. The answer to this question can be given by the
following linear program:
s.t.
LY	 rj)14 r	 Jo X	 +  0,e
r=1	 i=1
I tlr +IVi =1
r=1	 i=1
,UrVj Dj  O
If the optimal value of the objective function is zero, then there exists a linear value
function for which the target UOA is optimal. The above model classifies U0As as
efficient or not, but does not include any definition of the degree of efficiency. Though,
if the aim of the analysis is ultimately to seek a single 'best' UOA (a choice problem, as
in Chapter 3, The Applicant's Perpective), then the degree of efficiency is irrelevant,
since only efficient U0As can be optimal.
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Other differences from the traditional DEA approach are:
Firstly, the MCDM approach proposes that the input and output measures should be
scaled, in such a way that the maximum value is some specified value, for example 100
units. Such scaling would facilitate the interpretation of the results, as it avoids the
problem with directly restricting the multipliers, i.e. absolute weights restrictions, in
that they are no longer dependent on the units of measurement of the inputs and outputs.
Secondly, they also propose the standardisation of the weights ( Zs 1 U,. 	 V,r= 	 i=1
for instance) in order to facilitate judgement. With standardised scales, it is easier for
the controller to consider possible trade-offs between the factors. These two measures, 
in fact, pre-empt the need for the use of virtual weights restrictions.
Traditional DEA is a technique for extracting the maximum objective information
concerning differences in performance of the different units par excellence. MCDM,
instead, has developed a considerable body of knowledge concerning the assessment of
value judgements and the role of sensitivity analysis in supporting such judgements.
The inclusion of weights restrictions is an exercise in value judgement, but it still
only generates one single efficiency measure. This is in contradiction with the
uncertainty in the mind of the controller as to what weights best reflect the relative
importance of the individual inputs and outputs, and a single measure cannot capture the
extent of this uncertainty.
Doyle and Green" proposed the use of cross-efficiency in DEA, to overcome the
problem. Cross-efficiencies are the efficiencies determined for each U0A by using the
optimal weights from the other units in turn. The average of any given UOA can be
thought of as the average evaluation from each of the other U0As. Cross-efficiencies
can be used also in a restricted model, and will give a measure of the 'stability' of the
results. Thus a unit which has high cross-efficiencies will be a good all round unit,
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whereas a unit with low cross-efficiencies, albeit efficient, might be performing very
well in a particular factor, but not so good in other factors.
Belton and Vickers8 suggested an ad-hoc sensitivity analysis based on a visual
,
interactive approach, involving the controller. The controller can change graphically
the weights restrictions applying to the different factors in the problem, and then
visualise how that affects the positioning of a unit in relation to the frontier of an XY
scatter plot (aggregate input by the aggregate output) of all U0As under analysis.
Stewart9 proposed a more systematic approach, that also overcomes the
acknowledged problem in DEA of multiple solutions corresponding to alternative
weights vectors. Again the approach will suit both unrestricted, and restricted DEA
models. It is based on the fact that any probability distribution over weights implies
distribution for the efficiencies of each UOA. These distributions are easily obtained by
Monte Carlo methods. The approach allows users to obtain a direct picture of what the
uncertainties in weights imply. The upper bound of the distribution of efficiencies still
give the standard DEA solution, while the remainder of the distribution gives a clearer
picture of how extreme or implausible the weights need to be for any given degree of
efficiency to be attributed to a particular UOA. For example, two U0As might both be
efficient, but one might be efficient for almost all allowable weights, whereas the other
is efficient only for weights in a subset of very low probability. An even more
interesting insight might arise if one UOA is efficient, but only for unlikely weight
combinations, while another is inefficient, but with an efficiency never far below 1.
This awareness would be difficult to obtain from the standard DEA analysis.
6.7 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter a new classification for virtual weights restrictions is proposed. In
general, virtual weights restrictions are easier to interpret than proportional virtual
weights restrictions. Because of the problems described, in this thesis the concept of
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assurance regions, rather than imposing bounds on virtuals is often preferred. It is
shown how the concept of assurance regions in absolute weights restrictions can be
imported into virtual weights restrictions. It is concluded that the use of virtual
,
assurance regions applying to the target UOA Jo is the best approach for the natural
representation of preference structures and to translate established patterns across the
input-output divide. Also, the meaning of the efficiency score and targets in this
approach are most easily interpreted. For this reason, this was the approach used
throughout this thesis.
Soon after the first applications of the DEA technique to real situations, people were
faced with the problem that the efficiency of certain U0As was dependent upon rather
unlikely sets of weights. Restrictions on the weights were thus introduced into
'classical' DEA to curb its total flexibility, and obtain more sensible results. A problem
with placing absolute restrictions on the weights though, is that these will be dependent
on the units of measurement of the inputs and outputs, and will consequently be difficult
to devise.
The latter problem was overcome with the introduction of virtual weights
restrictions. Virtuals are dimensionless and give a measure of the importance of the
factor in the measurement of efficiency. It is easier to think of meaningful virtuals,
rather than absolute weights. This characteristic becomes even more important when
there is an external decision maker to the UOA, the controller, who is trying to impose a
preference structure on the evaluation of the U0As.
The consequences of the use of absolute weights restrictions on the efficiency
measurement, targets and peer units has been extensively reviewed by Allen et al. 5 , but
the consequences of the use of virtual weights restrictions has been less explored in the
literature.
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Wong and Beasley4 proposed a judicious method of constraining the virtuals based
on proportions: the controller can impose a range on the virtual factors in terms of
percentage 'importance'. The approach is not without fault, however. Virtual weights
,
restrictions are UOA specific, and one has to decide to which units the restrictions
apply. Applying them solely on the target UOA, means that the other U0As are being
imposed meaningless virtuals. At first thought, imposing weights restrictions on all the
units might solve the problem. However, in this chapter it is shown that the imposition
of 'unfair' restrictions also happens in this case. Moreover, this approach is
computationally expensive, and more worrying, it very often leads to infeasibility. A
third compromise approach does not seem to alleviate the latter problem. Moreover, the
targets obtained for inefficient units are increasingly difficult to interpret.
The use of virtual weights restrictions applying to the target unit only, as opposed to
proportional virtual weights restrictions, are advocated in this thesis. They still present
the problem that the target unit is evaluated in a more lenient manner than the other
units. However, the interpretation of the targets is more meaningful and it does not lead
to the infeasibility problems of the use of proportional weights restrictions applying to
all units.
Allen et al's 7 suggestion of transforming proportional virtual weights restrictions into
absolute ones often leads to infeasibility. However, the idea would be very useful in
transforming simple virtual weights restrictions, when only lower or upper bounds have
been determined for each factor, but not both simultaneously.
The perspective of traditionally MCDM authors on DEA has produced some recent
insights into the problem of weights restrictions. DEA used as an MCDM tool is able to
screen a number of alternatives in an MCDM problem, by extracting a maximum of
'objective' information. On the other hand, the MCDM researchers suggest that the
introduction of bounds on weights in DEA could benefit by the body of understanding
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concerning the assessment of value judgements and the role of sensitivity analysis in
supporting such judgements, developed in the MCDM field.
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7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
7.1 Summary
The objective of Chapter 1 was to give the background of the higher education sector
in the UK at present and its history. It introduces the drive for performance
measurement in higher education, and the motivation for the dissertation: bringing in
the stakeholders perspectives on performance measurement in UK universities using
data envelopment analysis. The method data envelopment analysis is then described.
In Chapter 2 the traditional use of performance indicators and peer assessment is
reviewed and the use of DEA, instead of parametric techniques, is justified. The review
of the literature on the use of DEA in performance measurement in universities
catalogues three kinds of studies: comparing universities; comparing university
departments; and appraisals of individuals within the university (staff and students).
The opportunity to use DEA in a somewhat different way than previously is identified.
The novel proposed framework integrates in the same analysis the perspectives of three
different levels of stakeholders. Firstly, the perspective of the applicant in the process
of choosing a university to apply to; secondly, the perspective of the State that funds
and evaluates university performance; and finally the institutional perspective, which
includes the views of the latter two external evaluations placed on it.
In Chapter 3 the applicant's perspective is presented. The use of DEA in university
selection is compared to existing methods and a new approach is proposed that uses
DEA. The approach devised recognises the different values of students and is
empirically tested in a case study at a comprehensive school. In a first part, the process
of decision making is looked at in a retrospective way, making use of students that had
already undergone the experience of applying to university. In a second part, the insight
gained from the first part is used to build a model that would help students in the
process of choosing a university to apply to. Chapter 3 clearly deals with a choice
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problem, and the link with MCDM is first approached. Finally, a comprehensive
decision support system that includes DEA for university selection is arrived at.
Chapter 4 also deals with an external summative evaluation on university
'
performance, from the perspective of the State. The relationship between the State and
higher education over time is described, the current operational model explained and the
future trends outlined. In order to measure performance, according to the mission and
objectives of the state/ funding councils, a review of their three main remits is
undertaken. The contribution of DEA to inform the State/ funding councils in their
remit is then discussed. Two different kinds of models are proposed: to inform the
assessment of quality, and to inform the resource allocation separately for teaching and
research, as is the current practice of the funding councils. The conceptual link between
the two different kinds of models is then described. An assessment of the total
performance of the university then follows, i.e. with teaching and research together,
from two different perspectives: accountability and autonomy from State funds; and a
more traditional evaluation of efficiency. The single difference between the two
approaches is the positioning of earned income in the input/ output divide. These two
approaches reflect two different performances, which have different ideological
supporters. Finally, a technical problem of taking account of subject mix factor in the
measurement of performance is dealt with, by linking the input/ output divide by means
of weights restrictions. An application to the university sector for the academic year
1995/96 is incomplete due to problems of data availability, which have only allowed for
some of the models proposed to be solved.
Chapter 5 shows how institutions can turn performance measurement to their own
benefit, by using it as a formative exercise to understand the different expectations of
them, by the two previous external evaluations. A methodology for institutional
performance management is proposed that takes into account the external/ internal
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interfaces: the applicant/ institution, and state/ institution interfaces. The methodology
is illustrated with an application to the University of Warwick.
Virtual weights restrictions are widely used in this thesis, a reflection on its uses is
offered in Chapter 6. The reasons for mainly using virtual weights restrictions instead
of absolute weights restrictions are explained. However, although the consequences of
the use of absolute weights restrictions on the efficiency score and targets of a DEA
model have been explored elsewhere, the same was not true for the use of restrictions on
the virtuals. A new classification of virtuals weights restrictions is presented. The use
of proportional weights restrictions is reviewed, and the reasons for using simple virtual
weights and virtual assurance regions in this thesis are justified. Alternatives to using
virtual weights restrictions are considered, namely using absolute weights restrictions
with a virtual meaning. In recognition of levels of decision making at the unit, and
external to the unit, the use of the terms unit of assessment (UOA) and controller is
proposed. The relationship between DEA and MCDM in this domain is elaborated
upon, following an initial reference in Chapter 3.
In the next sections the conclusions derived from the thesis and a discussion of the
methodology used in this thesis are presented, as well as suggestions for further
research.
7.2 Conclusions
7.2.1 The importance of bringing in the perspectives of different stakeholders
The first main conclusion of the present thesis was that previous DEA studies in the
area of performance measurement in universities failed to address the existence of
different stakeholders interested in performance measurement in universities, and the
emergence of interactions between the different perspectives. The approach proposed
sought to model the different perspectives and their interactions using DEA with
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weights restrictions. The stakeholders multi-perspective approach is a contribution to
the methodology of organisational performance measurement.
7.2.2 The contribution of DEA in choice problems
DEA with weights restrictions is an appropriate methodology to deal with choice
problems. Chapter 3 shows the contribution of DEA in choice problems, by focusing on
the evaluation of universities from the perspective of the prospective student. DEA with
weights restrictions is capable of recognising differences in institutional mission
through allowing variability in the weights, and at the same time, it recognises the
priorities of applicants, by the introduction of weights restrictions. DEA is also more
flexible, as opposed to popular methodologies, such as The Times', that assign common
values to all decision makers. Applicant's to universities differ in their objectives and
emphases on different criteria when evaluating universities. DEA allows for
customisation to suit individual decision makers. DEA also proved to be an effective
technique for the aggregation of a considerable amount of information, as part of a more
comprehensive decision support system.
7.2.3 Subject mix handled by virtual ARII
Handling subject mix in the context of university performance measurement has long
been a problem. A procedure is required which ensures that universities with low cost
subjects do not have an unfair advantage in the assessment of performance. In the past,
DMUs have been divided into different comparable sets, and assessed separately. In
Chapter 4 a solution for taking into account subject mix in universities is arrived at by
linking inputs and outputs across the input/ output divide. This represents a novel
application of the method devised by Thanassoulis et al.% which prevents units from
taking undue advantage of weight flexibility contrary to the known links between
certain inputs and outputs. It is the first time it is used in the context of university
performance measurement. Also, the concept was translated into virtual weights
restrictions, instead of the absolute weights restrictions used in the original application.
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7.2.4 Inadequate data availability policy
In Chapter 4 it is demonstrated that DEA could inform peer judgement in the
assessment of quality, bringing in a much desired objectivity into the current process.
Moreover DEA could inform the allocation of resources on a value-for-money
approach. A theoretical link between DEA models of quality assessment and resource
allocation, which would be an improvement on the current methodologies used by the
funding councils, is proposed.
The proposed methodology could not be tested because the performance measures
necessary were not available. The results of the models that could be run, relating to the
total performance of universities (i.e. teaching and research) are not completely robust,
because different measures are taken at different levels of aggregation. In Chapter 5,
when considering the institutional perspective, only analysis at subject level is
meaningful, however most relevant data is not to be found at subject level.
The policy of data availability at the time of the thesis fails in three distinct points:
• the appropriateness of the measures available;
• the aggregation at subject level; and
• the aggregation at cost level.
As to the appropriateness of the measures available, it is for the universities to agree
on a set of relevant measures that will help them monitor their performance. So far, the
university sector has failed to reach a consensus on the data that should be collected and
made available. However, if universities do not take ownership of the issue of
performance measures, external evaluators will. In that case, it will be difficult for
institutions to argue their case. As to the level of aggregation regarding cost levels, the
funding councils have already planned to use a consistent aggregation at cost code level
for all the data they collect. In the future, it will thus be possible to make the analysis
proposed in this thesis at cost level and subject level.
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7.2.5 A more appropriate way of comparing departments within a university
This thesis presents a novel approach for the comparison of departments of different
subjects within the same institution. Departing from previous studies, which compare
different subject departments directly, in this approach departments are firstly judged
against those of the same discipline in other universities to ensure comparability; and
then their performance, thus assessed, compared to the other departments of the same
university. The methodology proposed for institutional performance management,
enables the institution to allocate resources among departments taking into
consideration, not only its own mission and objectives, but also how those interact with
the two external evaluations placed on it. It basically integrates the three different
levels of stakeholders perspectives.
7.2.6 The usefulness of virtual assurance regions
Following a critique of Wong and Beasley's proposed method for constraining the
virtuals in DEA, a new classification scheme for virtual weights restrictions is
presented, which brings the concept of assurance regions into virtual weights
restrictions. It is shown that the use of simple virtual restrictions and virtual assurance
regions as used in this thesis are preferable to the use of the more generally advocated
proportional virtual weights restrictions.
It is concluded that the use of virtual assurance regions applying to the target UOA
Jo is the best approach for the natural representation of preference structures and to
translate established patterns between the input-output divide. Also, the meaning of the
efficiency score and targets in this approach are more easily interpreted.
7.3 Discussion of Methodology
This thesis is eclectic in its nature. It not only aims to contribute to the broad area of
organisational performance measurement, but also to the more technical research area of
DEA. The hybrid essence of the thesis, however, does not prevent its coherence. The
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running theme of the dissertation is that the application of DEA to concrete situations,
necessarily confronts the user of DEA with the organisational implications of a
performance measurement exercise. Both aspects, technical and organisational, should
'
be dealt with in any assessment of performance. Thus, this thesis is concerned with
establishing a theoretical framework for the measurement of performance in universities
using DEA.
Applied research of this nature raises some issues. What distinguishes this sort of
research from consultancy? What are the ethical implications of taking the viewpoint of
the different stakeholders involved? Is the researcher working for any of the
stakeholders?
The applied research in this thesis is indeed different from consultancy work. None
of the stakeholders mentioned in the thesis has commissioned any of the work, nor do
they necessarily condone its results. The most fundamental difference, however, is the
generalisability of the findings. The stakeholders multi-perspective approach is a
contribution to the methodology of organisational performance measurement, as
mentioned above. The approach can be used in other higher education systems, with
other stakeholders. Moreover, it can be used in other multi-level organisations
undergoing performance measurement exercises.
7.4 Suggestions for Further Research
The differences in performance of different universities, depending on age, location,
and structure of funding should be assessed when better data becomes available. The
results would have possibly important consequences for state policy decisions. It would
also be interesting to examine performance over time, bringing in novel research in
dynamic DEA.
As to the incorporation of quality into DEA models, more research is needed on how
to deal with index measures, which are typically used to describe qualitative aspects of
220
performance. If some qualitative aspects cannot be meaningfully dealt within the DEA
model itself, the relationship between quantitative and qualitative analyses and how to
integrate the two in a coherent model should be further explored.
Finally the relationship between DEA and MCDM holds much promise, specially in
eliciting weights from the decision maker when judging what we would call units of
assessment, rather than DMUs, in choice problems.
Given the multiplicity of applications in the 20 years after the original DEA
publication by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes in 1978, more is to be expected in DEA
research, as applications to real problems demand even more answers, and thus push the
boundaries of theoretical knowledge.
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